Shadwell v Shadwell [1860] EWHC CP J88 (11 January 1860)

An uncle promised his nephew a yearly payment if he married his fiancée. The nephew married but payments ceased upon the uncle's death. The court held that performance of an existing contractual duty owed to a third party was good consideration.

Facts

The claimant, Lancelot Shadwell, was engaged to marry a woman named Ellen Nicholl. His uncle, Charles Shadwell, wrote him a letter upon hearing of the engagement. In the letter, the uncle expressed his pleasure and promised to pay the claimant £150 per year during the uncle’s life, and until the claimant’s income as a barrister at the Chancery bar reached 600 guineas per annum. The letter stated:

‘I am glad to hear of your intended marriage with Ellen Nicholl; and, as I promised to assist you at starting, I am happy to tell you that I will pay to you 150l. yearly during my life and until your annual income derived from your profession of a Chancery barrister shall amount to 600 guineas, of which your own admission will be the only evidence that I shall receive or require.’

Relying on this promise, the claimant married Ellen Nicholl. The uncle made several payments but died before the full amount promised had been paid, and the claimant’s income had not yet reached the specified threshold. The claimant sued his uncle’s estate, represented by the defendant (Shadwell’s executor), for the arrears of the annuity. The defendant argued that no valid contract existed because the claimant was already legally bound to marry Ellen Nicholl, and therefore provided no consideration for the uncle’s promise.

Issues

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the claimant had provided good consideration for the uncle’s promise to pay the annuity. Specifically, could the performance of a pre-existing contractual obligation owed to a third party (the claimant’s promise to marry his fiancée) constitute valid consideration for a new promise made by the defendant (the uncle)?

Judgment

The Court of Common Pleas, by a majority of 2-1, found in favour of the claimant, holding that there was sufficient consideration to form a binding contract.

Erle, C.J. (with Keating, J. concurring)

Chief Justice Erle, delivering the majority judgment, held that the promise was binding. He determined that consideration could be found in either a detriment to the promisee (the nephew) or a benefit to the promisor (the uncle). He found both to be present. The marriage could be seen as a detriment to the claimant because it involved a material change in his position and the incurring of new financial responsibilities, which he may have undertaken in reliance on the promised annuity. More significantly, Erle, C.J. identified a clear benefit to the uncle:

‘I am of opinion that the marriage of the plaintiff at his uncle’s request would be a valid consideration… for the marriage of his nephew, an object of interest to a near relative, and so a benefit to him…’

He reasoned that the uncle had a tangible interest in seeing his nephew married, and securing this outcome was a benefit to him. The uncle’s letter was construed as a request for the marriage to go ahead, and the nephew’s subsequent action fulfilled this request, thus constituting good consideration. Erle, C.J. concluded:

‘The plaintiff has performed the condition upon which the promise was made; and, if the promise was not withdrawn before the performance of the condition, it is binding.’

Byles, J. (dissenting)

Justice Byles delivered a strong dissenting opinion. He argued that there was no consideration because the claimant was simply doing what he was already legally bound to do—marry Ellen Nicholl. Performing an existing duty, he argued, constitutes neither a legal detriment to the promisee nor a legal benefit to the promisor. He stated:

‘The reason why the doing what a man is already bound to do is no consideration, is, not only because it is extortion, but because it is no detriment to the party doing it, nor benefit to the party to whom it is done.’

In his view, the claimant had not given anything new of value in exchange for the uncle’s promise, as the obligation to marry already existed. Furthermore, he interpreted the uncle’s letter not as a request constituting an offer, but as a mere declaration of a benevolent intention to make a gift upon the marriage, which was not intended to create legal relations.

Implications

Shadwell v Shadwell is a landmark case in the English law of contract on the doctrine of consideration. It established the important principle that the performance of, or promise to perform, an existing contractual duty owed to a third party can be valid consideration for a fresh promise. The majority’s reasoning, focusing on the benefit derived by the promisor from the performance of the act they requested, became a key authority. This decision is often contrasted with the general rule that performing an existing duty owed to the *same promisor* is not good consideration (as in Stilk v Myrick), although that rule itself has been refined by later cases such as Williams v Roffey Bros. The case clarifies that the ‘value’ in consideration need not be a new legal obligation, but can be the factual performance of an act requested by the promisor, even if the promisee was already obliged to a different party to perform it.

Verdict: Judgment for the plaintiff; the demurrer was overruled.

Source: Shadwell v Shadwell [1860] EWHC CP J88 (11 January 1860)