Private Nuisance CASES

In English law, private nuisance protects a person’s use and enjoyment of land against substantial and unreasonable interferences. It covers both physical injury to land (for example, encroaching roots, fumes, vibrations) and interferences with amenity (such as persistent noise, smells or intrusive overlooking). The claim is about land-related interests, not personal injury as such.

Definition and principles

Liability turns on whether the interference is substantial and unreasonable in its context. The court considers the character of the locality, the duration, frequency and timing of the activity, the intensity of the interference, the practicality of prevention, and any malice. Ordinary sensitivity of the claimant or their activities is assumed: abnormally delicate uses do not expand liability. Foreseeability of the type of harm is relevant. Planning permission may change the locality’s character but is not, by itself, a defence, and public benefit is a factor in remedy rather than a licence to commit nuisance. A claimant generally needs a proprietary interest in the affected land (owner or tenant with exclusive possession). The defendant may be the creator of the nuisance or an occupier who adopted or continued it.

Common examples

  • Regular late-night noise from commercial premises or events that materially interferes with ordinary residential life.
  • Odours, smoke, dust or chemical fumes drifting onto neighbouring land and making normal use unpleasant or unhealthy.
  • Vibration or runoff from construction or industrial activities causing cracks, subsidence, or flooding.
  • Encroaching tree roots or branches damaging foundations, drains, or hardstanding.
  • Intense and persistent visual intrusion from a neighbouring viewing platform or similar use that substantially invades privacy and amenity.

Legal implications

Fault in the negligence sense is not essential: a person can be liable for continuing a nuisance even with reasonable care, although foreseeability and reasonableness matter. Defences include statutory authority and acquisition by prescription (a continuous nuisance enjoyed as of right for 20 years). “Coming to the nuisance” is not a defence, though timing can inform reasonableness. Remedies include prohibitory or mandatory injunctions, damages (including in lieu of an injunction), and careful, limited self-help (abatement). Landlords may be liable where they authorised or knew of a nuisance at grant and it was certain or almost inevitable. Limitation generally runs for six years, with a fresh cause of action accruing each day in a continuing nuisance.

Practical importance

Advisers should document the pattern and impact of the interference (logs, decibel readings, air quality data, photographs), obtain expert evidence where physical damage or health effects are alleged, and explore practical mitigation. Pre-action engagement and alternative dispute resolution often resolve boundary and neighbour disputes proportionately. When litigating, be precise about the activity said to constitute the nuisance, the harm it causes, and the remedy sought; consider whether an injunction is appropriate or whether damages will adequately reflect the balance of convenience.

See also: Public nuisance; Negligence; Trespass; Rylands v Fletcher; Planni

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Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852

A doctor built a consulting room next to a confectioner, whose noisy machinery had operated for over 20 years. The court granted an injunction, finding the noise was now a nuisance and rejecting the defence of 'coming to the nuisance'. Facts The claimant, Dr Sturges, was a physician who in 1873 moved into a property on Wimpole Street. His consulting room was situated at the back of his garden. The defendant, Mr Bridgman, was a confectioner who had operated his business at the back of his adjacent property on Welbeck Street for over 20 years. The defendant used large mortars

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St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping [1865] UKHL J81

Mr Tipping's property was damaged by noxious vapours from a smelting works. The House of Lords established that where a nuisance causes material injury to property, the industrial character of the neighbourhood is no defence, distinguishing this from mere personal discomfort. Facts In 1860, the claimant, Mr Tipping, purchased a large estate in St Helen’s, Lancashire. Approximately one year later, the defendant company, St Helen’s Smelting Co, erected a copper-smelting works about a mile and a half from the claimant’s property. The discharge of noxious vapours from these works caused significant damage to the trees, shrubs, crops, and cattle on

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Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callagan [1940] AC 880

An occupier of land was held liable for flooding caused by a blocked pipe laid by a trespasser. The court found they 'continued' and 'adopted' the nuisance, as they knew of the pipe's existence and failed to maintain it. Facts The respondents, the trustees of a religious society, occupied land that had a ditch on its boundary. Without the respondents’ knowledge, a local council, acting as a trespasser, laid a 15-inch pipe in this ditch to carry away water. The work was poorly executed, as no guard or grate was placed at the pipe’s inlet, creating a risk that it

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Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v Morris (t/a Soundstar Studio) [2004] EWCA Civ 172

A recording studio experienced electromagnetic interference in its electric guitars from new railway signalling. The studio owner sued in nuisance. The Court of Appeal held that this specific type of harm was not foreseeable, shifting the legal test from 'abnormal sensitivity' to foreseeability. Facts The claimant, Mr Morris, ran a commercial recording studio, Soundstar Studio, in Croydon. The studio was located approximately 80 metres from the main railway line between London and Brighton. In 1994, Railtrack plc (the predecessor to Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd, the appellant) installed new track circuits as part of a major re-signalling project. These circuits generated

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Malone v Laskey (1907) 2 KB 141 (25 March 1907)

The wife of an employee was injured by a falling cistern, caused by vibrations from a neighbouring engine. Her claim failed as she had no proprietary or contractual right to the property, only a licence to be there, defeating claims in both nuisance and negligence. Facts The claimant, Mrs Malone, resided in a house with her husband. The house was rented not by them, but by her husband’s employer, a company. Mr Malone was the company’s manager and occupied the house as part of his employment arrangement. The landlords had fixed a water cistern to the wall of the lavatory,

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Khoransandjian v Bush [1993] EWCA Civ 18

A young woman received persistent, unwanted telephone calls from a former friend. She successfully obtained an injunction to stop the harassment, even though she had no proprietary interest in the property. The case extended the tort of private nuisance to protect individuals. Facts The plaintiff, Miss Natasha Khorasandjian, an 18-year-old woman, was subjected to a campaign of harassment by the defendant, Mr Martin Bush, a 29-year-old man. They had been friends, but after their friendship ended, the defendant developed an obsession with the plaintiff. The harassment included threats of violence, unwanted visits, and persistent, menacing telephone calls to her parents’

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Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] UKHL 14

Residents claimed against Canary Wharf Ltd in nuisance for dust from construction and interference with television signals caused by a new tower. The House of Lords held that TV interference was not an actionable nuisance and, crucially, only claimants with a proprietary interest in the affected land could sue. Facts This case consolidated two sets of actions brought by hundreds of local residents. The first group of claimants, living in the shadow of the Canary Wharf Tower in London Docklands, complained that the construction of the tower, which was completed in 1990, interfered with their television reception. The tower, a

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Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 793 (QB) (16 April 2003)

The owners of a country estate near an RAF base sued the Ministry of Defence in nuisance due to severe noise from Harrier jet training. The court found a nuisance existed but, due to the public interest, refused an injunction and awarded damages. Facts The claimants, Mr and Mrs Dennis, were the owners of Walcot Hall, a valuable country estate in Northamptonshire located near RAF Wittering. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) used RAF Wittering as a key base for training pilots for Harrier jets. The training exercises, which involved low flying and circuit training, generated exceptionally loud and frequent noise,

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Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 312 (19 March 2012)

Residents near a landfill sued the operator for odorous emissions. The operator argued its statutory permit provided a defence by changing the neighbourhood's character. The Court of Appeal rejected this, clarifying that a permit does not authorise a common law nuisance. Facts The claimants, a group of residents of a housing estate in Hertfordshire, brought a claim in private nuisance against Biffa Waste Services Ltd, the operator of the nearby Westmill landfill site. The claim concerned significant and offensive odours emanating from the site between 2004 and 2009. Biffa operated the site under a detailed environmental permit issued in accordance

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Adams v Rhymney Valley District Council [2000] EWCA Civ 3035 (20 July 2000)

Tenants of a council tower block sued the council in nuisance for blocking their rubbish chutes, forcing them to carry waste down stairs. The Court of Appeal held this daily inconvenience did not legally constitute an actionable private nuisance interfering with their land. Facts The claimants, Mr and Mrs Adams, were tenants of a flat on the eighth floor of a tower block owned by the defendant, Rhymney Valley District Council. The refuse disposal chutes, which were part of the common parts of the building retained by the council, became blocked. The council decided that it was not economically viable