Veale and others v Scottish Power UK Plc [2025] UKSC 45

Family members of Robert Crozier, who died of mesothelioma, claimed damages under the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 despite his earlier settlement for asbestosis. The Supreme Court held that section 5 applies where someone dies of mesothelioma after discharging liability, regardless of whether mesothelioma existed at settlement.

Facts

Robert Crozier was employed by Scottish Power UK Plc between 1969 and 1992, during which he was exposed to asbestos. In 2014, he sued his former employer for damages having developed pleural plaques and asbestosis, with part of his claim relating to the risk of developing mesothelioma. The action was settled by agreement, discharging the defenders of further liability. Crucially, Mr Crozier was not suffering from mesothelioma at the time of settlement. He subsequently developed mesothelioma and died from it in 2018. His family members (the pursuers) then brought a claim for damages under section 4(3)(b) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011.

Issues

Central Legal Question

Whether section 5(1)(a) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 requires that the deceased (A) was suffering from mesothelioma at the time when the liability to pay damages was discharged, in order for the exception to section 4(2) to apply.

Appellant’s Argument

Scottish Power argued that the phrase “liability to pay damages” in section 5(1)(a) must refer specifically to a liability to pay damages for mesothelioma. Since no such liability existed at the time Mr Crozier settled his action (as he was not then suffering from mesothelioma), no such liability was discharged, and section 5 should not apply.

Judgment

Textual Analysis

Lord Reed, delivering the unanimous judgment, rejected the appellant’s argument on several grounds. First, Mr Crozier’s claim included damages for the risk of developing mesothelioma, and the settlement discharged the defenders’ liability in the event he subsequently developed the disease.

Second, the phrase “liability to pay damages” appears in sections 3, 4, and 5, and must have the same meaning throughout due to their interconnections. Section 3 governs the application of sections 4 and 5 and is concerned generally with persons who die from personal injuries, not specifically mesothelioma.

“There is no conceivable basis for construing the phrase ‘liability to pay damages’ in section 3 as referring only to a liability to pay damages for mesothelioma. Section 3 is not concerned specifically with persons suffering from mesothelioma: it is concerned generally with persons who die in consequence of suffering personal injuries as the result of the act or omission of another person.”

Lord Reed noted that the appellant’s argument was self-defeating:

“If, for the sake of argument, the liability to pay damages to Mr Crozier for mesothelioma was not discharged, with the consequence that section 5(1)(a) did not apply, it would follow that his relatives were entitled to bring a claim against the defenders under section 4(1). Section 4(2) would not operate to bar their claim, since ex hypothesi the liability to pay damages to Mr Crozier for mesothelioma had not been discharged.”

Background Materials

While acknowledging that the mischief prompting the legislation was the dilemma faced by persons who knew they were suffering from mesothelioma, Lord Reed emphasised that courts must faithfully give effect to enacted legislation:

“The identification of the mischief which prompted the introduction of the legislation can be of considerable value in the process of ascertaining its meaning, but it cannot override the meaning of the legislation where that is otherwise clear.”

Citing Lord Nicholls in R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Ex p Spath Holme Ltd [2001] 2 AC 349:

“Citizens, with the assistance of their advisers, are intended to be able to understand parliamentary enactments, so that they can regulate their conduct accordingly. They should be able to rely upon what they read in an Act of Parliament.”

Policy Rationale

Lord Reed identified understandable reasons for the broader drafting, noting it avoided the need to draw distinctions regarding whether individuals knew they had mesothelioma at the time of discharge, or whether the disease developed afterward.

Implications

This decision confirms that relatives of persons who die from mesothelioma may claim damages under section 4(3)(b) of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011, even where the deceased discharged the wrongdoer’s liability before developing mesothelioma. The exception in section 5 applies where the deceased subsequently dies of mesothelioma, regardless of whether they were suffering from the condition at the time of settlement.

The judgment reinforces fundamental principles of statutory interpretation: courts must give effect to the clear meaning of enacted legislation, and external materials identifying legislative mischief cannot override unambiguous statutory language. It also affirms that legislation may legitimately extend beyond the precise problem that prompted its introduction.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court unanimously held that section 5 of the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 does not require that the deceased was suffering from mesothelioma at the time when liability was discharged. The pursuers’ claim under section 4(3)(b) was therefore not barred.

Source: Veale and others v Scottish Power UK Plc (UKSC/2025/0002)