Plaintiffs contracted to deliver coals to third parties, who sold them to the defendant. The defendant promised to unload at a certain rate in exchange for delivery. The court held that delivery to the defendant was good consideration for his promise, despite the plaintiffs' pre-existing contractual duty to third parties.
Facts
The plaintiffs were shipowners who had entered into a contract with certain persons to carry and deliver a cargo of coals to their order. Those persons subsequently sold the coals to the defendant, Pegg, and ordered the plaintiffs to deliver the cargo to him. In consideration of the plaintiffs delivering the coals to the defendant, the defendant promised to unload and discharge the cargo at the rate of forty-nine tons per working day. The defendant failed to unload at the agreed rate, causing the plaintiffs additional expense in maintaining the ship and crew.
The Plea
The defendant pleaded that there was no consideration for his promise because the plaintiffs were already bound by their prior contract with third parties to deliver the coals to their order. He argued that performing an existing contractual obligation to third parties could not constitute consideration for a new promise.
Issues
The central issue was whether the delivery of the coals by the plaintiffs to the defendant constituted valid consideration for the defendant’s promise to unload at an agreed rate, given that the plaintiffs were already contractually bound to third parties to deliver those same coals.
Judgment
Martin B.
Martin B. held the plea was bad both on principle and in law. He stated that the ordinary rule is that any act done whereby the contracting party receives a benefit is good consideration for a promise. The benefit here was the delivery of the coals to the defendant. It was immaterial that the plaintiffs had previously contracted with third parties to deliver to their order, as the defendant received a benefit from the delivery.
Wilde B.
Wilde B. agreed that judgment should be for the plaintiffs. He acknowledged that a person cannot make performance of an existing contract with the same individual into consideration for a new promise to that same person. However, he found no authority preventing a valid promise to a different person for doing the same thing already promised to another. The delivery of the coals was a benefit to the defendant, who had induced the plaintiffs to part with the cargo, and this constituted good consideration.
Implications
This case established an important principle in the law of consideration: performance of an existing contractual duty owed to a third party can constitute good consideration for a new promise made by another party. The decision distinguished between situations where the promisee already owes a duty to the promisor (no fresh consideration) and where the duty is owed to a third party (valid consideration). This principle has significant implications for commercial transactions where multiple contractual relationships exist concerning the same subject matter.
Verdict: Judgment for the plaintiffs. The plea was held to be bad, and the delivery of the coals to the defendant constituted good consideration for his promise despite the plaintiffs’ pre-existing contract with third parties.
Source: Scotson v Pegg [1861] EWHC Exch J2 (28 January 1861)
Cite this work:
To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Scotson v Pegg [1861] EWHC Exch J2 (28 January 1861)' (LawCases.net, August 2025) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/scotson-ors-v-pegg-1861-ewhc-exch-j2-28-january-1861/> accessed 16 March 2026

