Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1961] UKHL 3

Bratty strangled a young woman and claimed he acted unconsciously due to ‘blackness’. He raised defences of automatism and insanity based on possible psychomotor epilepsy. The House of Lords held that automatism requires evidential foundation and where the only suggested cause is disease of the mind, rejection of insanity precludes automatism defence.

Facts

George Bratty, aged approximately 26, strangled 18-year-old Josephine Fitzsimmons on 22nd December 1960 using a stocking from her leg. The deceased had asked Bratty to drive her to Hillsborough. In his statement to police, Bratty described experiencing ‘a terrible feeling, and then a sort of a blackness’ before the attack. He admitted catching the girl, throwing her into the back seat, and tightening a stocking around her neck. Evidence showed some form of advance was made which was resisted. Bratty had lived with family friends for approximately 20 years and was described as backward but ordinarily well-behaved.

Issues

First Issue

Whether, when a plea of insanity has been rejected by the jury, it was open to the accused to rely upon a defence of automatism.

Second Issue

Whether, on the evidence, the defence of automatism should have been left to the jury.

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction for murder.

On the Defence of Automatism

The Lord Chancellor defined automatism as:

“connoting the state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing … It means unconscious involuntary action, and it is a defence because the mind does not go with what is being done.”

Lord Denning provided important clarification on involuntary acts:

“No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context—some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as ‘automatism’—means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleep-walking.”

On the Evidential Foundation Required

The Lord Chancellor held that for automatism to be left to the jury, there must be a proper evidential foundation:

“It is necessary that a proper foundation be laid before a judge can leave ‘automatism’ to the jury. That foundation, in my view, is not forthcoming merely from unaccepted evidence of a defect of reason from disease of the mind.”

Lord Denning emphasised:

“The evidence of the man himself will rarely be sufficient unless it is supported by medical evidence which points to the cause of the mental incapacity. It is not sufficient for a man to say ‘I had a blackout’: for ‘Black-out’ as Stable J said in Cooper v. McKenna, 1960 Queensland Reports at p. 419, ‘is one of the first refuges of a guilty conscience and a popular excuse’.”

On the Relationship Between Insanity and Automatism

The Court held that where the only cause suggested for unconscious action is disease of the mind, rejection of the insanity defence necessarily precludes automatism. Lord Denning stated:

“When the only cause that is assigned for it is a disease of the mind, then it is only necessary to leave insanity to the jury, and not automatism.”

On the Burden of Proof

The Lord Chancellor addressed the burden of proof, concluding:

“once the defence have surmounted the initial hurdle to which I have referred and have satisfied the judge that there is evidence fit for the jury’s consideration, the proper direction is that, if that evidence leaves them in a real state of doubt, the jury should acquit.”

Implications

This case established fundamental principles regarding the defence of automatism in criminal law. It confirmed that automatism, if properly established, provides a complete defence resulting in acquittal. However, it distinguished between non-insane automatism (complete defence) and automatism arising from disease of the mind (subject to M’Naghten Rules). The case established that a proper evidential foundation must be laid before automatism can be left to the jury, and mere claims of ‘blackout’ without supporting medical evidence are insufficient. It clarified the relationship between automatism and insanity, establishing that prosecution can raise insanity even when not pleaded by defence, and that diseases of the mind manifesting in violence should be treated under insanity rules to protect the public.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The conviction for murder was upheld. The trial judge was correct in not leaving the defence of automatism to the jury, as the only evidential foundation suggested for unconscious action was psychomotor epilepsy (a disease of the mind), and once the jury rejected the insanity defence, no proper foundation remained for automatism.

Source: Bratty v Attorney General of Northern Ireland [1961] UKHL 3