Monsato plc v Tilly [1999] EWCA Civ 3044

Monsanto sought injunctions against protesters who uprooted genetically modified crops as part of their GenetiX Snowball campaign. The defendants argued their actions were justified by necessity and public interest concerns about GM crop dangers. The Court of Appeal allowed Monsanto's appeal, holding that no defence of necessity or public interest could justify deliberate trespass to publicise a cause.

Facts

Monsanto plc conducted research and development of genetically modified (GM) crops at various licensed sites across the United Kingdom. In June 1998, individuals founded GenetiX Snowball (GXS), an unincorporated association campaigning against GM plants and crops. The defendants, who were members of GXS, deliberately uprooted GM oilseed rape plants at Monsanto’s trial sites as part of their campaign. The first action occurred on 4 July 1998 at Shirburn in Oxfordshire, where defendants one to five pulled up plants whilst the sixth defendant acted as media liaison officer. The defendants’ campaign sought a five-year moratorium on GM crop growth and ultimately aimed to ban all such crops.

The GXS Campaign

GXS operated as a coordinated organisation with a handbook for action, media liaison, public meetings, and training for direct action. Each participant undertook not to uproot more than 100 plants, with the uprooting being symbolic rather than comprehensive. The campaign’s central method involved what was termed ‘non-violent action’ of pulling up GM crops, with care taken to alert the press in advance to maximise publicity.

Issues

The principal issues before the Court of Appeal were:

• Whether Monsanto had sufficient interest in the land or crops to maintain an action for trespass
• Whether the defendants had an arguable defence of necessity or public interest justifying their actions
• Whether the defendants were properly sued in a representative action
• Whether the sixth defendant was liable as a joint tortfeasor

Judgment

Trespass to Land and Goods

The Court held that Monsanto had sufficient interest to maintain an action for trespass. Under the standard agreement with farmers, the seed was Monsanto’s property and the resulting crop belonged to Monsanto. Stuart-Smith LJ cited the principle from Back v Daniels [1925] 1 KB 526: two persons may have possession of the same land simultaneously, each entitled to bring trespass for damage to their respective rights.

Defence of Necessity

The Court rejected the defendants’ defence of necessity. Stuart-Smith LJ examined the principle in Re F (Mental Patient) [1990] 2 AC 1, noting that Lord Goff’s analysis concerned situations where the assisted person was incapable of giving consent. The Court emphasised that necessity requires immediate and obvious danger where a reasonable person would conclude there was no alternative to the act of trespass.

Stuart-Smith LJ quoted Lord Denning MR in Southwark Borough Council v Williams [1971] 1 Ch 734:

The doctrine so enunciated must, however, be carefully circumscribed. Else necessity would open the door to many an excuse.

Lord Denning continued:

So here. If homelessness were once admitted as a defence to trespass, no one’s house could be safe. Necessity would open a door which no man could shut.

Public Interest Defence

The Court held that no defence of public interest was available. Mummery LJ stated that no authority existed recognising protection of the public interest as justification for a private citizen entering another’s property or inflicting damage. He referred to Blackstone’s Commentaries:

So great moreover is the regard of the Law for private property that it will not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community.

Mummery LJ emphasised that it is for Parliament to enact laws restricting private property rights for the good of the community, not for private citizens to take the law into their own hands.

Justiciability

Mummery LJ held that even if the public interest defence were available, the matters the defendants wished to establish were not properly justiciable. Civil proceedings for trespass were not an appropriate vehicle for determining whether growing GM crops was in the public interest. Such decisions required input from sources of information and specialist guidance to which the court did not have access.

Representative Action

The Court upheld the representative action under RSC Order 15 r12(1). Stuart-Smith LJ noted that GXS was clearly an unincorporated association with coordinated activities, and a representative order was necessary to provide Monsanto adequate protection against future violations of their rights.

Joint Tortfeasor

The sixth defendant was held liable as a joint tortfeasor despite not personally uprooting plants. He had reconnoitred the site, led the press to the location, and explained the significance of the actions to the media, all in furtherance of the common design.

Implications

This case establishes important principles regarding the limits of defences of necessity and public interest in trespass claims:

• The defence of necessity requires immediate and obvious danger with no alternative course of action available
• Symbolic acts designed to attract publicity cannot be justified as necessary to avert danger
• There is no common law defence of public interest justifying trespass on private property
• In a democratic society, those who wish to change government policy must do so by lawful means
• The availability of public authorities to address concerns negates claims of individual necessity
• Courts will not determine broad policy questions in private law proceedings

The decision reinforces the fundamental protection of private property rights and the principle that the rule of law in a democratic society requires disputes to be resolved through lawful channels rather than self-help.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. Summary judgment granted in favour of Monsanto. The defendants had no real prospect of successfully defending the claim for trespass, as neither necessity nor public interest provided an arguable defence to their deliberate uprooting of GM crops.

Source: Monsato plc v Tilly [1999] EWCA Civ 3044