Woodland v Essex CC [2013] UKSC 66

A ten-year-old pupil suffered a severe brain injury during a swimming lesson arranged by her school but provided by independent contractors. The Supreme Court established the school owed the pupil a non-delegable duty to ensure her safety, making it potentially liable.

Facts

The claimant, Annie Woodland, was a 10-year-old pupil at a school for which the defendant, Essex County Council, was the education authority. The school arranged for pupils to have swimming lessons during school hours as part of the physical education curriculum. These lessons took place at a swimming pool run and occupied by a different local authority. The council contracted with an independent third party, Direct Swimming Services Ltd (‘DSS’), to provide the swimming lessons, which included providing a teacher and a lifeguard. During a lesson, the claimant experienced difficulties in the water, which went unnoticed. By the time she was rescued, she had sustained a severe hypoxic brain injury. The claimant sued the education authority, arguing it was responsible for her safety during the lesson, even though it was conducted by an independent contractor.

Issues

The case was heard as a preliminary issue to determine a point of law. The central issue was whether the education authority owed the claimant a non-delegable duty of care. Specifically, was the authority legally responsible for the negligence of its independent contractor (and its employees) in carrying out the swimming lesson? If such a duty existed, the authority would be liable for any negligence on the part of the contractor’s staff, just as it would be for the negligence of its own employees.

Judgment

The Supreme Court, in a majority decision led by Lord Sumption, held that the education authority did owe a non-delegable duty of care to the claimant. The court distinguished this duty from vicarious liability, noting that a non-delegable duty is a personal duty on the defendant to ensure that care is taken, which is not discharged by delegating the task to a competent contractor.

Lord Sumption’s Reasoning

Lord Sumption identified two broad categories of non-delegable duties. The first, more commonplace category, arises from a particular relationship between the defendant and claimant. He set out five ‘defining features’ that characterise this relationship:

1. The claimant is a patient or a child, or for some other reason is especially vulnerable or dependent on the protection of the defendant against the risk of injury.
2. There is an antecedent relationship between the claimant and the defendant which places the claimant in the actual custody, charge or care of the defendant, and from which it is possible to impute to the defendant the assumption of a positive duty to protect the claimant from harm.
3. The claimant has no control over how the defendant chooses to perform those obligations.
4. The defendant has delegated to a third party some function which is an integral part of the positive duty which he has assumed towards the claimant; and the third party is exercising, for the purpose of the function delegated to him, the defendant’s custody or care of the claimant and the element of control that goes with it.
5. The third party has been negligent not in some collateral respect but in the performance of the very function assumed by the defendant and delegated by the defendant to him.

Applying these principles, Lord Sumption found that the school had assumed a duty to ensure the child’s safety, a duty which extended beyond the classroom. The swimming lessons were an integral part of the school’s educational function. As such, the school could not avoid liability by outsourcing this function.

The school’s duty is to see that reasonable care is taken of the pupils. It is not a duty to take reasonable care itself. In the case of a school, that duty extends to the sports field and the swimming pool as much as to the classroom. It is a duty to see that the children are safe. The school has an anterior and overarching duty of that kind. The swimming lessons were part of the curriculum. They were what the school was supposed to be doing.

Lady Hale’s Concurring Judgment

Lady Hale delivered a concurring judgment, agreeing with the outcome but placing a stronger emphasis on the particular vulnerability of children and the quasi-parental responsibility a school assumes for them. She argued that the duty arises from the school’s assumption of responsibility for the child’s welfare and safety during school hours. She noted that when a school entrusts a child to a third party for an activity that is part of the school day, it remains responsible for ensuring the child’s safety.

Implications

The decision in Woodland v Essex CC provides significant clarification on the scope and nature of non-delegable duties of care. It confirms that organisations such as schools and hospitals, which assume a protective relationship over vulnerable individuals, cannot absolve themselves of their core responsibilities by delegating functions to independent contractors. The case establishes a clear framework for identifying when such duties arise, impacting how public bodies and other institutions manage outsourcing and contractual arrangements for core services. It reinforces the principle that the duty to ensure safety for vulnerable people in an organisation’s care is fundamental and cannot be passed on.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court held that the school authority owed the claimant a non-delegable duty of care. The case was remitted to the Queen’s Bench Division for a factual determination of negligence.

Source: Woodland v Essex CC [2013] UKSC 66