A patent holder agreed to suspend compensation payments from a licensee during the war. After the war, they sought to resume payments. The House of Lords held their promise was terminable by giving reasonable notice, confirming promissory estoppel suspends, not extinguishes, rights.
Facts
In 1938, the appellants (Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd, ‘TMM’) granted the respondents (Tungsten Electric Co Ltd, ‘TECO’) a licence to import, make, use, and sell hard metal alloys protected by TMM’s patents. The agreement stipulated that if TECO’s monthly sales exceeded a specified quota, they were required to pay ‘compensation’ to TMM. Following the outbreak of war in 1939, TMM agreed to suspend their right to compensation, allowing TECO to increase production for the war effort. This promise was not supported by consideration.
After the war, a dispute arose. In a first action, TMM unsuccessfully counterclaimed for compensation payments from 1st June 1945. The Court of Appeal held that TMM’s promise to suspend payments was binding until such time as they provided reasonable notice of their intention to resume their strict legal rights. In a second, new action, TMM claimed for compensation payable from 1st January 1947, arguing that their counterclaim in the first action (delivered in September 1946) constituted sufficient notice to end the suspension.
Issues
The central legal issue before the House of Lords was whether TMM had effectively revoked their promise to suspend compensation payments. This involved two key questions:
- Could a party who had promised to suspend their contractual rights, thereby creating an equitable estoppel, later resume those rights?
- If so, what constituted sufficient and ‘reasonable’ notice of their intention to do so? Specifically, was the service of a counterclaim in a prior legal action adequate notice to allow enforcement of the original rights from a future date?
Judgment
The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal, finding in favour of TMM. The court affirmed and clarified the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel, as previously articulated in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439 and Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130.
Reasoning of the Court
The Lords held that the equitable principle prevents a party from insisting on their strict legal rights when they have made a promise or representation to suspend them, which the other party has acted upon. However, this estoppel was held to be suspensory, not extinctive. The promisor could resume their rights by giving the promisee reasonable notice, allowing the promisee a fair opportunity to adjust their position.
The crucial finding was that the counterclaim delivered by TMM in the first action constituted clear and unequivocal notice that the period of suspension was over. As Lord Cohen stated:
I think that the Appellants’ counterclaim in the first action was a plain notice to the Respondents that the Appellants intended thenceforth to enforce the provisions of clause 5 of the 1938 deed… They could not, of course, recover compensation for any period before the service of the counterclaim and it might be that a reasonable time must elapse before the notice became effective, but it was none the less a good notice.
The court determined that the period between the delivery of the counterclaim in September 1946 and the date from which compensation was now claimed (1st January 1947) was a ‘reasonable’ time for TECO to rearrange its commercial affairs in light of the restored obligation to pay compensation.
Viscount Simonds summarised the underlying principle:
The gist of the equity lies in the fact that one party has by his conduct led the other to alter his position. I lay stress on this, because I would not have it supposed, particularly in commercial transactions, that a promise, binding in equity, can be plucked out of the air.
Implications
The decision in Tool Metal v Tungsten Electric is a landmark case in contract law. It authoritatively established that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has a suspensory effect on legal rights. The case confirms that rights waived or suspended by an estoppel are not permanently extinguished and can be revived upon the giving of reasonable notice. It also clarified that such ‘notice’ need not be formal; a clear communication of intent, such as the institution of legal proceedings, can be sufficient. This judgment cemented the role of promissory estoppel as a flexible equitable tool for achieving fairness in contractual relations, balancing the protection of a party who has relied on a promise with the original rights of the promisor.
Verdict: Appeal allowed. The appellants (Tool Metal) were entitled to the relief claimed in their statement of claim.
Source: Tool Metal Manufactuing Company Ltd v Tungsten Electric Company Ltd [1955] UKHL 5 (16 June 1955)
Cite this work:
To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Tool Metal Manufacturing Company Ltd v Tungsten Electric Company Ltd [1955] UKHL 5 (16 June 1955)' (LawCases.net, September 2025) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/tool-metal-manufactuing-company-ltd-v-tungsten-electric-company-ltd-1955-ukhl-5-16-june-1955/> accessed 17 November 2025

