Miss Stone was struck by a cricket ball hit out of the Cheetham Cricket Club ground onto a public road. The House of Lords held the club not liable for negligence, as the risk of such an accident was so small that a reasonable person would not have taken precautions against it. This case established the principle that liability requires more than mere foreseeability of harm.
Facts
On 9th August 1947, Miss Stone was struck and injured by a cricket ball while standing on Beckenham Road, a public highway adjacent to the Cheetham Cricket Club ground. The ball had been hit by a batsman during a match. The cricket club had existed since approximately 1864, with matches regularly played on the ground. The field was protected by a fence 7 feet high, with the top of the fence approximately 17 feet above the cricket pitch due to the upward slope of the ground. The distance from the batsman to the fence was about 78 yards, and to where the plaintiff was struck, approximately 100 yards.
Evidence established that over approximately 38 years, only about six balls had been hit out of the ground into the road. Two club members of over 30 years’ standing described the hit that injured Miss Stone as altogether exceptional. No previous accident had occurred, and no complaint had been made to the club.
Issues
The central legal issue was whether the cricket club was liable in negligence for failing to take sufficient precautions to prevent cricket balls from being hit out of the ground and causing injury to persons on the adjacent highway. A secondary issue was whether the club was liable in nuisance, though counsel for the respondent conceded this claim could not succeed if the negligence claim failed.
Standard of Care
The key question was what degree of care the club was required to exercise: whether it was sufficient that injury was merely foreseeable, or whether a greater probability of harm was required before liability could attach.
Judgment
The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal, restoring the judgment of Oliver J at first instance and holding that the cricket club was not liable in negligence.
Lord Porter
Lord Porter emphasised that for an action to be negligent, there must not only be a reasonable possibility of an event happening but also of injury being caused. He stated that it is not enough that the event should be such as can reasonably be foreseen; the further result that injury is likely to follow must also be such as a reasonable man would contemplate. He concluded that a reasonable man would not anticipate that injury would be likely to result from cricket being played on this field.
Lord Normand
Lord Normand stated that it is not the law that precautions must be taken against every peril that can be foreseen by the timorous. He held that the plaintiff must establish not merely that the occupiers could have foreseen the possibility of a ball being hit out and causing injury, but that they ought, as reasonable men, to have foreseen the probability of such an occurrence.
Lord Oaksey
Lord Oaksey observed that an ordinarily careful man does not take precautions against every foreseeable risk, but rather against risks which are reasonably likely to happen. He noted that many foreseeable risks are extremely unlikely to happen and cannot be guarded against except by almost complete isolation.
Lord Reid
Lord Reid articulated the test as whether the risk of damage was so small that a reasonable man, considering the matter from the point of view of safety, would have thought it right to refrain from taking steps to prevent the danger. He acknowledged the case was near the border line but concluded the risk was extremely small.
Lord Radcliffe
Lord Radcliffe expressed sympathy for the respondent but concluded that the appellants had not been guilty of any culpable act or omission. He stated that while the accident was reasonably foreseeable, there was only a very remote chance of it occurring, and a reasonable man would not have felt called upon to abandon cricket or increase the fence height.
Implications
This case established the important principle that foreseeability of harm alone is insufficient to establish negligence. The law requires consideration of the probability or likelihood of harm occurring, not merely its possibility. A reasonable person is not obliged to guard against every conceivable risk, but only against those that are reasonably likely to materialise. The decision balanced the social utility of activities against remote risks, recognising that imposing liability for highly improbable accidents would make many ordinary activities impossible. The case remains a leading authority on the standard of care in negligence and the assessment of risk.
Verdict: Appeal allowed. The judgment of Oliver J at first instance was restored. The cricket club was held not liable in negligence as the risk of injury to persons on the highway from cricket balls was so small that a reasonable person would not have taken precautions against it. The respondent was ordered to pay costs in the House of Lords and Court of Appeal.
Source: Stone v Bolton [1951] UKHL 2 (10 May 1951)
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To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Stone v Bolton [1951] UKHL 2 (10 May 1951)' (LawCases.net, September 2025) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/stone-v-bolton-1951-ukhl-2-10-may-1951-2/> accessed 18 May 2026
