Chaplin v Hicks 16 May 1911 [1911] 2 KB 786, CA

A contestant in a beauty contest was denied her interview opportunity due to the organiser's breach of contract. She successfully sued for damages for the loss of a chance to win, establishing that difficulty in assessing damages does not preclude their award.

Facts

The claimant, Miss Chaplin, an actress, entered a competition organised by the defendant, Mr Hicks, a theatre manager. The prize was a three-year theatrical engagement for the twelve winners. The competition involved readers of a newspaper voting for contestants, with the top fifty being invited to an interview from which the final twelve would be selected. The claimant successfully became one of the fifty finalists. However, due to the defendant’s breach of contract, the letter inviting her to the final interview was sent to a late address, and she only received it when it was too late to attend. She was thereby deprived of the opportunity to be present at the selection process and potentially win one of the twelve engagements.

Issues

The central legal issue was whether the claimant could recover substantial damages for the loss of a chance or opportunity, or if she was entitled only to nominal damages. The defendant argued that the damages were too remote and impossible to assess, as it was uncertain whether she would have been chosen as one of the twelve winners even if she had attended the interview.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the defendant’s appeal, upholding the jury’s award of £100 in damages to the claimant. The court held that the fact that damages were difficult to assess did not prevent the claimant from recovering for the substantial loss of the opportunity she had been deprived of by the defendant’s breach.

Vaughan Williams L.J.

Vaughan Williams L.J. held that the claimant’s opportunity was a thing of value and that the jury was right to estimate that value. He rejected the notion that the existence of a contingency makes damages unassessable. He stated:

The fact that damages cannot be assessed with certainty does not relieve the wrong-doer of the necessity of paying damages for his breach of contract.

He reasoned that where a clear breach of contract has occurred, and it is evident that the claimant has lost something of value, the jury must do its best to estimate the loss, even if a precise mathematical calculation is not possible.

Fletcher Moulton L.J.

Fletcher Moulton L.J. delivered a forceful judgment, emphasising that a defendant cannot escape liability by arguing that their own breach has made it impossible to measure the damage precisely. He argued that the claimant’s right to participate in the final selection process was a contractual right with monetary value.

Where by contract a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors, he is possessed of something of value, and it is the duty of the jury to estimate the pecuniary value of that advantage if it is taken from him. The present case is a typical one. The plaintiff has been deprived of her right to be one of a body of fifty, out of which twelve were to be chosen for remunerative employment.

He concluded that the jury’s role in such cases is to make an estimation of the value of the lost chance, and the court should not interfere with their reasonable assessment.

Farwell L.J.

Farwell L.J. concurred, stating that the claimant had a contractual right to be given a fair opportunity to be considered. The breach was in depriving her of this right. He likened the situation to other cases where damages are awarded despite contingencies, and concluded that the assessment of damages was a question of fact for the jury, and their award of £100 was a reasonable figure.

Implications

This case is a landmark authority in English contract law for establishing the ‘loss of a chance’ principle. It confirms that a claimant can be compensated for the loss of a valuable opportunity, even if it cannot be proven that the opportunity would have definitely resulted in a financial gain. The key takeaway is that difficulty in assessing damages is not a bar to recovery; the court or jury must make a reasonable and considered estimation of the value of the lost chance. This principle has been widely applied in subsequent cases, particularly in professional negligence (e.g., a solicitor’s failure to file a claim in time) and commercial disputes where a party is wrongfully deprived of a chance to compete for a contract or prize.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The jury’s award of £100 in damages to the claimant was upheld.

Source: Chaplin v Hicks 16 May 1911 [1911] 2 KB 786, CA