Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1981] UKHL 3

An employee's work injury reduced his earning capacity. Before trial, a separate, naturally occurring disease made him totally unfit for work. The House of Lords held the employer was only liable for lost earnings until the supervening illness's onset, treating it as a 'vicissitude of life'.

Facts

In 1973, the appellant, Mr Jobling, sustained a back injury (a slipped disc) at work due to his employer’s (the respondent’s) breach of statutory duty. This injury resulted in a continuing partial incapacity, reducing his earning capacity by 50%. In late 1976, before the trial for damages, he was diagnosed with spondylotic myelopathy, a pre-existing but previously latent spinal condition entirely unrelated to the accident. This condition developed and, by the time of the trial, had rendered him totally unfit for any work. The trial judge awarded damages for the partial loss of earnings only up to the point when the supervening illness rendered him totally incapacitated. The Court of Appeal, feeling bound by the precedent in Baker v Willoughby, reversed this and awarded damages for the partial loss of earnings for the rest of his working life, ignoring the effects of the myelopathy.

Issues

The central legal issue was how to assess damages for future loss of earnings when a non-tortious, supervening event (a natural illness) occurs after the initial tortious injury, which itself would have caused a total loss of earnings. The key question was whether the court should follow the principle from Baker v Willoughby, where a second tort did not diminish the liability of the first tortfeasor, or whether the onset of a natural disease should be treated as a ‘vicissitude of life’ that effectively ends the period of loss caused by the original tort.

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge’s decision. Their Lordships distinguished the precedent of Baker v Willoughby and held that the supervening illness must be taken into account when assessing damages.

Lord Wilberforce

Lord Wilberforce emphasised that the purpose of damages in tort is to provide fair compensation for the loss caused by the defendant’s wrongdoing. Assessing future loss inherently involves speculation about what might have happened, and courts must account for the ordinary ‘vicissitudes of life’. When such a ‘vicissitude’ actually occurs before the trial, it is no longer a matter of speculation but a known fact that must be considered.

This is a process of estimation, or speculation. But it does not depart from the basic rule. And a supervening event of this character, which is a contingency, or a vicissitude, has to be taken into account if it is to work ‘justice’ to the defendant. To hold otherwise would be to award damages for a loss which, on the facts as they are known to be, would have been suffered anyway.

He distinguished Baker v Willoughby on the grounds that it involved two successive torts, and policy considerations might prevent a claimant from being under-compensated if the second tortfeasor was untraceable or a ‘man of straw’. In contrast, an illness is a common risk of life which the law does not provide compensation for.

Lord Keith of Kinkel

Lord Keith analysed the issue through the lens of causation. He argued that once the myelopathy rendered Mr Jobling totally incapacitated, the original back injury ceased to be a cause of his loss of earnings. The total incapacity caused by the illness ‘submerged and obliterated’ the partial incapacity caused by the tort.

Can it be said, then, that after the onset of the myelopathy the back injury was no longer a cause of any loss of earning capacity? In my opinion it can. On a realistic view of the facts, after the myelopathy had manifested itself the appellant’s loss of earnings was wholly attributable to it.

Lord Bridge of Harwich

Lord Bridge provided a clear distinction between a supervening tort and a supervening illness. He explained that a tortfeasor is liable for the damage they cause, which in Baker was the loss of a healthy leg. A second tort damaging the same leg did not remove the consequences of the first tort. However, a supervening illness is different.

But when a supervening illness overtakes the plaintiff which is such that it would in any event have reduced him to the same state of disablement as that which was produced by his accident, the supervening illness can be described as a cause of his disablement but the tort cannot be so described. The consequences of the tort are obliterated by the illness.

Implications

The decision in Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd is a landmark ruling on the assessment of damages in tort law. It clarifies and limits the scope of the Baker v Willoughby principle, establishing a critical distinction between supervening tortious acts and supervening non-tortious events such as natural illness. The case reinforces the compensatory principle of damages, ensuring that a defendant is only liable for losses they have actually caused. It confirms that courts must adopt a realistic approach, taking into account all known facts at the time of trial, including the ‘vicissitudes of life’, to prevent a claimant from being compensated for a loss they would have suffered regardless of the defendant’s tortious act.

Verdict: Appeal allowed; the decision of the trial judge was restored. Damages were only payable for the loss of earnings up to the onset of the supervening incapacitating illness.

Source: Jobling v Associated Dairies Ltd [1981] UKHL 3