Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1404

Mr Spencer suffered a minor knee injury at work which led to leg amputation. Later, while filling his car at a petrol station without using his prosthesis or walking sticks, he fell and sustained further serious injuries. The Court held the original tortfeasor remained liable for the subsequent injury, reduced by one-third for contributory negligence.

Facts

Mr Spencer, employed as a shunter-driver by Wincanton Holdings Ltd, suffered a minor knee injury in March 2000 when a collision caused his knee to strike a steering column bolt. The injury proved persistently painful, leading to employment termination in June 2001 and eventually an informed decision to undergo above-knee amputation in February 2003. Wincanton accepted vicarious liability for the original injury and the amputation.

Mr Spencer made good recovery and was fitted with a prosthesis. On 14 October 2003, while filling his car at a Sainsbury’s petrol station without using his prosthesis or walking sticks, he caught his foot on a raised manhole cover and fell, rupturing his left quadriceps tendon and confining him to a wheelchair permanently.

Issues

The central issue was whether Wincanton remained liable for the consequences of Mr Spencer’s fall at the petrol station, or whether his conduct in not using his walking sticks or prosthesis constituted a novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation from the original negligent act.

Legal Test for Breaking Chain of Causation

The court considered what standard of unreasonable conduct by a claimant would constitute such an interruption to the chain of causation that the defendant would no longer be liable for subsequent injuries.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal (Sedley LJ, Longmore LJ, and Aikens LJ) unanimously dismissed the appeal. Judge Bullimore’s finding at first instance that Wincanton remained liable, subject to a one-third reduction for contributory negligence, was upheld.

Key Principles from McKew v Holland

The court applied the test from McKew v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969]. Sedley LJ quoted Lord Reid:

“If a man is injured in such a way that his leg may give way at any moment he must act reasonably and carefully… But if the injured man acts unreasonably he cannot hold the defender liable for injury caused by his own unreasonable conduct. His unreasonable conduct is novus actus interveniens.”

Standard of Unreasonableness

The court emphasised that a high degree of unreasonable conduct is required to break the chain of causation. Sedley LJ noted:

“the rationale of the principle that a novus actus interveniens breaks the chain of causation is fairness”

Aikens LJ stated that the question is always: “having established the facts, what is the extent of the loss for which a defendant ought fairly, or reasonably, or justly to be held liable?”

Application to Facts

The trial judge had found that Mr Spencer was “carrying out an everyday task that he had done a number of times before without incident” and that his conduct “fell far below what could be described as McKew unreasonable.” The Court of Appeal found no error in this assessment.

Implications

This case clarifies the distinction between conduct amounting to contributory negligence (reducing damages) and conduct constituting a novus actus interveniens (extinguishing liability entirely). The judgment confirms that the threshold for breaking the chain of causation is high, and ordinary imprudence by an injured claimant will typically result only in a reduction for contributory fault rather than complete denial of recovery. The case emphasises that determinations of remoteness involve value judgments about fairness, rather than mechanical application of foreseeability tests.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. Wincanton Holdings Ltd remained liable for the consequences of Mr Spencer’s fall at the petrol station, with damages reduced by one-third for contributory negligence.

Source: Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1404