Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2

A woman was murdered by her ex-partner after her 999 call was mishandled and not given high priority. The Supreme Court found the police owed no common law duty of care to protect her from the actions of a third party, reinforcing the established position on police liability.

Facts

Ms Joanna Michael made a 999 call to Gwent Police at 2.29 am on 5 August 2009. She reported that her violent ex-partner had come to her house, found her with another man, and had bitten her ear. He then left, taking her car to drive the other man home, and stated he would return to kill her. The call handler at Gwent Police did not hear the threat to kill. She relayed the information to South Wales Police, omitting the death threat. Consequently, South Wales Police graded the call with a response time of 60 minutes, not as an immediate emergency. At 2.43 am, Ms Michael made a second 999 call; she was heard screaming before the line went dead. Police officers arrived at her address at 2.51 am and found she had been stabbed to death by her ex-partner. Ms Michael’s parents and children brought a claim against both police forces for negligence at common law and for a breach of Article 2 of the ECHR.

Issues

The primary legal issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the police owe a duty of care at common law to a specific individual who provides credible information about an imminent threat to their life or physical safety. The appeal focused solely on the negligence claim, as the Article 2 claim was to proceed to trial regardless of the outcome.

Judgment

By a 5-2 majority, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the police do not owe a common law duty of care in negligence to protect an individual from harm caused by a third party, even when they are aware of a specific and imminent threat.

Majority Opinion

Lord Toulson, delivering the leading judgment, reaffirmed the core principle established in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53. He articulated the general rule that the law does not impose liability for pure omissions, especially concerning the failure to prevent harm from a third party. He stated:

English law does not as a general rule impose liability on a defendant (A) for injury or damage to the person or property of a claimant (C) caused by the conduct of a third party (B).

The majority reasoned that creating such a duty would have undesirable public policy consequences. It could lead to defensive policing, divert resources from other essential police functions, and entangle the courts in decisions about the allocation of police resources. Lord Toulson concluded that there was no principled basis to depart from the established general rule:

The question is therefore whether there is a sound basis for the court to create a new head of duty on the police in the proposed terms. Like Lord Hope and Lord Phillips in the Smith case, I cannot see a principled basis for such a duty, which would be inconsistent with the well-established general rule that the police are not under a duty of care to protect individuals from harm caused by criminals.

The majority held that claims relating to failures to protect the right to life were more appropriately addressed under the Human Rights Act 1998, which imposes a different and less expansive positive obligation on state authorities.

Dissenting Opinions

Lord Kerr and Lady Hale provided strong dissenting judgments. They argued that a duty of care should exist in specific circumstances. Lord Kerr proposed a narrower principle:

Where the police are given apparently credible evidence that a third party, whose identity and whereabouts are known, presents a specific and imminent threat to the life or physical safety of a particular individual, they are under a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the threat being realised.

Lady Hale agreed, arguing that the relationship between a 999 caller reporting a specific, imminent threat and the police was sufficiently proximate to give rise to a duty of care. She challenged the public policy arguments against liability, suggesting they were overstated:

It is difficult to see how recognising the possibility of such a liability could make the task of the police any more difficult than it already is. It might, of course, make it more costly, through the payment of damages and insurance premiums. But the proper allocation of resources is a matter for the police authorities…

The dissenters argued that a failure to recognise a duty in such clear-cut cases represented an abdication of the law’s role in setting standards and providing redress for foreseeable harm.

Implications

The decision in Michael decisively upheld the long-standing principle of police immunity from negligence claims for failing to prevent crime by third parties. It confirmed that the general duty of the police is to the public at large, not to specific individuals. The judgment solidifies the distinction between common law negligence and human rights law, directing claims concerning the state’s failure to protect life towards Article 2 of the ECHR, which involves a different legal test. The strong dissent highlights the ongoing tension in public authority liability between individual justice and broader public policy considerations regarding the operational discretion of emergency services.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed.

Source: Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2