Robinson v West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4

Mrs Robinson, a frail 76‑year‑old pedestrian, was injured when plain‑clothes officers attempted to arrest a drug suspect in a busy street and all fell on her. The Supreme Court held the police owed her a duty of care, rejecting any general immunity and clarifying that Caparo is not a universal test and that positive acts causing foreseeable injury attract ordinary negligence liability.

Facts

In July 2008, Mrs Elizabeth Robinson, a 76‑year‑old described as relatively frail, was walking along Kirkgate, a shopping street in Huddersfield. Detective Sergeant Willan had observed Ashley Williams apparently dealing drugs and called for backup. Four plain‑clothes officers (Willan, Roebuck, Green and Dhurmea) planned to arrest Williams outside a bookmakers on Kirkgate.

The plan was that Willan and Dhurmea would approach Williams from one direction to seize him, while Roebuck and Green positioned themselves on the opposite side to block any escape route. Kirkgate was moderately busy with pedestrians, including Mrs Robinson. As she passed within a yard of Williams, Willan and Dhurmea moved in, took hold of him and attempted to arrest him. Williams resisted and struggled. The group moved into Mrs Robinson, who was knocked over, with all three men falling on top of her, causing personal injuries.

Procedural History

Recorder

Mrs Robinson sued the Chief Constable in negligence (and originally also for assault/trespass). The Recorder relied on CCTV footage and police evidence about the planning of the arrest. He found that the officers had foreseen a significant risk that Williams would try to run away, and that they were aware of the potential for harm to members of the public if he did so.

The Recorder held that the decision to arrest at that time and place created a foreseeable risk to Mrs Robinson, who was in close proximity and elderly. He found the officers negligent because: (i) Willan accepted he should have taken care for the safety of people nearby but failed even to notice Mrs Robinson within a yard of Williams; (ii) they could have waited for a safer opportunity; and (iii) Roebuck and Green were too far away to assist promptly. However, he concluded, relying on Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire and Desmond, that the police enjoyed an immunity from negligence claims when apprehending criminals, and dismissed the claim.

Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal (Hallett LJ, Arnold J, Sullivan LJ) dismissed Mrs Robinson’s appeal. Hallett LJ treated the Caparo three‑stage test as applicable to all negligence claims, stating that the court would only impose a duty where it considered it right to do so on the facts, and that most claims against the police for investigating and suppressing crime would fail the “fair, just and reasonable” limb.

She characterised the case as one concerning an omission (failure to prevent Williams from harming Mrs Robinson) rather than a positive act, held there was no sufficient proximity despite direct physical injury, and considered that even if a duty existed the Recorder’s negligence finding should be overturned, criticising him for acting as if an expert in arrest techniques. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues

The Supreme Court identified the main issues:

• Whether the existence of a duty of care always depends on applying a single “Caparo test” to the particular facts.
• Whether there is a general rule that the police owe no duty of care when investigating and preventing crime, or whether they are generally subject to ordinary negligence principles; and the relevance of the acts/omissions distinction.
• Whether, on the facts, the case was one of a positive act or an omission.
• Whether the officers owed Mrs Robinson a duty of care.
• Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to overturn the Recorder’s finding of breach.
• Whether any breach caused Mrs Robinson’s injuries.

Judgment

Approach to Caparo

Lord Reed (with whom Lady Hale and Lord Hodge agreed) rejected the notion of a universal “Caparo test” applied afresh in every negligence case. He emphasised that Caparo itself repudiated any single comprehensive test and mandated an incremental, precedent‑based development of the law. He stated that, in established categories (such as motorists to other road users, employers to employees, doctors to patients), the elements of proximity and justice/fairness are already built into the recognised duty and need not be reconsidered in each case.

He stressed that novel situations may require consideration of what is “fair, just and reasonable”, but the present case fell within established principles governing liability for personal injury.

Public authorities and the police

Lord Reed summarised the law on public authorities: generally they are subject to the same tortious liabilities as private persons, save where statute expressly or impliedly provides otherwise. They are ordinarily liable for causing actionable harm in situations where a duty of care would arise under orthodox negligence principles. Conversely, like private individuals, they are generally not liable for pure omissions or for failing to prevent harm caused by third parties, absent recognised exceptions (such as assumption of responsibility or creation of a danger).

Turning specifically to the police, Lord Reed explained that they owe a public duty to prevent crime and maintain order, enforceable by public law means but not ordinarily giving rise to private law duties to individuals. Analysing Hill and subsequent authorities, he emphasised that Hill did not create a general immunity from negligence claims.

He quoted Lord Keith’s statement in Hill that:

“There is no question that a police officer, like anyone else, may be liable in tort to a person who is injured as a direct result of his acts or omissions. So he may be liable in damages for assault, unlawful arrest, wrongful imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and also for negligence.”

Lord Reed concluded that Hill established only that, in the absence of special circumstances such as an assumption of responsibility, the police do not owe a duty of care to protect individuals from harm caused by criminals in the performance of their investigative functions. Subsequent cases like Brooks, Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police, Elguzouli‑Daf and Desmond were analysed and reconciled on this basis. He held that there is no general rule exempting the police from duties of care when preventing and investigating crime; instead, they are generally subject to ordinary negligence principles for positive acts causing personal injury.

Acts versus omissions

Lord Reed distinguished between liability for positive acts causing harm and the general non‑liability for omissions, particularly failures to prevent third‑party wrongdoing. He reiterated that negligence law primarily imposes duties not to cause harm rather than duties to confer benefits such as protection from third parties.

On the facts, the officers were not passive observers of third‑party wrongdoing; they actively initiated an arrest in a busy street. The ground of liability was the damage caused by their carelessness in circumstances where it was reasonably foreseeable that such carelessness would result in Mrs Robinson being injured. Lord Reed held that this was a case of a positive act, not an omission.

Duty of care

Given that the case involved a positive act causing foreseeable physical injury, and that there was no statutory or common law exclusion, Lord Reed applied ordinary negligence principles. The officers in fact foresaw that Williams might attempt to escape and that a struggle was likely. They chose to arrest him in a moderately busy town‑centre street with pedestrians in close proximity. It was reasonably foreseeable that attempting an arrest when pedestrians, particularly vulnerable ones such as an elderly woman, were within arm’s length could result in them being knocked over and injured in the ensuing struggle.

That foreseeability of physical injury imposed a duty of care on the officers towards pedestrians in the immediate vicinity when the arrest was attempted, including Mrs Robinson.

Breach of duty

The Court of Appeal had been right, Lord Reed accepted, to warn against imposing unrealistically demanding standards on operational policing, especially where officers must make rapid decisions in stressful situations. A duty of care is always to take reasonable care in the circumstances, and policing may lawfully involve exposure of officers or even members of the public to some risk when justified.

However, on the facts found by the Recorder, the situation did not require an instant arrest regardless of bystanders’ safety; Willan himself had said he would have walked past had someone been in harm’s way. The Recorder accepted that the officers were aware of the risk of Williams trying to escape and of potential harm to the public; that guidance required them to consider risks to people nearby; and that Mrs Robinson had just passed within a yard of Williams and was in the officers’ line of sight. Despite this, Willan failed to notice her.

Lord Reed held that the Recorder was entitled to find negligence at least on this basis alone. A reasonably careful officer, applying the acknowledged guidance and his own evidence about risk assessment, would have checked for nearby pedestrians before initiating the arrest and, seeing Mrs Robinson next to Williams, would have delayed for a safer opportunity.

Both Lord Mance and Lord Hughes expressed some doubt about the Recorder’s evaluation of negligence, given the dynamic circumstances and the brief time window. However, both agreed that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge’s assessment absent error of principle, and neither considered that threshold met.

Causation

The chain of events began with Willan and Dhurmea physically seizing Williams. That caused him to struggle, and during that struggle he and the officers collided with Mrs Robinson and fell on her. Lord Reed rejected any contention that Williams’s voluntary resistance broke the chain of causation. His attempt to escape was precisely the risk against which the officers were obliged to take care, given their own evidence that such resistance was likely. Mrs Robinson’s injury was the realisation of the very danger they were under a duty to guard against.

Implications

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal. It held that:

• The existence of a duty of care does not depend on re‑applying a universal “Caparo test” in every case; established categories and incremental development remain central.
• Public authorities, including the police, are generally subject to the ordinary law of negligence; there is no general immunity for actions taken in investigating and preventing crime.
• The distinction between positive acts causing harm and omissions (failures to prevent harm by others) remains fundamental. Police are generally not liable for failing to prevent third‑party criminality absent special circumstances, but they are liable, like anyone else, for negligent positive acts that foreseeably cause personal injury.
• Where officers initiate an arrest in a place and manner that foreseeably exposes nearby members of the public to physical injury, they may owe them a duty of care and be liable if they fail to take reasonable precautions.

The decision clarifies and limits earlier readings of Hill, Brooks, Smith and Desmond, re‑asserts orthodoxy on omissions and public authority liability, and affirms that operational policing decisions are subject to negligence principles where police conduct positively injures bystanders.

Verdict: Appeal allowed; the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police was held liable in negligence for Mrs Robinson’s injuries, and the case was remitted for assessment of damages.

Source: Robinson v West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4