Stephenson v Daley [2026] EWHC 53 (Ch)

The High Court propounded in solemn form the 2016 will of Elaine Reid, who left her estate to her partner Malcolm rather than her sons. The court rejected the sons' challenge based on want of knowledge and approval, and found their 7½-year delay also barred the claim by laches.

Facts

Elaine Carol Reid (the Deceased) died on 25 October 2016, aged 62, having executed a will dated 12 July 2016 prepared by solicitor Stephen Davies and witnessed by him and his assistant Helen Sadler. By the Will, she left her entire estate, including her property at 3 Berry House Cottages, to her long-term partner Malcolm Roocroft, with a gift over to her two sons (the defendants) if Malcolm predeceased her. Malcolm survived her but died on 28 November 2024 without having obtained probate, his efforts having been blocked by caveats entered by the defendants from late 2016 onwards. The claimants, as executors and beneficiaries of Malcolm’s 2024 will, sought to propound the Deceased’s Will in solemn form. The Deceased had been terminally ill with cancer and was in hospital shortly before the Will was prepared. Malcolm had been her full-time carer and had repeatedly raised concerns about his housing should she die intestate.

Issues

At trial, the sole substantive ground on which the defendants sought to set aside the Will was that the Deceased did not know and approve of its contents. Capacity, due execution, and undue influence (coercion) were no longer in dispute. A secondary issue was whether the counterclaim was in any event barred by laches given the defendants’ delay of over seven years in bringing proceedings.

Arguments

Defendants

The defendants advanced fifteen grounds of suspicion, including: that the Will was initiated by Malcolm (the sole beneficiary); that Malcolm was likely present during the instruction-taking telephone call on 8 July 2016 and throughout the execution on 12 July 2016; that Mr Davies’ file notes were unreliable and one was dated “12/7/17” suggesting it had been fabricated; that the Deceased was likely in hospital and unable to take or make calls; that the Will represented a dramatic change from her previous refusal to make a will; that the address on the Will was misspelled as “Bury House Cottages” suggesting she had not read it carefully; and that the relationship between the Deceased and Malcolm was unhappy, with her regarding him as a lodger she despised.

Claimants

The claimants contended that the Deceased knew and approved of her short, simple, and rational Will, which had been read over to her by an experienced solicitor, and that she had corrected typographical errors demonstrating her engagement with the document. They also argued the counterclaim was barred by laches.

Judgment

HHJ Cadwallader set out the relevant law, citing Hoff v Atherton [2003] EWCA Civ 1554, Fuller v Strum [2001] EWCA Civ 1879, Pascall v Graham [2025] UKPC 26, and Gill v Woodall [2010] EWCA Civ 1430. The judge preferred the unitary approach to knowledge and approval endorsed in Pascall v Graham and Gill v Woodall, noting the strong presumption that arises where a properly executed will has been read over to a capable testator. He quoted Lord Neuberger MR’s observations in Gill v Woodall:

As a matter of common sense and authority, the fact that a will has been properly executed, after being prepared by a solicitor and read over to the testatrix, raises a very strong presumption that it represents the testatrix’s intentions at the relevant time, namely the moment she executes the will.

The judge also cited Scarman J’s observation in In the Estate of Fuld (No 3):

when all is dark, it is dangerous for a court to claim that it can see the light.

Assessing the evidence, the judge found Helen Sadler honest and accurate, and considered that Mr Davies, though his working practices had been casual and his recollection patchy, was genuinely attempting to assist. He rejected the serious allegation that Mr Davies had fabricated and backdated his file notes in 2017, describing it as unjustified and unsupported by cogent evidence. The judge found that the Deceased herself gave the instructions for the Will (whether or not Malcolm was present during the call), that the change in her testamentary stance was explicable by Malcolm’s care for her and her sense of obligation, and that Malcolm had left the room before execution. The Will was read over to her, she corrected the misspelling of her sons’ surname (“Daley” for “Daily”), amended provisions regarding cremation, and executed the Will with full capacity. The failure to spot the “Bury”/”Berry” address error was not sufficient to displace the presumption of knowledge and approval.

On laches, the judge applied the principles stated in Lindsay Petroleum Company v Hurd (1873) 5 AC 221 and James v Scudamore [2023] EWHC 996 (Ch). The defendants had full knowledge of the grounds of challenge by July 2017 (following the Larke v Nugus reply of 10 April 2017) but did not bring proceedings until counterclaiming in 2025, a delay of at least 7½ years. The delay had deprived the court of Malcolm’s evidence entirely, weakened the memories of key witnesses, and prejudiced the reconstruction of the solicitor’s file (the firm having closed in 2023). The defendants’ explanation that they thought it was for Malcolm to take the next step was accepted as plausible but did not justify the delay. The judge held he would have refused to set aside the Will on the ground of laches alone.

Implications

The decision reinforces the very strong presumption of knowledge and approval that arises where a will is prepared by a solicitor, read over to a testator with full capacity, and duly executed. It illustrates the high evidential hurdle faced by disappointed relatives who challenge a short and straightforward will on the narrow ground of want of knowledge and approval, particularly where capacity, due execution, and coercion are not in issue. The judgment also underlines the courts’ reluctance to entertain unsupported allegations of professional misconduct or forgery against solicitors drafting wills.

On laches, the decision applies the approach in James v Scudamore to probate claims and demonstrates that unjustified delay combined with detrimental consequences (such as the loss of key witness evidence through intervening death) can defeat a probate challenge independently of its merits. Practitioners advising potential will challengers should note the importance of bringing proceedings promptly, particularly where key witnesses are elderly or unwell. The case also highlights the policy considerations articulated in Pascall v Graham and Gill v Woodall: that testamentary freedom should not be undermined by disappointed relatives, and estates should not be diminished by speculative litigation.

Verdict: The court directed a grant of probate in solemn form of the last will of Elaine Carol Reid dated 12 July 2016 to the claimants and dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim. The court found that the Deceased knew and approved the contents of her Will, and held that, in any event, the counterclaim would have been barred by laches.

Source: Stephenson v Daley [2026] EWHC 53 (Ch)