Baker v Willoughby [1969] UKHL 8 (26 November 1969)

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident caused by the defendant's negligence, damaging his left leg. Before trial, robbers shot his leg, necessitating amputation. The House of Lords held that the defendant remained liable for the original injury's consequences, as the subsequent injury did not diminish or obliterate the losses already caused.

Facts

On 12th September 1964, the appellant (Mr Baker) was crossing a road on Mitcham Common when he was struck by the respondent’s (Mr Willoughby’s) car. The appellant had been standing behind a van that had run out of petrol and was crossing the road to give money to a companion. He looked to his right before leaving the kerb but failed to see the respondent’s car, which overtook another vehicle. The trial judge found the appellant negligent for not seeing more than one car approaching and for not looking to his right again. The respondent was found negligent for driving at excessive speed or failing to keep a proper look out.

The accident caused fairly severe injury to the appellant’s left leg and ankle, resulting in a stiff ankle with the possibility of worsening. The trial judge assessed damages at £1,600, reduced to £1,200 accounting for 25% contributory negligence.

On 29th November 1967, before trial, the appellant was working sorting scrap metal when two men entered, demanded money, and shot him in the already damaged leg. The injuries were so severe that the leg had to be amputated above the knee.

Issues

Apportionment of Liability

Whether the Court of Appeal was correct to alter the trial judge’s apportionment from 75% defendant and 25% plaintiff to 50% each.

Assessment of Damages

Whether the subsequent shooting and amputation should reduce the damages recoverable from the respondent for the original car accident injuries.

Judgment

On Apportionment

Lord Reid held that there was no reason to disagree with the trial judge’s assessment. He noted that a pedestrian must look both ways while moving slowly and is rarely a danger to others, whereas a motorist travelling at considerable speed must not relax observation given the potentially disastrous consequences. The House restored the original apportionment of 75% to the defendant.

On Damages and the Supervening Injury

The respondent argued that the second injury removed the very limb from which the earlier disability stemmed, and therefore no loss suffered thereafter could be attributed to the respondent’s negligence. The Court of Appeal accepted this argument, but the House of Lords rejected it.

Lord Reid explained that a man is not compensated for the physical injury itself, but for the loss suffered as a result of that injury—his inability to lead a full life, enjoy amenities dependent on freedom of movement, and earn as much as before. The second injury did not diminish any of these losses; the appellant still suffered the same disabilities for the same duration.

Lord Reid referred to Harwood v Wyken Colliery Co [1913] 2 KB 158, where Hamilton LJ stated:

“… he is not disentitled to be paid compensation by reason of the supervention of a disease of the heart. It cannot be said of him that partial incapacity for work has not resulted and is not still resulting from the injury. All that can be said is that such partial incapacity is not still resulting ‘solely’ from the injury.”

Lord Pearson acknowledged the force of the respondent’s argument but held it must not succeed because it produces manifest injustice. The supervening event had not made the plaintiff less lame or disabled—it had made him more so. He emphasised that if the robbers were sued, they would be entitled to take the plaintiff as they found him, only being liable for the additional devaluation caused by their tort.

Lord Pearson proposed viewing damage comprehensively, describing it as a “devaluation” of the plaintiff—a general reduction of his capacity to do things, earn money, and enjoy life. For that devaluation, the original tortfeasor should remain responsible unless something happens to diminish it or shorten the plaintiff’s expectation of life.

Implications

This case established an important principle regarding successive injuries and damages assessment. Where a plaintiff suffers an initial tortious injury followed by a subsequent unrelated injury affecting the same body part, the original tortfeasor remains liable for the full consequences of their wrong. The subsequent injury operates as a concurrent cause rather than obliterating or submerging the original cause of action.

The decision prevents manifest injustice where a plaintiff might otherwise fall into a gap—unable to recover full damages from either tortfeasor. It confirms that compensation is for the loss suffered (disability, loss of amenity, reduced earning capacity) rather than for the physical injury itself.

The case has significant implications for personal injury litigation involving multiple injuries or supervening events, establishing that wrongdoers cannot escape liability simply because subsequent events have compounded or altered the plaintiff’s condition.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The judgment of Donaldson J at first instance was restored, including the apportionment of 75% liability to the defendant and 25% to the plaintiff, and the original damages assessment of £1,600 (reduced to £1,200 for contributory negligence).

Source: Baker v Willoughby [1969] UKHL 8 (26 November 1969)