Dr Thaler sought patents for inventions allegedly created autonomously by DABUS, an AI machine. He claimed entitlement through ownership of the machine. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed his appeal, holding that under the Patents Act 1977, an inventor must be a natural person, and ownership of an AI machine does not confer patent rights to its outputs.
Facts
Dr Stephen Thaler filed two patent applications in 2018 for inventions he claimed were autonomously generated by DABUS, a machine powered by artificial intelligence. Dr Thaler did not designate any human inventor, instead naming DABUS as the inventor and asserting his entitlement to the patents based solely on his ownership of the machine. The UK Intellectual Property Office found the applications deficient because Dr Thaler failed to identify a person as inventor and failed to properly indicate how he derived the right to be granted the patents.
Procedural History
The Hearing Officer for the Comptroller held that the applications must be taken as withdrawn. Appeals to the High Court and Court of Appeal were dismissed by majority decisions, though Birss LJ dissented in the Court of Appeal.
Issues
1. Whether a machine such as DABUS can be an ‘inventor’ within the meaning of the Patents Act 1977.
2. Whether Dr Thaler, as owner of DABUS, was entitled to apply for and obtain patents for technical advances generated by the machine.
3. Whether the Comptroller was entitled to hold that the applications were to be taken as withdrawn under section 13 of the 1977 Act.
Judgment
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Dr Thaler’s appeal. Lord Kitchin, delivering the judgment of the Court, addressed each issue systematically.
Issue 1: Meaning of ‘Inventor’
The Court held that under the Patents Act 1977, an inventor must be a natural person. Section 7(3) defines ‘inventor’ as ‘the actual deviser of the invention’, and section 13(2)(a) requires applicants to identify ‘the person or persons whom he believes to be the inventor or inventors’. DABUS, being a machine with no legal personality, cannot qualify as an inventor.
“The inventor, as defined in section 7(3), is the natural person who came up with the inventive concept.”
Lord Kitchin cited Lord Hoffmann’s statement in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc v Yeda Research and Development Co Ltd that section 7(2) provides an exhaustive code for determining entitlement to a patent grant:
“In saying that the patent may be granted ‘primarily’ to the inventor, section 7(2) emphasises that a patent may be granted only to the inventor or someone claiming through him.”
Issue 2: Dr Thaler’s Entitlement
The Court rejected Dr Thaler’s argument that ownership of DABUS entitled him to patents for its outputs through the doctrine of accession. That doctrine concerns tangible property, not intangible concepts or inventions. Section 7(2)(b), which allows patents to be granted to persons other than the inventor, requires derivation of rights through the inventor—which presupposes the inventor is a person.
“There is no principled basis for applying the doctrine of accession in these circumstances.”
Since DABUS cannot be an inventor, there was no inventor through whom Dr Thaler could derive any rights.
Issue 3: Withdrawal of Applications
Having failed to identify any person as inventor under section 13(2)(a) and failed to indicate any valid derivation of his right to be granted the patents under section 13(2)(b), the applications necessarily fell to be treated as withdrawn pursuant to section 13(2).
“Dr Thaler has chosen to proceed on the basis that the inventions for which he seeks protection were made by DABUS powered by AI and acting autonomously… But DABUS is not a person or persons and, for the reasons I have given, it is not a tenable interpretation of the 1977 Act that a machine can be an inventor.”
Implications
This decision confirms that under current UK patent law, only natural persons can be inventors and patents can only be granted to inventors or those deriving rights through them. The Court acknowledged broader policy questions about AI-generated inventions but emphasised these were matters for Parliament, not judicial interpretation:
“If patents are to be granted in respect of inventions made by machines, the 1977 Act will have to be amended.”
The judgment has significant implications for the rapidly developing field of AI and innovation policy, establishing clear limits on patentability under existing legislation while leaving open the possibility of future legislative reform.
Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Comptroller’s decision that Dr Thaler’s patent applications must be taken as withdrawn because he failed to comply with the requirements of section 13 of the Patents Act 1977 by not identifying a natural person as inventor and not properly indicating how he derived entitlement to the patents.
Source: Thaler v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks [2023] UKSC 49
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To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Thaler v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks [2023] UKSC 49' (LawCases.net, April 2026) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/thaler-v-comptroller-general-of-patents-designs-and-trade-marks-2023-uksc-49/> accessed 27 April 2026
