Rondel v Worsley [1967] UKHL 5

A convicted criminal sued his barrister for negligence in conducting his defence at trial. The House of Lords unanimously held that barristers enjoy immunity from negligence claims arising from their conduct of litigation, based on public policy considerations including the barrister's duty to the court and the administration of justice.

Facts

In 1959, the Appellant was charged at the Central Criminal Court with causing grievous bodily harm. He obtained a dock brief and the Respondent, a barrister, agreed to act for him. The Appellant was convicted and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment. Nearly six years later, he brought an action against the Respondent alleging professional negligence in the conduct of his defence, claiming that his counsel failed to put certain questions to witnesses and to call certain witnesses.

Procedural History

The Master struck out the Statement of Claim and dismissed the action. Lawton J dismissed the appeal, holding that a barrister cannot be sued for negligence in conducting a client’s case in court. The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal. Leave to appeal was granted by the House of Lords.

Issues

The central issue was whether a barrister can be sued by a client for negligence in the conduct of litigation.

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the immunity of barristers from negligence claims relating to the conduct of litigation.

Lord Reid

Lord Reid emphasised the unique duties of barristers to both their clients and to the court:

“Every counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every argument, and ask every question, however distasteful, which he thinks will help his client’s case. But, as an officer of the Court concerned in the administration of justice, he has an overriding duty to the Court, to the standards of his profession, and to the public, which may and often does lead to a conflict with his client’s wishes or with what the client thinks are his personal interests.”

He concluded that public policy required the retention of barrister immunity to preserve the proper administration of justice.

Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest

Lord Morris held that while barristers owe a duty of care to clients, public interest required immunity in litigation matters. He stated that permitting such actions would create undesirable retrials and undermine the judicial process.

Lord Pearce

Lord Pearce emphasised the advocate’s unique position within the judicial process:

“The five essential ingredients of the judicial process at the trial are the parties, the witness, the judge, the juror and the advocate.”

He noted that all these participants enjoy immunity and removing it from advocates alone would harm the administration of justice.

Lord Upjohn

Lord Upjohn identified two factors supporting immunity: first, barristers are bound to accept briefs and cannot refuse clients; second, barristers owe duties not merely to clients but to the proper administration of justice.

Lord Pearson

Lord Pearson affirmed that the relationship between barrister and client in litigation does not create legal rights or obligations, and this principle remained valid.

Implications

This decision confirmed the long-standing immunity of barristers from negligence claims in litigation, based on public policy grounds. The Lords suggested that similar immunity might extend to solicitor-advocates when performing advocacy functions. The case established that the immunity exists not for the benefit of barristers personally, but to protect the proper administration of justice. This principle remained influential until modified by Arthur JS Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615, which removed advocate immunity in civil proceedings.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. Barristers are immune from negligence claims by clients in respect of their conduct of litigation, based on public policy grounds relating to the proper administration of justice.

Source: Rondel v Worsley [1967] UKHL 5