Economic duress in English law

Economic duress is the doctrine by which English law permits a party to avoid a contract, or recover money paid, where that party’s consent was obtained by illegitimate economic pressure rather than by physical threats or coercion of the person. It occupies a critical position at the intersection of contract, restitution, and commercial morality. A party who agrees to terms only because he has been subjected to an unlawful threat which leaves him with no practical alternative has not truly consented, and the law will not hold him to his apparent bargain.

The doctrine is relatively young. While duress to the person has ancient roots, the common law’s recognition that economic pressure – a threat to breach a contract, to withhold goods, or to damage a party’s business interests – could vitiate consent did not emerge until the latter decades of the twentieth century. Its development has been marked by significant judicial creativity, periodic uncertainty, and a sustained search for a principled distinction between the hard commercial bargaining which the law tolerates and the coercive conduct which it does not.

This guide traces that development from the early authorities through to the Supreme Court’s landmark restatement in Times Travel (UK) Ltd v Pakistan International Airlines Corporation [2021] UKSC 40, which represents the most authoritative modern treatment of the doctrine and which resolved a controversy that had persisted for over four decades.

1. Historical foundations: from duress to the person to duress of goods

1.1 The original scope of duress

The common law recognised duress as a vitiating factor from an early period, but its scope was narrowly confined. In its original form, duress was limited to actual or threatened violence to the person – duress per minas. A contract procured by threats of physical harm was voidable at the instance of the coerced party. The doctrine required an unlawful threat, the absence of any reasonable alternative, and a causal connection between the threat and the entry into the contract.

1.2 Duress of goods

The extension of the doctrine beyond threats to the person proved slow and contested. In Skeate v Beale (1841) 11 Ad & El 983, the court held that a contract could not be avoided on the ground of duress of goods – that is, a threat to seize or detain the claimant’s property. This decision, which reflected a rigid adherence to the categories of the old forms of action, was subsequently recognised as anomalous and was effectively overruled by the Privy Council in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 and by the House of Lords in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ Federation (The Universe Sentinel) [1983] 1 AC 366.

Even before those decisions, however, the law had long recognised a right to recover money paid under compulsion – colore officii or under protest – as money had and received. In Astley v Reynolds (1731) 2 Strange 915, the claimant recovered money paid to a pawnbroker who refused to return pledged goods except upon payment of an excessive sum. The basis of recovery was not contractual avoidance but restitution: the payment was involuntary and could be recovered as of right. This line of authority – restitutionary rather than contractual in character — provided an important doctrinal precursor to the modern law of economic duress.

2. The recognition of economic duress

2.1 Occidental Worldwide Investment Corporation v Skibs A/S Avanti (The Siboen and The Sibotre) [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 293

The first explicit recognition in English law that economic pressure could constitute duress sufficient to vitiate a contract came in the judgment of Kerr J in The Siboen and The Sibotre. Charterers of two vessels falsely represented that they were in financial difficulty and threatened to default on the charterparties unless the hire rates were reduced. The shipowners agreed under protest.

Kerr J held that, as a matter of principle, “if I should be satisfied that the agreement … was caused by what may be called economic duress, then that contract … would be voidable and could be set aside.” Although the claim failed on the facts – the owners had not been subjected to sufficient pressure – the decision was seminal in its acceptance that duress was not confined to threats of physical violence. Kerr J reasoned that there was no logical basis for distinguishing between threats to the person and threats to property or economic interests; the essential question in each case was whether the victim’s will had been “coerced.”

2.2 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614

The Privy Council in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long confirmed that economic duress was a recognised ground for avoiding a contract under English law. Lord Scarman, delivering the judgment of the Board, identified the critical question:

“There is nothing contrary to principle in recognising economic duress as a factor which may render a contract voidable, provided always that the basis of such recognition is that it must amount to a coercion of will, which vitiates consent.”

Lord Scarman identified a number of factors relevant to determining whether duress was established:

1. Did the person claiming to be coerced protest?
2. Did he have an alternative course open to him, such as an adequate legal remedy?
3. Was he independently advised?
4. Did he take steps to avoid the contract after entering into it?

These factors were not presented as a formal test but as practical indicia of whether the pressure had in fact vitiated consent. The appeal failed because the claimant had not demonstrated coercion of the will; the agreement was the product of commercial pressure, which the law does not treat as duress.

2.3 Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers’ Federation (The Universe Sentinel) [1983] 1 AC 366

The Universe Sentinel was the first case in which the House of Lords directly addressed the doctrine of economic duress. The ITF had “blacked” the appellants’ vessel in the port of Milford Haven, preventing it from sailing, unless the owners made various payments including a contribution to the union’s welfare fund. The owners paid under protest and then sought recovery.

The House of Lords held that the payment to the welfare fund was recoverable as having been made under economic duress. The critical question, as Lord Diplock explained, was whether the pressure exerted was illegitimate:

“The rationale is that his apparent consent was induced by pressure exercised upon him by that other party which the law does not regard as legitimate, with the consequence that the consent is treated in law as revocable unless approbated either expressly or by implication after the illegitimate pressure has ceased to operate on his mind.”

Lord Diplock thus shifted the doctrinal focus from the subjective question of whether the victim’s will had been “overborne” (language which had been used in Pao On) towards the objective question of the legitimacy of the pressure. This reorientation proved foundational. Lord Scarman, in a separate speech, agreed that the critical issue was the nature of the pressure, not merely its effect on the victim’s mind.

3. The elements of economic duress

Following The Universe Sentinel and the authorities which built upon it, the doctrine of economic duress crystallised around the following elements, though their precise formulation has been the subject of continuing refinement.

3.1 Illegitimate pressure

The central inquiry is whether the defendant exerted illegitimate pressure upon the claimant. Not all pressure is illegitimate. The common law accepts that commercial parties routinely drive hard bargains, exploit superior bargaining positions, and exercise contractual rights for self-interested purposes. The question is whether the pressure crosses the line from permissible commercial conduct to unlawful coercion.

The clearest cases of illegitimacy involve a threat to commit a wrong – typically, a threat to breach a contract. In B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419, a contractor threatened not to erect exhibition stands unless the client paid additional sums to meet the contractor’s workers’ demands. The Court of Appeal held that the threat to breach the contract constituted economic duress.

Similarly, in Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] QB 833, a carrier who had agreed to deliver goods to Woolworths at a stated rate per carton threatened to cease deliveries unless a minimum charge per load was agreed. Tucker J held that the renegotiated agreement was voidable for economic duress: the carrier’s threat to breach the existing contract, combined with Kafco’s inability to find an alternative carrier in time to meet its obligations to Woolworths, left Kafco with no practical alternative but to submit.

3.2 The absence of a practical alternative

A recurrent theme in the case law is the requirement that the coerced party had no reasonable or practical alternative but to submit to the pressure. This is not identical to the proposition that the threat must have been the sole cause of the claimant’s entry into the contract, but it is closely related to it.

In Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 620, Mance J (as he then was) emphasised that the availability of alternative remedies – including the ability to sue for breach of contract — is a highly material consideration. Where a claimant has a readily available legal remedy, the conclusion that he had “no practical alternative” will be difficult to sustain.

3.3 Causation

The pressure must be a significant cause of the claimant’s entry into the contract or the making of the payment. In Huyton SA v Peter Cremer, Mance J considered whether the “but for” test was appropriate and concluded that, while the pressure need not be the sole cause, it must be shown that the duress was at least a reason for the claimant’s decision. He preferred the formulation that the illegitimate pressure must be “a significant cause” – a test subsequently adopted in Carillion Construction Ltd v Felix (UK) Ltd [2001] BLR 1.

3.4 Protest and affirmation

A party who submits to duress and then takes no steps to avoid the transaction may be taken to have affirmed it. As Lord Scarman noted in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, the presence or absence of protest, and the speed with which steps were taken to set the agreement aside, are important evidential factors. Excessive delay may bar the claim.

4. DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo-Services ASA [2000] BLR 530

The most frequently cited synthesis of the pre-Times Travel case law was provided by Dyson J (as he then was) in DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo-Services ASA. He identified the following ingredients of actionable economic duress:

“(1) There must be pressure (a) whose practical effect is that there is compulsion on, or a lack of practical choice for, the victim, (b) which is illegitimate, and (c) which is a significant cause inducing the claimant to enter into the contract.

(2) In determining whether there has been illegitimate pressure, the court takes into account a range of factors including:
(a) whether there has been an actual or threatened breach of contract;
(b) whether the person allegedly exerting the pressure has acted in good or bad faith;
(c) whether the victim had any realistic practical alternative;
(d) whether the victim protested at the time;
(e) whether he affirmed and sought to rely on the contract.”

This summary has been cited with approval in numerous subsequent decisions and represents a reliable practical checklist, though it must now be read in light of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Times Travel.

5. Times Travel (UK) Ltd v Pakistan International Airlines Corporation [2021] UKSC 40

5.1 The facts

Times Travel is the leading modern authority on economic duress and the only decision of the Supreme Court directly addressing the doctrine. Times Travel, a small travel agency, derived almost all of its revenue from selling PIA tickets. PIA gave lawful notice reducing Times Travel’s ticket allocation and commission. PIA then offered to restore the allocation on condition that Times Travel entered into a new agreement which included a waiver of claims for unpaid commission. Times Travel, having no practical alternative, signed the new agreement.

The central question was whether a lawful act – the exercise of a contractual right – could constitute illegitimate pressure sufficient to found a claim in economic duress.

5.2 The judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Times Travel’s appeal, holding that PIA’s conduct did not amount to economic duress. However, the Justices divided significantly on the proper doctrinal analysis of lawful act duress.

Lord Hodge (with whom Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Kitchin agreed) held:

1. Economic duress is established where there is (a) illegitimate pressure (b) which is a significant cause of the claimant’s entry into the contract.
2. Where the threat is of an unlawful act (such as a breach of contract), the question of illegitimacy is “relatively straightforward” — though not every threat to breach a contract will constitute duress, and the court must consider all the circumstances.
3. Where the threat is of a lawful act, the doctrine of economic duress applies in “very limited” circumstances. Lord Hodge identified two situations:
   • Where the defendant uses knowledge of the claimant’s criminal activity to obtain a contract – “the blackmail or bad faith demand case” (Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797).
   • Beyond this, Lord Hodge was not persuaded that any broader category of lawful act duress had been established.
4. There is “no general principle” that a lawful act threat made in bad faith amounts to economic duress. The law must be developed cautiously and incrementally.

Lord Burrows (with whom Lady Arden agreed) took a broader view:

1. The categories of lawful act economic duress should not be confined to the blackmail case.
2. The appropriate test is whether the defendant made a demand in bad faith – that is, a demand which the defendant did not genuinely believe it was entitled to make, coupled with the use of illegitimate means to compel compliance.
3. Lord Burrows drew on the analogy with the criminal law of blackmail (Theft Act 1968, section 21), under which a demand with menaces is criminal if the defendant does not believe he has reasonable grounds for making the demand, or does not believe that the use of menaces is a proper means of reinforcing it.
4. On the facts, however, PIA genuinely believed it was entitled to negotiate as it did. The claim therefore failed even under the broader test.

5.3 The significance of Times Travel

Times Travel is significant for several reasons:

First, it confirmed that economic duress is a recognised doctrine of English law, applicable to both unlawful and lawful act threats, but emphasised the narrow scope of the latter category.

Second, the majority’s approach (Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Kitchin) is cautious and restrictive: lawful act duress is essentially confined to the blackmail paradigm unless and until the law is developed incrementally.

Third, the minority’s approach (Lord Burrows and Lady Arden) offers a broader framework based on bad faith demands, which would potentially capture a wider range of commercially oppressive conduct. Although this did not command a majority, it represents a significant intellectual contribution and may influence future development.

Fourth, the decision clarified that the exercise of a lawful contractual right, even for the purpose of extracting concessions from a weaker party, does not without more constitute economic duress. This is of considerable commercial importance: parties are entitled to exercise their contractual rights for self-interested purposes, and the mere fact that the effect is to place the other party under severe commercial pressure does not vitiate consent.

6. Lawful act duress: boundaries and controversies

6.1 The problem defined

Lawful act duress presents the most difficult conceptual problem in this area of law. Where the defendant threatens to do something he is perfectly entitled to do – exercise a break clause, reduce a supply, withdraw custom – but does so for the purpose of extracting a concession to which he has no independent entitlement, the question is whether the law should intervene.

The difficulty was identified by Lord Atkin in Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797, where he observed that the threat to do a lawful act could constitute the “menaces” required for the offence of demanding money with menaces (the forerunner of blackmail). The dividing line, Lord Atkin held, depended on whether the demand coupled with the threat was made bona fide: was the demandant genuinely asserting a right, or was he exploiting his position to extract something to which he knew he had no claim?

6.2 CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714

The leading pre-Times Travel authority on lawful act duress was CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd. Gallaher, the sole distributor of popular cigarette brands, mistakenly invoiced CTN for goods which had been stolen after delivery but before acceptance. CTN paid the invoice under protest, fearing that Gallaher would withdraw its credit facilities (as it was contractually entitled to do). The Court of Appeal held that lawful act duress was not made out.

Steyn LJ (as he then was) accepted that lawful act duress was “conceptually possible” but held that it could not be established in a case involving arm’s length commercial dealings where the defendant was exercising its contractual rights. He emphasised the need for caution:

“Outside the field of protected relationships, and in a purely commercial context, it is not easy to see the scope for a doctrine of lawful act duress.”

This decision stood for nearly thirty years as the principal authority limiting the scope of lawful act duress, and its reasoning was substantially endorsed by the majority in Times Travel.

6.3 The question left open

Times Travel did not definitively close the door on the future development of lawful act duress beyond the blackmail paradigm. Lord Hodge acknowledged that the law in this area should develop “cautiously and incrementally” and did not exclude the possibility that further categories might be recognised. Lord Burrows’ broader test based on bad faith demands remains available as a framework for future argument, particularly in cases involving an inequality of bargaining power so extreme, or a demand so unconscionable, that the blackmail analogy may prove insufficient.

7. Unlawful act duress: the core doctrine

7.1 Threats to breach a contract

The paradigm case of economic duress – and the most commonly encountered in practice — involves a threat to breach an existing contract unless the other party agrees to new terms. The authorities are numerous:

• North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd (The Atlantic Baron) [1979] QB 705: A shipbuilder threatened not to complete construction of a vessel unless the buyer agreed to an increase of 10 per cent in the contract price. Mocatta J held that the agreement to pay the increase was procured by economic duress, but the claim failed because the buyer had affirmed the contract by continuing to pay without protest for eight months after delivery.
• B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419: A threat not to erect exhibition stands unless additional sums were paid constituted economic duress.
• Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] QB 833: A carrier’s threat to cease deliveries unless minimum charges were agreed was economic duress.
• Carillion Construction Ltd v Felix (UK) Ltd [2001] BLR 1: A subcontractor’s threat to withhold deliveries of cladding unless the main contractor made additional payments was held to constitute economic duress. Dyson J applied the DSND Subsea framework and found that the claimant had been left with no practical alternative.

7.2 Third-party threats

Economic duress is not confined to bilateral situations. In Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers’ Federation (The Evia Luck) [1992] 2 AC 152, the House of Lords held that a contract could be avoided for duress even though the pressure was exerted by a third party, provided the other contracting party had actual or constructive knowledge of the duress.

7.3 Other unlawful threats

Threats to commit a tort, to commit a crime, or to institute or continue proceedings in bad faith may also constitute the illegitimate pressure required for economic duress, though such cases are less common in reported authority. In Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC (The Cenk Kaptanoglu) [2012] EWHC 273 (Comm), Cooke J held that a wrongful refusal to perform a charterparty, coupled with demands for additional payments, constituted economic duress.

8. Remedy: voidability and restitution

8.1 The contract is voidable, not void

A contract procured by economic duress is voidable, not void ab initio. The coerced party has an election: he may affirm the contract and be bound by it, or he may avoid it. Until avoidance, the contract remains valid and enforceable.

This has important consequences. Third-party rights acquired before avoidance are protected. And the right to avoid may be lost through affirmation, lapse of time, or the inability to achieve restitutio in integrum.

8.2 Restitution of money paid

Where money has been paid under economic duress, the payee may recover it in a claim in unjust enrichment. The basis of restitution is that the payment was vitiated by duress and the defendant has been unjustly enriched at the claimant’s expense. This was the basis of recovery in The Universe Sentinel [1983] 1 AC 366, where the House of Lords held that the payments made to the ITF were recoverable as money had and received.

The relationship between the contractual remedy (avoidance) and the restitutionary remedy (recovery of money paid) was considered by Mance J in Huyton SA v Peter Cremer [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 620, who confirmed that the two remedies are analytically distinct but will often operate in tandem.

8.3 The bar of affirmation

A party who, with knowledge of the facts giving rise to the duress and after the pressure has ceased, unequivocally elects to treat the contract as subsisting will be taken to have affirmed it and will lose the right to avoid. The Atlantic Baron [1979] QB 705 remains the leading illustration: the eight-month delay in seeking relief after the duress had ceased was fatal to the claim.

9. The relationship with other doctrines

9.1 Economic duress and consideration

The development of economic duress was closely linked to the doctrine of consideration, and particularly to the question of whether a promise to perform an existing contractual duty could constitute good consideration for a new promise by the other party. In Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317, Lord Ellenborough held that a promise to pay sailors additional wages for completing a voyage (after some crew members had deserted) was unenforceable for want of consideration: the sailors were already bound to complete the voyage.

Stilk v Myrick functioned for nearly two centuries as a crude mechanism for policing coercive renegotiations. In Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1, the Court of Appeal relaxed the consideration requirement, holding that a promise to pay additional sums to a subcontractor could be supported by a “practical benefit” to the promisor, provided there was no economic duress. Russell LJ stated expressly that the doctrine of economic duress now provided a more appropriate and refined tool for distinguishing between legitimate renegotiations and coerced ones than the blunt instrument of the consideration rule.

The relationship between Williams v Roffey and economic duress was recently revisited by the Court of Appeal in MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 553, and the Supreme Court in the same case [2018] UKSC 24 touched upon it obliquely in the context of oral variation and no oral modification clauses, without disturbing the Roffey framework.

9.2 Economic duress and undue influence

Economic duress and undue influence are distinct doctrines, though they share the common feature of vitiating consent. Undue influence typically arises in relationships of trust and confidence (solicitor and client, doctor and patient, parent and child) and does not require an identifiable threat. Economic duress, by contrast, requires identifiable illegitimate pressure and typically arises in arm’s length commercial transactions. In Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, Lord Nicholls emphasised the conceptual distinctness of the two doctrines.

9.3 Economic duress and unconscionability

The relationship between economic duress and the doctrine of unconscionable bargains is less clearly delineated. In Times Travel, Lord Burrows considered whether the law of economic duress might develop to encompass a broader principle of “unconscionable exploitation,” but the majority preferred a narrower approach. The question whether English law should develop a general doctrine of unconscionability – as distinct from the specific equitable doctrine of unconscionable bargains derived from Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312 – remains unresolved, and the Supreme Court in Times Travel declined to address it.

10. Practical considerations for commercial parties

10.1 Documenting the pressure

A party who is subjected to economic duress should, as far as possible, record the pressure contemporaneously: in correspondence, emails, or internal memoranda. The evidential factors identified in Pao On – protest, the absence of independent advice, the lack of a practical alternative — all favour a party who can demonstrate a clear paper trail. The failure to protest or to reserve the right to challenge the agreement is not necessarily fatal, but it makes the claim significantly harder to establish.

10.2 Acting promptly

Delay is the enemy of the duress claim. The Atlantic Baron demonstrates that a party who acquiesces after the pressure has ceased may be treated as having affirmed the agreement. The coerced party should take steps to avoid the contract as soon as practicable after the duress has been removed – typically by writing to the other party, repudiating the agreement, and if necessary issuing proceedings.

10.3 The practical alternative question

The availability of an alternative remedy – suing for breach of contract, obtaining an injunction, finding a substitute supplier – is a critical factor. A party who has a readily available and adequate alternative will find it difficult to establish that it was left with “no practical choice” but to submit. Practitioners advising a client who is faced with a coercive demand should therefore explore all available alternatives before advising submission.

10.4 Renegotiation and good faith

Since Williams v Roffey Bros, the law has accepted that renegotiations producing a practical benefit to both parties may be enforceable. The dividing line between a legitimate renegotiation and one tainted by economic duress depends upon the voluntariness of the process. A renegotiation prompted by genuine commercial difficulties — where, for example, a subcontractor cannot complete at the original price without going into insolvency — is unlikely to be impugned, provided the other party is not subjected to threats. A demand made with the sole purpose of extracting additional payment to which the demanding party knows it has no entitlement, backed by a threat to withhold performance, is the paradigm of economic duress.

11. Summary: a framework for analysis

Step	Question	Key authorities
1. Identify the pressure	What threat or conduct is alleged? Was it a threat to breach, to withhold goods, to exercise a lawful right?	The Universe Sentinel [1983]; DSND Subsea [2000]
2. Unlawful or lawful act?	Is the threatened act unlawful (breach of contract, tort) or the exercise of a lawful right?	Times Travel [2021] UKSC 40
3. Illegitimacy	If unlawful: was there a genuine threat? If lawful: does it fall within the blackmail paradigm or a recognised extension?	CTN Cash and Carry v Gallaher [1994]; Times Travel [2021]
4. Practical alternative?	Did the claimant have a realistic choice other than submission?	Atlas Express v Kafco [1989]; Huyton v Cremer [1999]
5. Causation	Was the illegitimate pressure a significant cause of the claimant’s entry into the contract or payment?	Huyton v Cremer [1999]; Carillion v Felix [2001]
6. Protest?	Did the claimant protest or reserve its position?	Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980]
7. Affirmation?	Did the claimant affirm the contract after the pressure ceased?	The Atlantic Baron [1979]
8. Remedy	Avoidance of the contract and/or restitution of sums paid	The Universe Sentinel [1983]

12. Conclusion

The law of economic duress in England and Wales has developed, in the space of half a century, from non-existence to a mature – if still evolving – body of doctrine. The trajectory has been from the recognition of the basic principle in The Siboen and The Sibotre and Pao On, through the identification of illegitimate pressure as the organising concept in The Universe Sentinel, to the Supreme Court’s careful delineation of the boundaries of lawful and unlawful act duress in Times Travel.

The doctrine now occupies a settled place in the architecture of English contract law. It performs an essential function: distinguishing between the robust commercial bargaining which a market economy requires and the coercive exploitation which undermines the voluntariness upon which contractual obligation depends. It complements rather than replaces the doctrines of consideration, undue influence, and unconscionability, and its development has been consciously incremental — reflecting the common law’s characteristic preference for building principle from the ground up rather than imposing abstract theory from the top down.

For the practitioner, the key lesson of Times Travel is that the doctrine’s boundaries remain narrow, particularly in respect of lawful act duress. The exercise of a contractual right, even for a self-interested purpose and even against a party with limited bargaining power, does not without more constitute economic duress. For the researcher, the unresolved tension between the majority and minority approaches in Times Travel – between Lord Hodge’s cautious incrementalism and Lord Burrows’ principled framework of bad faith demands – provides fertile ground for future scholarship. And for the student, the development of economic duress offers a case study in the common law’s capacity for organic growth: its ability to recognise new forms of injustice, to fashion principled responses, and to do so without sacrificing the commercial certainty upon which the law of contract ultimately depends.

See also: Economic duress cases

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