Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5 (18 February 2015)

A 13-year-old girl was struck by a car after stepping out from behind a school minibus. The driver was travelling too fast and failed to keep proper lookout. The Supreme Court reduced the girl's contributory negligence from 70% to 50%, holding both parties equally responsible for the accident.

Facts

On 12 January 2004, the appellant, then aged 13, alighted from a school minibus on the A98 road near Fraserburgh. The road had a 60 mph speed limit with no street lighting, and it was approximately 40 minutes after sunset. The minibus stopped with its hazard lights on. The appellant attempted to cross the road from behind the stationary bus. The respondent was driving in the opposite direction at approximately 50 mph. He saw the stationary bus but did not reduce his speed or keep proper lookout for pedestrians. The appellant stepped into the road when the respondent’s car was only 30-40 metres away. The respondent struck her, causing severe injuries.

Findings at First Instance

The Lord Ordinary found that the respondent had failed to drive with reasonable care by not reducing speed, not keeping proper lookout, and not being vigilant for children. However, he assessed the appellant’s contributory negligence at 90%, describing her conduct as ‘reckless folly’. The Extra Division of the Inner House reduced this to 70%.

Issues

The key issues before the Supreme Court were: (1) how responsibility should be apportioned in cases involving negligent drivers and careless pedestrians; and (2) what principles should govern appellate review of apportionment decisions.

Judgment

Principles of Apportionment

Lord Reed, delivering the majority judgment, explained that section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 requires damages to be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in responsibility for the damage. This involves consideration of both blameworthiness and causative potency of each party’s conduct.

Lord Reed emphasised that apportionment is inevitably a rough and ready exercise because the fault of the claimant (failure to take care for own safety) and defendant (breach of duty owed to claimant) are incommensurable.

Appellate Review

The court confirmed that appellate courts should only interfere with apportionment where the court below has gone wrong, meaning the determination exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.

Application to Facts

The majority held that the Extra Division’s assessment of 70% contributory negligence was wrong. Lord Reed found that the defender’s conduct played at least an equal role to the pursuer’s in causing damage and was at least equally blameworthy. The defender was driving at speed in poor light conditions, failed to slow down despite seeing a school bus with hazard lights, and failed to keep proper lookout. While the pursuer failed to take reasonable care, she was only 13 years old, and assessing speed in poor light conditions is difficult even for adults.

Dissent

Lord Hodge, with whom Lord Wilson agreed, would have dismissed the appeal, considering that the Extra Division’s determination was within the generous limits of reasonable disagreement. He noted the pursuer displayed a very high degree of carelessness by either not looking or knowingly running into the path of the car.

Implications

This case provides important guidance on apportionment of responsibility in pedestrian-vehicle accidents. It confirms that motorists bear significant responsibility when driving at speed, given the potentially dangerous nature of vehicles. The judgment emphasises that a car being driven at speed is potentially a dangerous weapon, and this must be reflected in assessments of blameworthiness. The case also clarifies the limited circumstances in which appellate courts should interfere with apportionment decisions, while confirming they may do so where the difference of view exceeds the ambit of reasonable disagreement.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court by a 3-2 majority reduced the appellant’s contributory negligence from 70% to 50%, awarding her 50% of the agreed damages.

Source: Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5 (18 February 2015)