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April 22, 2026

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National Case Law Archive

R v Quick & Anor [1973] EWCA Crim 1

Reviewed by Jennifer Wiss-Carline, Solicitor

Case citations

[1973] EWCA Crim 1, [1973] 3 WLR 26, [1973] 3 All ER 347, 57 Cr App Rep 722, [1973] QB 910, 137 JP 763

Quick, a diabetic nurse, assaulted a patient whilst allegedly suffering from hypoglycaemia caused by taking insulin without eating properly. The Court of Appeal held that hypoglycaemia caused by external factors (insulin) did not constitute a ‘disease of the mind’ under the M’Naghten Rules, allowing a defence of automatism rather than insanity.

Facts

William Quick, a charge nurse at Farleigh Mental Hospital, and William Paddison, a State Enrolled nurse, were charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm against a paraplegic patient named Green. On 27th December 1971, Green sustained severe injuries including two black eyes, a fractured nose, and a split lip. Quick was a diabetic who had taken insulin that morning but consumed only a small breakfast, no lunch, and had been drinking alcohol including whisky and rum. Medical evidence from Dr Cates indicated Quick had been admitted to hospital on multiple occasions due to hypoglycaemia, which can cause aggressive and violent behaviour.

The Ruling at Trial

The trial judge, Mr Justice Bridge, ruled that Quick’s defence based on hypoglycaemia could only support a defence of insanity, not automatism. Consequently, Quick pleaded guilty as he did not wish to pursue an insanity defence. Paddison was convicted of aiding and abetting.

Issues

The central legal issue was whether a person who commits a criminal act whilst suffering from hypoglycaemia can raise a defence of automatism, or whether such a person must rely on a defence of insanity under the M’Naghten Rules. Specifically, whether hypoglycaemia constitutes a ‘defect of reason, from disease of the mind’.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal, led by Lord Justice Lawton, allowed the appeals of both Quick and Paddison.

Disease of the Mind

The Court analysed the meaning of ‘disease of the mind’ under the M’Naghten Rules, distinguishing between internal and external causes of mental malfunction. Lord Justice Lawton stated:

“In our judgment the fundamental concept is of a malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by disease. A malfunctioning of the mind caused by the application to the body of some external factor such as violence, drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences cannot fairly be said to be due to disease.”

Application to Quick’s Case

The Court found that Quick’s mental condition was caused by insulin (an external factor) rather than by diabetes itself:

“In this case Quick’s alleged mental condition, if it ever existed, was not caused by his diabetes but by his use of the insulin prescribed by his doctor. Such malfunctioning of his mind as there was, was caused by an external factor and not by a bodily disorder in the nature of a disease which disturbed the working of his mind.”

Limitations on Automatism Defence

The Court noted that automatism would not always provide a defence:

“A self-induced incapacity will not excuse nor will one which could have been reasonably foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting to do something, as, for example, taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain prescribed drugs, or failing to have regular meals whilst taking insulin.”

Implications

This case established the important distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ causes of automatism in criminal law. Where mental malfunction results from an external factor applied to the body (such as drugs, alcohol, violence, or insulin), the appropriate defence is automatism rather than insanity. The decision has significant implications for diabetics and others whose medical treatment may cause temporary mental impairment. The Court also emphasised that self-induced automatism or foreseeable incapacity will not provide a defence, maintaining a balance between justice and public protection.

Verdict: Both appeals were allowed. Quick’s conviction was quashed as unsatisfactory because the defence of automatism should have been left to the jury. Paddison’s conviction was also quashed as the acquittal of Quick introduced an element of unreality into the verdict against him for aiding and abetting.

Source: R v Quick & Anor [1973] EWCA Crim 1

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National Case Law Archive, 'R v Quick & Anor [1973] EWCA Crim 1' (LawCases.net, April 2026) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/r-v-quick-anor-1973-ewca-crim-1/> accessed 22 April 2026