Majera, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 46

An asylum seeker was granted bail by the First-tier Tribunal with specific conditions. The Secretary of State imposed additional restrictions inconsistent with the bail order without seeking to vary it. The Supreme Court held that court orders must be obeyed until set aside, regardless of any defects, affirming the fundamental constitutional principle of the rule of law.

Facts

The appellant, a Rwandan national with indefinite leave to remain, was convicted of serious offences in 2006 and made subject to a deportation order in 2012. Following release from prison in March 2015, he was immediately detained under immigration powers. In July 2015, the First-tier Tribunal granted him bail with conditions including reporting to his offender manager and prohibiting only paid employment.

Shortly after the bail hearing, an immigration officer served the appellant with a notice imposing restrictions under paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971, including a prohibition on unpaid work and a curfew—conditions the Tribunal had declined to impose. The Secretary of State maintained these restrictions despite the inconsistency with the bail order.

Issues

The central question was whether the Government could lawfully act inconsistently with a court order that was allegedly defective, without first applying to have that order varied or set aside. The Court of Appeal had held the bail order was void and a nullity due to non-compliance with statutory requirements.

Judgment

The Duty to Obey Court Orders

Lord Reed, delivering the unanimous judgment, established that the Court of Appeal had erred in treating cases concerning subordinate legislation and administrative acts as governing orders made by courts or tribunals. He emphasised the constitutional principle from Chuck v Cremer (1846):

A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it … It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid – whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the Court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the Court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.

Lord Reed cited Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] where Romer LJ stated:

It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom, an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void.

Rule of Law Considerations

Lord Reed explained that the rationale for this rule is the rule of law itself, citing R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015]:

subject to being overruled by a higher court or (given Parliamentary supremacy) a statute, it is a basic principle that a decision of a court is binding as between the parties, and cannot be ignored or set aside by anyone, including (indeed it may fairly be said, least of all) the executive.

Distinguishing Administrative Acts from Court Orders

The Court clarified that cases like Hoffmann-La Roche and Boddington concerning subordinate legislation did not apply to court orders. The principle applies to courts of limited jurisdiction as well as unlimited jurisdiction, given its basis in maintaining the authority of court orders for the rule of law.

Implications

This decision reaffirms a fundamental constitutional principle: the executive cannot simply ignore court orders it considers defective. The proper course is to apply to have the order varied or set aside. The Secretary of State’s failure to do so, instead simply imposing her own restrictions, was unlawful regardless of any defects in the original bail order.

The judgment has significant implications for the relationship between the executive and the judiciary, emphasising that even allegedly invalid orders must be respected until properly challenged through appropriate legal channels. This protects the authority of the courts and maintains orderly administration of justice.

Verdict: The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, restoring the Upper Tribunal’s decision that quashed the Secretary of State’s decisions of 3 December 2015 and 4 January 2016, and reinstating the declaration that the appellant remained on bail granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 30 July 2015.

Source: Majera, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 46