Barrett v London Borough of Enfield [1999] UKHL 25 (17 June 1999)

A man, who was in the care of a local authority from infancy, sued them for psychological injuries allegedly caused by their negligence during his upbringing. The House of Lords held the claim should not be struck out, establishing that a local authority could owe a common law duty of care to a child in its care.

Facts

The plaintiff, Paul Barrett, was taken into the care of the defendant, the London Borough of Enfield, at the age of 10 months in 1973 and remained in their care until he turned 18 in 1990. During this period, he was moved multiple times between foster parents and residential children’s homes. He alleged that the local authority failed to arrange for his adoption, failed to manage his reintroduction to his mother, and acted negligently in the general management of his childhood, leading to a series of unsuccessful placements. After leaving care, he experienced significant psychological and psychiatric problems, which he claimed were a direct result of the council’s negligence and/or breach of statutory duty during his time in their care.

Issues

The primary legal issue was whether the plaintiff’s claim should be struck out on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. This involved two key questions: 1. Could a local authority, in the exercise of its statutory powers and duties relating to a child in its care, be held liable in negligence for causing psychological harm? 2. Was it fair, just, and reasonable to impose a common law duty of care on the local authority in these circumstances, considering the public policy arguments against such a duty which had previously been accepted in cases like X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council?

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously allowed the plaintiff’s appeal, overturning the Court of Appeal’s decision to strike out the claim. The case was remitted to the Queen’s Bench Division to proceed to a full trial. Their Lordships held that it was at least arguable that a common law duty of care was owed by the local authority to a child once that child was taken into its care. They distinguished this situation from the facts of X v. Bedfordshire, where the negligence alleged related to the decision-making process of whether to take a child into care. In this case, the local authority had assumed direct responsibility for the plaintiff’s upbringing, effectively stepping into the shoes of a parent.

Reasoning of the Court

The court reasoned that striking out the claim at a preliminary stage was inappropriate, as the complex factual and policy issues could only be properly determined after hearing evidence at trial. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, giving the leading speech, criticised the blanket immunity from suit that previous cases had appeared to confer on local authorities in the child protection context. He highlighted the distinction between policy decisions (which are generally not justiciable) and operational negligence (which is). While acknowledging the difficulty in drawing the line, he felt many of the allegations in this case fell into the operational category.

Lord Hutton provided a detailed analysis, distinguishing the position of a child already in care from one where the authority is deciding whether to intervene. He stated:

…once a child is taken into care and is in the care of a local authority which has assumed the responsibility for its welfare, there is a close and direct relationship between the child and the local authority and it is fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of care on the local authority to take reasonable care to safeguard the child’s health and welfare.

The judges were not convinced by the public policy arguments that imposing a duty of care would lead to ‘defensive social work’ and divert resources from front-line services to litigation. Lord Slynn of Hadley noted:

I am not satisfied that the arguments on policy are so conclusive as to have the effect of showing at this stage that no cause of action can be established. It may be that at the end of a trial a judge will consider that, in respect of particular decisions, a head of claim should not be allowed… But to rule out the claim in limine is to accept that in no circumstances, whatever the evidence, can the authority be liable for the tort of negligence.

Implications

The decision in Barrett v Enfield LBC was highly significant. It marked a crucial departure from the previous judicial reluctance, exemplified by X v. Bedfordshire, to impose a common law duty of care on local authorities in the performance of their statutory child welfare functions. The judgment established that once a local authority assumes care for a child, its relationship becomes sufficiently proximate to give rise to a duty of care, parallel to that of a parent. This opened the door for claims by adults who had been in care and suffered harm due to the alleged negligence of the authority responsible for them. The case underscored the principle that complex negligence claims against public bodies should be resolved on the basis of evidence at trial, rather than being dismissed at a preliminary stage on broad public policy grounds.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The order of the Court of Appeal to strike out the claim was set aside and the case was remitted to the Queen’s Bench Division to proceed to trial.

Source: Barrett v London Borough of Enfield [1999] UKHL 25 (17 June 1999)