Wilkinson v Downton [1897] EWHC 1

A man falsely told a woman her husband was badly injured in a practical joke. She suffered severe nervous shock and physical illness as a result. The court found she had a valid claim, establishing that intentionally causing nervous shock that leads to physical harm is an actionable tort.

Facts

The defendant, Mr Downton, as a practical joke, told the plaintiff, Mrs Wilkinson, that her husband had been seriously injured in an accident. He informed her that her husband, Thomas Wilkinson, was lying at The Elms public-house in Leytonstone with both his legs broken and that she should go to him at once. The statement was entirely false. The effect of this statement on Mrs Wilkinson was a violent shock to her nervous system, producing vomiting and other serious physical consequences which at one point threatened her reason and resulted in weeks of suffering and incapacity. There was no pre-existing condition of ill-health that would have made her unusually susceptible to such a shock.

Issues

The primary legal issue was whether the plaintiff had a valid cause of action against the defendant for the harm she suffered. The court considered several key questions:
1. Could the plaintiff’s claim succeed in an action for deceit?
2. Can a person be held liable for causing physical harm through words intended to shock, where there is no physical impact or threat of assault?
3. If so, what is the nature of this cause of action, and must the defendant have intended the specific physical harm that resulted?

Judgment

The judgment was delivered by Wright J. He first considered and rejected a cause of action based on deceit. While the defendant had made a fraudulent representation, the plaintiff’s harm did not arise from her acting upon the statement to her detriment in a way typically associated with deceit (e.g., financial or proprietary loss). The expenses she incurred for railway fares to retrieve her husband were recoverable, but the primary claim was for the illness caused by the nervous shock.

The court then established a new and distinct cause of action. Wright J. articulated the principle that forms the basis of the modern tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. He stated:

The defendant has, as I assume for the moment, wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff — that is to say, to infringe her legal right to personal safety, and has in fact thereby caused physical harm to her. That proposition without more appears to me to state a good cause of action, there being no justification alleged for the act.

The critical element was the defendant’s intention. Wright J. reasoned that while the defendant may not have intended to cause the specific, severe illness that Mrs Wilkinson suffered, the intention to produce some kind of harm could be imputed to him. The act of telling such a lie was so obviously likely to cause distress and shock that the law should treat him as if he intended the consequences. He held:

One question is whether the defendant’s act was so plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind which was produced that an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to the defendant, regard being had to the fact that the effect was produced on a person proved to be in an ordinary state of health and mind. I think that it was. … It is no answer in law to say that more harm was done than was anticipated, for that is commonly the case with all wrongs.

Therefore, the court found that the defendant had wilfully and without justification committed an act calculated to cause physical harm, and since physical harm had in fact resulted, he was liable in damages.

Implications

The decision in Wilkinson v Downton was groundbreaking. It established that a cause of action can exist for intentionally inflicting nervous shock that results in a recognised physical or psychiatric illness, even in the absence of any direct physical impact. This created the ‘Rule in Wilkinson v Downton,’ a distinct tort that sits outside of negligence and trespass to the person. It affirmed that the law protects not only physical integrity from direct assault but also from indirect, intentionally inflicted harm communicated by words. The case remains a foundational authority on liability for nervous shock and intentional, indirect harm, demonstrating the common law’s ability to evolve to recognise new forms of injury.

Verdict: Judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of £100 1s. 10½d. awarded by the jury.

Source: Wilkinson v Downton [1897] EWHC 1