Tindall and another v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33

Police attended a road accident caused by black ice but left without adequately warning other motorists. A fatal collision subsequently occurred on the same stretch of road. The Supreme Court held the police owed no duty of care as they had not made matters worse in a legally relevant sense, nor did any exception to the general rule against liability for omissions apply.

Facts

On 4 March 2014, Martin Kendall lost control of his car on black ice and crashed. He called 101, informing police of the ice hazard. Police officers attended, placed a single warning sign on the northbound carriageway, and requested a gritter. However, they left the scene without ensuring the road was made safe, removing the sign. Shortly afterwards, Carl Bird lost control on the same ice patch, colliding head-on with Malcolm Tindall’s car. Both Mr Tindall and Mr Bird died. Mrs Tindall, as widow and administratrix, sued the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police in negligence.

Mr Kendall’s Evidence

Mr Kendall stated he would have continued warning motorists had the police not arrived. However, it was accepted that the police neither encouraged nor directed him to stop his warning efforts or to leave in the ambulance.

Issues

The central legal issue was whether the police owed a duty of care in negligence to Mr Tindall. The claimant argued the police either: (1) made matters worse by displacing Mr Kendall’s warning efforts; or (2) fell within an exception to the general rule that no duty of care exists to protect persons from harm not created by the defendant.

Judgment

Making Matters Worse

The Supreme Court affirmed the fundamental distinction between making matters worse and failing to confer a benefit. Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrows, delivering the joint judgment, stated:

“The relevant comparison is with what would have happened if the defendant had done nothing at all and had never embarked on the activity which has given rise to the claim.”

The Court accepted the ‘interference principle’ articulated by McBride and Bagshaw: if a defendant’s conduct puts off or prevents someone else from helping a claimant, a duty of care may arise. However, for such a duty to arise, the defendant must have known or ought to have known that their conduct would have this effect.

The claimant’s case failed on this point. There was no evidence that the police knew or ought to have known that Mr Kendall intended to warn motorists. The Court stated:

“As far as the police were concerned, Mr Kendall was someone who had been injured in an accident and no more than that. He was a victim, not a rescuer.”

Exceptions to the General Rule

The Court rejected arguments based on assumption of responsibility (no communication or interaction between police and Mr Tindall), control (the police did not take control of the ice patch itself), and status (irreconcilable with the decision in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police).

Implications

This case reinforces the settled principles from Michael and Robinson that public authorities, including the police, are generally not liable in negligence for failing to protect individuals from harm unless they have made matters worse or fall within a recognised exception. The ‘interference principle’ was accepted as valid but requires foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct would displace alternative protective measures. The judgment confirms that ineffectual attempts at rescue or protection do not create liability.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The police owed no duty of care to Mr Tindall as they had not made matters worse in any legally relevant sense, and no exception to the general rule against liability for pure omissions applied.

Source: Tindall and another v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33