R v Lane and Letts [2018] UKSC 36

Two parents were charged with terrorism funding for sending money overseas. Before trial, the Supreme Court had to interpret "has reasonable cause to suspect" in section 17 Terrorism Act 2000, holding it sets an objective suspicion test, not requiring actual suspicion.

Facts

The appeal arose from a preparatory hearing in the Crown Court concerning an impending criminal trial. The two appellants, Sally Lane and John Letts, were charged with the offence of entering into funding arrangements connected with terrorism contrary to section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

No evidence had yet been heard and the underlying facts were not established. The Supreme Court therefore stated that as little as possible should be said about the allegations, which might or might not be proved. The court recorded only that the appellants were charged with sending money overseas, or arranging to do so, when they knew or had reasonable cause to suspect that it would, or might, be used for the purposes of terrorism.

Because the ruling concerned an interlocutory point prior to trial, statutory reporting restrictions under section 37 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 applied, limiting what could be reported until the conclusion of the trial.

Issues

The central issue was the proper construction of section 17(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000, which defines the mental element of the funding offence. Section 17 provides:

“17.    Funding arrangements.

A person commits an offence if –

(a)     he enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available or is to be made available to another, and

(b)     he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism.”

The specific question was how to interpret the phrase “has reasonable cause to suspect” in section 17(b):

• Whether it required proof that the accused actually suspected, and for reasonable cause, that the money might be used for terrorist purposes (a subjective test); or
• Whether it was sufficient that, on the information known to the accused, there existed, assessed objectively, reasonable cause to suspect that the money might be used for terrorism, even if the accused did not in fact form such a suspicion (an objective test).

The appellants advanced several arguments:

• The wording was said to be capable of either meaning.
• They contended that the presumption that offences require a guilty mind (mens rea), as articulated in Sweet v Parsley, should lead to a construction requiring actual suspicion.
• They argued this was especially important because the terrorism-funding offence is serious and not merely regulatory.
• They criticised the Court of Appeal for starting from the natural meaning of the words rather than from the presumption of mens rea.
• They submitted that the Court of Appeal over-emphasised the public protection purpose of terrorism legislation.

Judgment

The presumption of mens rea

The court reviewed the well-established presumption that Parliament does not intend to create criminal liability without some element of mens rea, referring in particular to Lord Reid’s magisterial statement in Sweet v Parsley:

“our first duty is to consider the words of the Act: if they show a clear intention to create an absolute offence that is an end of the matter. But such cases are very rare. Sometimes the words of the section which creates a particular offence make it clear that mens rea is required in one form or another. Such cases are quite frequent. But in a very large number of cases there is no clear indication either way. In such cases there has for centuries been a presumption that Parliament did not intend to make criminals of persons who were in no way blameworthy in what they did. That means that whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that, in order to give effect to the will of Parliament, we must read in words appropriate to require mens rea.

…

… it is firmly established by a host of authorities that mens rea is an essential ingredient of every offence unless some reason can be found for holding that that is not necessary.

It is also firmly established that the fact that other sections of the Act expressly require mens rea, for example because they contain the word ‘knowingly’ is not in itself sufficient to justify a decision that a section which is silent as to mens rea creates an absolute offence. In the absence of a clear indication in the Act that an offence is intended to be an absolute offence, it is necessary to go outside the Act and examine all relevant circumstances in order to establish that this must have been the intention of Parliament. I say ‘must have been’ because it is a universal principle that if a penal provision is reasonably capable of two interpretations, that interpretation which is most favourable to the accused must be adopted.”

The Supreme Court stressed that this presumption is a principle of statutory construction. Its purpose is to prevent the inadvertent or ambiguous removal of mens rea, but it does not permit a court to rewrite clear statutory language. The first duty remains to consider the statutory words themselves.

The court noted that in earlier cases such as R v Brown (Richard), R v Hughes (Michael) and R v Taylor (Jack), the presumption had been applied where the statutory language was ambiguous or silent, but had given way where the statutory context and purpose clearly indicated a different intention.

The language of section 17(b)

The court held that section 17(b) is not silent as to the required mental element. It expressly provides for liability where the defendant “knows or has reasonable cause to suspect”. The court contrasted this wording with what Parliament would have said if actual suspicion were required, such as “knows or suspects” or “knows or reasonably suspects”. The chosen phrase strongly suggested an objective test based on the existence of reasonable cause to suspect, rather than the actual formation of suspicion.

Reliance on Saik and O’Hara

The appellants relied on R v Saik and O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary to argue that a requirement of “reasonable grounds to suspect” assumes an actual suspicion. The Supreme Court examined those authorities in detail.

In Saik, the relevant money-laundering offence under section 93C(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 used the phrase “knowing or having reasonable grounds to suspect”. Although the House of Lords had concluded that this offence required actual suspicion, the Supreme Court emphasised that in Saik the crucial factor was that the offence also required the defendant to act “for the purpose of assisting” another to avoid prosecution or confiscation. As the court summarised, citing Lady Hale:

“Without that actual suspicion, he cannot act with the purpose required.”

Thus, in Saik, the need for actual suspicion came from the combined effect of the statutory language, particularly the purpose element, rather than from any general rule about the phrase “reasonable grounds to suspect”. The Supreme Court concluded that neither Saik nor O’Hara established a universal principle that “has reasonable cause to suspect” always presupposes actual suspicion; rather, the meaning depends on the specific statutory context.

Statutory context and legislative history

The court placed significant weight on the legislative history of terrorism funding offences and the internal structure of the Terrorism Act 2000.

Earlier terrorism legislation

The first statutory offence of providing funding towards terrorism appeared in section 10(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976, later re-enacted in the 1984 Act. That provision stated:

“If any person gives, lends or otherwise makes available to any other person, whether for consideration or not, any money or other property, knowing or suspecting that the money or other property will or may be applied or used for or in connection with the commission, preparation or institution of acts of terrorism to which this section applies, he shall be guilty of an offence.”

This formulation required proof of knowledge or actual suspicion.

However, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989 altered the wording. Section 9(2) provided that a person is guilty of an offence if he:

“enters into or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby money or other property is or is to be made available to another person, knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect that it will or maybe applied or used as mentioned in subsection (1) above.”

The 1989 Act also introduced analogous language (“intending … or having reasonable cause to suspect”) for related offences of soliciting or receiving contributions. The Supreme Court considered these changes deliberate and explicable only on the basis that Parliament intended to widen liability to include those who, on an objective assessment, had reasonable cause to suspect terrorist use, even if they lacked actual suspicion.

In particular, the Terrorism Act 2000 replaced the earlier “knows or suspects” wording with “knows or has reasonable cause to suspect” in section 17, indicating a conscious choice to move away from an actual suspicion requirement.

Other provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000

The court drew further support from neighbouring provisions.

Section 19 of the 2000 Act imposes a disclosure obligation on certain persons who, in the course of their work, acquire a “belief or suspicion” that another has committed specified terrorism offences. The section refers expressly to a person who:

“believes or suspects …”

This demonstrated that, within the same Act and in the terrorism context, Parliament continued to use language clearly directed at actual suspicion when it wished to do so. The use of different language in section 17, therefore, was a strong indication of a different, more objective test.

Section 18 creates a terrorist property money-laundering offence and, by subsection (2), provides a defence where the accused:

“did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect”

that he was dealing with terrorist property. The court considered this consistent with an objective “reasonable cause to suspect” standard, aligned with section 17, albeit with the burden of proof reversed. It rejected the appellants’ suggestion that section 18 could be read as protecting a defendant who simply did not in fact suspect; had that been intended, Parliament would have used the formulation “did not know or suspect”, mirroring section 19.

Section 21A, inserted later by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, was also noted. It creates an offence of non-disclosure in the regulated sector and distinguishes between:

“(a)     knows or suspects, or

(b)     has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting,”

that another has committed or attempted a section 15–18 offence. The court regarded this as a clear demonstration that Parliament treats “knows or suspects” and “has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting” as distinct concepts; the latter cannot sensibly be equated with the former.

Strict liability and culpability

The appellants argued that interpreting section 17(b) objectively would create a form of strict liability inconsistent with the mens rea presumption. The Supreme Court rejected this characterisation. It explained that, unlike true strict liability offences, section 17(b) still focuses on the accused’s state of knowledge in the sense of the information available to them.

The court stated that the requirement is met only where, on the information available to the accused, a reasonable person would suspect terrorist use of the money:

“the requirement is satisfied when, on the information available to the accused, a reasonable person would (not might or could) suspect that the money might be used for terrorism.”

This standard implies a degree of blameworthiness, albeit less than that of a person who knowingly funds terrorism. Parliament was entitled to conclude that the seriousness of the terrorist threat justifies imposing liability on those who, given what they know, should reasonably suspect that funds may be used for terrorism. Differences in culpability can be reflected at the sentencing stage.

Conclusion and order

The Supreme Court held that the natural and contextual reading of section 17(b), supported by the legislative history and related provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000, is that it establishes an objective test. It is sufficient that, on the information known to the accused, there exists, assessed objectively, reasonable cause to suspect that the money may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Proof of actual suspicion is not required.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the rulings of the trial judge and the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). As Lord Hughes concluded:

“For these reasons it is clear that the conclusions arrived at by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal were correct. The appeal must be dismissed.”

Implications

This decision authoritatively settles the meaning of “has reasonable cause to suspect” in section 17(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000. It confirms that the offence covers defendants who, on an objective assessment of the information known to them, should have suspected terrorist use of funds, even if they did not form such a suspicion in fact.

The judgment clarifies the limits of the presumption of mens rea: it operates only where statutory language is silent or genuinely ambiguous, and cannot override clear legislative choices, particularly in the context of serious public protection statutes such as terrorism legislation.

The reasoning also informs the interpretation of related provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000, including sections 18, 19 and 21A, and provides guidance on the distinction between actual suspicion and reasonable grounds to suspect. It underscores Parliament’s ability to calibrate different levels of culpability within a single statutory scheme and confirms that offences grounded in objectively assessed suspicion are not properly characterised as strict liability.

Finally, the case reiterates the operation of reporting restrictions under section 37 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 for interlocutory appeals, emphasising the protection of the fairness of jury trials in terrorism prosecutions.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed; the Supreme Court upheld the interpretation that section 17(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000 requires only objectively assessed reasonable cause to suspect, and does not require proof that the defendants actually suspected terrorist use of the funds.

Source: R v Lane and Letts [2018] UKSC 36