Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1987] UKHL 12 (28 April 1987)

The mother of the final victim of the 'Yorkshire Ripper' sued the police for negligence in failing to catch him. The House of Lords held that police do not owe a general duty of care to individuals for failing to apprehend criminals.

Facts

The appellant was the mother and administratrix of the estate of Jacqueline Hill, the final victim of Peter Sutcliffe, the “Yorkshire Ripper”. Sutcliffe had murdered thirteen women and attempted to murder others between 1975 and late 1980. The appellant brought an action for damages against the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, alleging that the police force had been negligent in its investigation and failure to apprehend Sutcliffe before he killed her daughter in November 1980.

Issues

The central legal issue was whether the police owed a duty of care to individual members of the public, including Jacqueline Hill, to exercise reasonable skill and care in the investigation and suppression of crime. Specifically, the court had to determine if the police could be held liable in negligence for failing to apprehend a criminal, where that failure foreseeably led to a person being harmed by that criminal.

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that no duty of care was owed by the police to the plaintiff. Lord Keith of Kinkel delivered the leading judgment. He analysed the duty of care by reference to foreseeability of harm, proximity of relationship, and whether it would be fair, just, and reasonable to impose such a duty. While it was foreseeable that if the police failed to catch the killer he would strike again, Lord Keith found a lack of sufficient proximity between the police and Jacqueline Hill. She was simply one of a vast number of potential victims in the West Yorkshire area.

From the point of view of proximity, there is no material distinction to be drawn between the position of Jacqueline Hill and that of any other woman in the area, all of whom were at risk from the Ripper’s activities, though it was impossible to say that any one of them was at special risk in the absence of some particular reason for the killer to select her.

The judgment then turned decisively on public policy grounds. Lord Keith reasoned that imposing liability would not improve police standards but would lead to defensive policing, where resources would be diverted from the primary function of suppressing crime towards dealing with litigation and defending against claims. He feared that courts would be drawn into making judgments on police operational matters, for which they were ill-suited.

In my opinion it would not be in the public interest that the police should be liable to be sued for negligence in respect of their failure to apprehend a criminal, with the consequences I have mentioned. The result would be a significant diversion of police manpower and attention from their most important function, the suppression of crime.

Implications

This landmark decision established a core principle that the police do not owe a general duty of care to individual members of the public to protect them from harm caused by unknown criminals. This is often referred to as a form of ‘police immunity’ from negligence claims concerning their core operational duties of investigating and suppressing crime. The case highlighted the judiciary’s deference to police operational discretion and prioritised the broader public interest in effective policing over individual claims for compensation, a principle that has been highly influential in subsequent cases concerning the liability of public authorities.

Verdict: The appeal was dismissed. The police were held not to owe a duty of care to the victim and were therefore not liable in negligence.

Source: Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1987] UKHL 12 (28 April 1987)