Jorden v Money [1854] UKHL J50 (07 June 1854)

Jorden repeatedly assured Money she would not enforce a debt, inducing Money to marry. The House of Lords held this statement of future intention was not a misrepresentation of existing fact, so did not create a legally binding estoppel.

Facts

The respondent, Miss Louisa Money, was contemplating marriage. Her brother, Charles Money, was indebted for £1200 to the family of the appellant, Mrs. Jorden. This debt, secured by a bond, was a subject of concern during the marriage settlement negotiations. Mrs. Jorden repeatedly and explicitly assured Miss Money, her solicitor, and others that she would “absolutely and entirely abandon the debt” and would “never” enforce the bond. Relying on these unequivocal assurances, the marriage and the related financial settlements proceeded. Subsequently, the trustees of Mrs. Jorden’s own marriage settlement (including her husband) brought a claim to enforce the bond against Charles Money’s estate.

Issues

The central legal issue before the House of Lords was whether a representation of a future intention, which was relied upon by another party to their detriment, could create an estoppel in equity. In other words, was Mrs. Jorden’s promise not to enforce the debt legally binding, preventing her from later changing her mind, even though it was not a formal contract supported by consideration?

Judgment

The House of Lords, by a majority (Lord Chancellor Cranworth and Lord St Leonards, with Lord Brougham dissenting), reversed the decision of the Master of the Rolls. The majority held that Mrs. Jorden was not bound by her statements.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Cranworth)

Lord Cranworth drew a critical distinction between a misrepresentation of an existing fact and a statement of future intention. He reasoned that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies only to representations of fact. A promise regarding future conduct, he argued, is only enforceable if it forms part of a valid contract.

I think that that doctrine does not apply to a case where the representation is not a representation of a fact, but a statement of something which the party intends or does not intend to do. In the former case it is a contract, in the latter it is not.

He concluded that Mrs. Jorden had only represented her then-current intention, not an existing fact. To hold her to this promise would be to enforce a promise without consideration, undermining fundamental principles of contract law.

Lord Brougham (Dissenting)

Lord Brougham argued forcefully that Mrs. Jorden had made the declarations with the clear intention that they be acted upon, and they were indeed acted upon. He viewed it as a case of fraud for her to retract her statements after the marriage had taken place in reliance on them. He believed that equity should intervene to prevent such an injustice, stating she was “bound by her declaration, and cannot now be allowed to controvert it.”

Implications

The decision in Jorden v Money established a restrictive precedent on the scope of estoppel. It solidified the principle that, at law and in equity, an estoppel could only be founded on a misrepresentation of an existing fact, not a promise about future action. This case is therefore a landmark authority for the traditional refusal of English law to recognise ‘promissory estoppel’ as a cause of action. While the doctrine was later developed and given a new life by Lord Denning in the High Trees case, Jorden v Money remains the classic statement of the orthodox position that a promise of future conduct, if not contractual, is unenforceable.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed, and the decree of the Master of the Rolls which had prevented the enforcement of the bond was reversed.

Source: Jorden v Money [1854] UKHL J50 (07 June 1854)