Tamiz v Google Inc [2012] EWHC 449 (QB)

A libel claim against Google for comments on its Blogger platform was struck out. The court held that after notification, Google's liability as a publisher was for a very brief period, and the publication was too trivial to constitute a real and substantial tort.

Facts

The claimant, Mr Payam Tamiz, brought a libel claim against Google Inc. concerning allegedly defamatory comments posted by anonymous users on a blog titled ‘London’s Dirty Little Secret’. The blog was hosted on Google’s ‘Blogger’ platform. The eight comments in question were posted between April and August 2011. Mr Tamiz’s solicitors sent a letter of claim to Google on 24 August 2011, notifying them of the comments and requesting their removal. The entire blog was eventually removed by Google on 28 September 2011. The claimant issued proceedings against Google on 21 October 2011, alleging that Google was liable as a publisher of the defamatory material.

Issues

The court considered an application by Google to strike out the claim. The key legal issues were:

Publisher Liability

Whether Google Inc, as the host of the Blogger platform, could be considered a ‘publisher’ of the defamatory comments at common law, particularly after it had been notified of their existence.

Abuse of Process

Whether the claim should be struck out under the principle established in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc, on the basis that the publication was so limited that it did not amount to a ‘real and substantial tort’ and allowing the claim to proceed would be an abuse of the court’s process.

Statutory Defences

Whether Google could rely on the defence for intermediaries under s.1 of the Defamation Act 1996 or the ‘hosting’ defence under Regulation 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.

Judgment

Mr Justice Eady granted Google’s application to strike out the claim. The court’s reasoning focused primarily on the concepts of publisher liability and abuse of process.

Analysis of Publisher Status

The judge was prepared to assume, without deciding, that Google was not a publisher of the comments prior to being notified of the complaint. However, he concluded that upon notification, an intermediary like Google may become liable as a publisher if it fails to remove the content within a reasonable period. The judge held that any period of publication attributable to Google would have been very short, starting from a reasonable time after the notification on 24 August 2011 and ending when the blog was removed.

Application of the Jameel Principle

The core of the judgment rested on the application of the Jameel principle of ‘real and substantial tort’. The court found that the claimant had provided no evidence that anyone in the jurisdiction of England and Wales had actually read the defamatory comments. The judge determined that any publication for which Google could be held responsible was trivial and did not justify the use of judicial resources. He stated:

In my judgment, the intermittent and passing nature of the publication in this case, coupled with the lack of any evidence that a third person in England and Wales ever accessed the offending material, means that it would be an abuse of the court’s process to permit it to continue.

Mr Justice Eady concluded that even if Google were deemed a publisher for the period between notification and removal, the resulting tort would be insignificant. Continuing the litigation would be disproportionate and would not serve the interests of justice. He made the following critical observation:

I do not consider that a claim in respect of the short period of continued publication of this material, after the Claimant first gave notification of his complaint on 24 August 2011, constitutes a real and substantial tort. The game would not be worth the candle. Furthermore, to permit the Claimant to proceed would be to inflict an injustice on the Defendant and, I would add, to bring the administration of justice into disrepute…

Because the claim was struck out on this primary basis, the court did not need to make a definitive ruling on the applicability of statutory defences under the Defamation Act 1996 or the E-Commerce Regulations 2002.

Implications

The decision in Tamiz v Google Inc was significant in the developing law of internet libel. It affirmed that while internet intermediaries may become publishers upon notification of defamatory content, they will not be liable if the actual publication is trivial and lacks evidence of readership within the jurisdiction. The case reinforces the high bar set by the Jameel principle, requiring claimants in libel actions to demonstrate a ‘real and substantial’ harm to reputation, thereby preventing disproportionate litigation over minor or unread online comments. It serves as a key authority on the responsibility of platform hosts and the procedural hurdles claimants face in bringing defamation claims against them.

Verdict: The claim was struck out.

Source: Tamiz v Google Inc [2012] EWHC 449 (QB)