Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd [1946] UKHL 1

A crane driver employed by the Harbour Board was hired out with his crane to stevedores. When the driver negligently injured a checker, the question arose whether the Board or the stevedores were vicariously liable. The House of Lords held the Board remained liable as they retained control over how the crane was operated.

Facts

The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board owned mobile cranes and employed skilled drivers to operate them. The Board hired out these cranes with their drivers to stevedores for loading and unloading ships at Liverpool Docks. Coggins and Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd, master stevedores, hired a crane and its driver, Newall, to assist in loading cargo onto the ship ‘Port Chalmers’. John McFarlane, a registered checker employed by forwarding agents, was checking cargo when Newall negligently set the crane in motion, striking and seriously injuring McFarlane.

The hiring agreement contained a regulation stating that drivers provided by the Board ‘shall be the servants of the Applicants’ (the hirers). However, the stevedores could only direct what work the crane should do (which parcels to lift, where to take them), not how the crane should be operated. The manipulation of the crane’s controls remained entirely within Newall’s discretion as a skilled workman.

Issues

The central question was whether, for the purposes of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the crane driver Newall was acting as the servant of the Board (his general employer) or of Coggins and Griffiths (the hirers) at the time of the negligent act.

Key Sub-Issues

• Whether the contractual provision stating the driver ‘shall be the servants of the Applicants’ was determinative of vicarious liability
• What degree of control is necessary to transfer responsibility from a general employer to a temporary hirer
• Whether control over what work is done is sufficient, or whether control over how the work is performed is required

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board remained vicariously liable for Newall’s negligence.

Viscount Simon

Viscount Simon emphasised that the burden of proof rests on the general employer to shift vicarious responsibility, and this burden is heavy, discharged only in exceptional circumstances. The test is whether the temporary employer has authority to direct how the work is done, not merely what work is to be done. Evidence showed that Coggins and Griffiths had no control over how Newall drove the crane—only over what tasks he performed.

Lord Macmillan

Lord Macmillan confirmed that while it is possible for a general employer to temporarily transfer a servant’s services, making the hirer liable pro hac vice, this had not occurred here. The stevedores could direct what Newall was to do but had no authority to tell him how to handle the crane. Newall was acting as the Board’s servant, not the stevedores’, when driving negligently.

Lord Porter

Lord Porter articulated that the most satisfactory test is to ask who is entitled to tell the employee the way in which he is to do his work. It is not enough that the task be under the hirer’s control; the hirer must also control the method of performing it. Where a workman operates a machine belonging to his general employer, it is easier to infer continued control by the general employer.

Lord Simonds

Lord Simonds stated that entire and absolute control must pass to the temporary employer for liability to shift. The hirer must be able to direct not only what the workman does but how he does it. The contractual term deeming the driver to be the servant of the hirers could not contradict the fact that complete dominion and control had not actually passed.

Lord Uthwatt

Lord Uthwatt emphasised that without the workman’s consent, he could not be made the servant of the hirer. The provision in the hiring agreement stating the driver would be the servant of the applicants was merely an agreed legal conclusion between the Board and the Company, immaterial to determining actual control. The workman’s statement in evidence that he took ‘no orders from anybody’ regarding how to operate the crane accurately depicted his legal position.

Legal Principles

• The general employer bears the burden of proving that control has transferred to a temporary employer
• This burden is heavy and discharged only in exceptional circumstances
• The critical test is who has authority to control the manner in which the work is performed, not merely what work is to be done
• Contractual provisions between employers cannot determine vicarious liability to third parties if they do not reflect the actual control relationship
• A servant cannot be transferred from one employer to another without their consent, express or implied

Implications

This case established the authoritative test for determining vicarious liability when employees are temporarily lent to another party. The decision made clear that control over the method of work performance is essential for liability to transfer. Mere direction of tasks is insufficient. The case has significant implications for hiring arrangements involving skilled workers and equipment, clarifying that general employers who retain control over how work is done remain vicariously liable for their employees’ negligence, regardless of contractual provisions purporting to transfer that liability.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board was held vicariously liable for the negligence of the crane driver Newall, as they retained control over how he performed his work, despite the crane and driver being hired out to the stevedores.

Source: Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Coggins & Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd [1946] UKHL 1