T.M.M.C. granted TECO a patent licence requiring royalty and 'compensation' payments for exceeding production quotas. During wartime, T.M.M.C. informally suspended compensation claims. The House of Lords held that delivery of a counterclaim in earlier litigation sufficiently terminated this equitable suspension, allowing T.M.M.C. to recover compensation after reasonable notice.
Facts
Tool Metal Manufacturing Company Limited (T.M.M.C.) owned patents relating to tungsten carbide hard metal alloys. In 1938, they granted Tungsten Electric Company Limited (TECO) a licence to manufacture under these patents. The licence agreement required TECO to pay a 10% royalty and additionally ‘compensation’ of 30% on the value of material exceeding 50 kilograms per month. During the Second World War, T.M.M.C. informally indicated they would not claim compensation, and TECO ceased making such payments. In 1945, TECO sued T.M.M.C. for fraud and alleged an agreement abolishing compensation. T.M.M.C. counterclaimed for compensation from June 1945. The Court of Appeal in the first action held that while no binding agreement existed, equitable principles prevented T.M.M.C. from claiming compensation without first giving notice to terminate the suspension. In the present action, T.M.M.C. claimed compensation from 1st January 1947.
Issues
Whether the counterclaim in the first action constituted sufficient notice to terminate the equitable suspension
TECO argued that the counterclaim was insufficient because it did not expressly terminate an existing agreement and did not specify a date for termination.
Whether clause 5 was void as an unreasonable restraint of trade
Whether clause 5 imposed an unenforceable penalty
Whether clause 5 contravened section 38 of the Patents and Designs Act 1907
Judgment
The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal and restored the judgment of Pearson J. in favour of T.M.M.C.
On the notice issue, the Lords held that the counterclaim delivered in March 1946 was sufficient intimation that T.M.M.C. intended to reassert their legal rights. The arrangement was not a binding agreement but a voluntary concession which equity required T.M.M.C. to give notice before terminating. Viscount Simonds held that once the counterclaim was delivered, TECO must be taken to know that the suspensory period was at an end. Lord Cohen agreed that the counterclaim was a plain intimation of changed intention. Lord Tucker stated that the counterclaim contained a clear intimation of reversal of T.M.M.C.’s previous attitude regarding compensation.
The Lords rejected the argument that a dated notice specifying a future termination date was required, distinguishing the Canadian Pacific Railway v The King case on its particular facts. The nine months between the counterclaim and 1st January 1947 provided adequate time for TECO to readjust their position.
On restraint of trade, the Lords held that even if clause 5 contained a restraint, it was reasonable both between the parties and in the public interest. TECO had accepted the agreement in difficult circumstances, and there was no evidence it limited supply or affected consumer prices.
On the penalty defence, this was rejected as clause 5 did not impose a penalty in the equitable sense relating to breach of contractual obligation.
On section 38 of the Patents and Designs Act 1907, there was a division of reasoning. Viscount Simonds would have allowed the appeal on this ground alone, holding that clause 5’s effect was to restrict TECO from using material from outside suppliers by imposing economic consequences that prevented free choice. However, Lords Oaksey (reading Lord Reid’s opinion), Tucker and Cohen held that section 38 did not apply because it required prohibition or restriction of legal rights, not merely financial inducements affecting commercial choice.
Implications
This case is significant for clarifying the doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable forbearance. It establishes that the suspension of contractual rights through equitable principles can be terminated by any clear intimation that the party intends to resume their legal rights, without requiring a formally dated notice specifying a termination date. The adequacy of notice depends on the circumstances of each case. The decision also demonstrates that pleadings in litigation can constitute sufficient notice for these purposes. On patent law, the case shows the courts’ approach to interpreting section 38 of the Patents and Designs Act 1907 regarding conditions in patent licences.
Verdict: Appeal allowed. The order of Pearson J. was restored, entitling T.M.M.C. to recover compensation of £84,050 4s. 4d. with interest from TECO. The Court of Appeal's decision was reversed.
Source: Tool Metal Manufacturing Company Ltd v Tungsten Electric Company Ltd [1955] UKHL 5 (16 June 1955)
Cite this work:
To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Tool Metal Manufacturing Company Ltd v Tungsten Electric Company Ltd [1955] UKHL 5 (16 June 1955)' (LawCases.net, September 2025) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/tool-metal-manufactuing-company-ltd-v-tungsten-electric-company-ltd-1955-ukhl-5-16-june-1955/> accessed 11 March 2026
