Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd (Rev 1) [2019] UKSC 6

Ms Cameron was injured by a hit-and-run driver of an insured Nissan Micra. She sought to sue the unidentified driver and have the insurer satisfy any judgment. The Supreme Court held an unidentifiable defendant cannot generally be sued where service cannot meaningfully be effected.

Facts

On 26 May 2013, Ms Bianca Cameron was injured when her car collided with a Nissan Micra. The Micra’s driver was negligent but fled the scene and was never identified. The registered keeper, Mr Naveed Hussain, refused to identify the driver and was convicted of failing to do so. The vehicle was insured by Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd under a policy issued to a Mr Nissar Bahadur, believed by the insurer to be fictitious. Neither Hussain nor the unknown driver was insured to drive the car under the policy.

Ms Cameron initially sued Mr Hussain and sought a declaration that the insurer would satisfy any judgment. When the insurer denied Hussain was the driver, Ms Cameron applied to amend her claim form to substitute the defendant with “the person unknown driving vehicle registration number Y598 SPS who collided with vehicle registration number KG03 ZJZ on 26 May 2013.” District Judge Wright refused the application. The Court of Appeal (by majority) allowed the amendment, directed that service on the insurer constitute service on the driver, and entered judgment against the unknown driver. Notably, Ms Cameron could have claimed against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau under the Untraced Drivers Agreement 2003, but elected not to do so.

Issues

The central issue was in what circumstances it is permissible to sue an unnamed defendant, specifically whether proceedings could be brought and pursued to judgment against a defendant who is not only unnamed but also unidentifiable in any meaningful sense. Additionally, the Court considered whether the Sixth Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103/EC required a different result.

Arguments

Appellant (Liverpool Victoria Insurance)

The insurer argued that an unidentifiable defendant could not be validly sued because service of process, a fundamental requirement for subjecting a person to the court’s jurisdiction, could not be effected. Service on the insurer could not be expected to bring proceedings to the driver’s attention.

Respondent (Ms Cameron)

Ms Cameron argued that the court had discretion to permit suits against unnamed defendants where justice required. She further contended that the Sixth Motor Insurance Directive required a direct right against the insurer on the underlying liability, and that recourse to the Motor Insurers’ Bureau was not an adequate substitute under EU law.

Judgment

Lord Sumption (with whom the rest of the Court agreed) allowed the appeal. The Court drew a crucial distinction between two categories of unnamed defendants:

• Anonymous but identifiable defendants — such as squatters, internet wrongdoers, or protesters — who can be described in a way that makes it possible to locate them, communicate with them, or know whether a particular person is the one described.
• Anonymous and unidentifiable defendants — such as hit-and-run drivers — who cannot be identified at all.

Lord Sumption held that actions against defendants in the second category are not permissible, because it is conceptually impossible to serve them. He emphasised that service of originating process is the act by which a defendant is subjected to the court’s jurisdiction, citing Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119.

The Court reaffirmed the principle articulated in Porter v Freudenberg [1915] 1 KB 857 that substituted (alternative) service must be such as can reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to the defendant’s attention. Lord Sumption quoted Atkin LJ in Jacobson v Frachon (1927) 138 LT 386:

Those principles seem to me to involve this, first of all that the court being a court of competent jurisdiction, has given notice to the litigant that they are about to proceed to determine the rights between him and the other litigant; the other is that having given him that notice, it does afford him an opportunity of substantially presenting his case before the court.

The Court held that Abbey National Plc v Frost [1999] 1 WLR 1080, insofar as it suggested service need not be such as to bring the proceedings to the defendant’s attention, was wrongly decided as a general proposition. Applying CPR 6.15, service on the insurer could not reasonably be expected to reach the unknown driver and amounted to no service at all.

Regarding CPR 6.16 (dispensing with service), Lord Sumption held this would only be appropriate where the defendant was aware of the proceedings or had deliberately evaded service. The mere breach of the statutory duty to stop and report was insufficient to establish evasion.

On the EU law issue, the Court rejected both arguments. Article 18 of the Directive, even assuming it required a direct right of action on the underlying wrong, did not require recognition of a right to sue an unidentified person without observing the rules designed to ensure awareness of proceedings. The Motor Insurers’ Bureau scheme under the Untraced Drivers Agreement adequately fulfilled the Directive’s requirements.

Implications

This decision clarifies the basis for suing unnamed defendants in English civil proceedings. Actions against persons described only by reference to past conduct, where no means exists to locate or communicate with them, are not permitted because service — a prerequisite for jurisdiction — cannot be effected. The judgment reaffirms the fundamental principle of natural justice that a person cannot be subjected to the court’s jurisdiction without notice sufficient to enable participation.

The decision is significant for road traffic cases involving hit-and-run drivers: claimants in such cases must generally pursue the Motor Insurers’ Bureau under the Untraced Drivers Agreement rather than attempting to sue the unidentified driver and then the insurer. However, Lord Sumption acknowledged the Bureau’s indemnity may be slightly narrower (for example, an excess on property damage and limited costs recovery), though this was held consistent with the Directive.

The judgment also validates the jurisdiction to sue anonymous but identifiable defendants (as established in Bloomsbury Publishing Group Plc v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] 1 WLR 1633 and subsequent cases concerning internet wrongdoers, protesters, and trespassers), where alternative service can effectively bring proceedings to the defendant’s attention. The Court did not rule out narrow statutory exceptions to the natural justice principle in specific regulatory schemes but declined to extend such an exception to the compulsory motor insurance regime.

The decision matters to personal injury practitioners, motor insurers, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, and victims of uninsured or untraced drivers, setting clear boundaries on procedural innovation in claims against anonymous parties and reinforcing due process safeguards.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Court of Appeal and reinstated the order of District Judge Wright, holding that an unidentifiable defendant such as a hit-and-run driver cannot be sued under a pseudonym or description where service of the claim form cannot be effected or properly dispensed with.

Source: Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd (Rev 1) [2019] UKSC 6