Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248

A fire caused by faulty wiring at a tyre-fitting business spread to an adjoining property. The defendant was not held strictly liable under Rylands v Fletcher because the items brought onto the land (tyres) did not themselves escape, only the fire did.

Facts

The defendant, Mr Stannard, operated a tyre-fitting business, Wyvern Tyres, from a unit on a trading estate. In February 2008, a fire, which likely originated from an electrical fault in the wiring, ignited a large collection of tyres stored on the premises. The blaze became incredibly intense due to the approximately 3,000 tyres acting as fuel, and it spread to the claimant’s adjoining property, which was completely destroyed. The claimant, Mr Gore, brought an action for damages, and at first instance, the judge held the defendant strictly liable for the damage under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.

Issues

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge had correctly applied the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The Court of Appeal considered two primary questions:

1. Can the rule in Rylands v Fletcher apply where the ‘thing’ that escapes (fire) is not the same ‘thing’ that was brought onto the land (tyres)?

2. Did the defendant’s storage of a large quantity of tyres on his business premises constitute a ‘non-natural use’ of the land for the purposes of the rule?

Judgment

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal, overturning the High Court’s decision. Lord Justice Ward gave the leading judgment.

The Scope of Rylands v Fletcher

Ward LJ conducted a comprehensive review of the historical development of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and its application to cases involving fire. He emphasised the core principle as originally stated by Blackburn J, where liability is imposed on a person who brings something onto their land which is ‘likely to do mischief if it escapes’.

The court analysed subsequent developments, particularly the House of Lords decisions in Read v J. Lyons & Co. Ltd, Cambridge Water Co. Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc, and Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council. These cases established that the rule imposes strict liability for damage caused by the escape of an exceptionally hazardous thing from a ‘non-natural’ use of land.

Application to Fire Cases

The decisive issue was the distinction between the item accumulated and the item that escaped. The court held that for the rule in Rylands v Fletcher to apply, the ‘thing’ which the defendant brought onto his land must be the ‘thing’ that escaped. In this case, Mr Stannard brought tyres onto the land, but it was the fire that escaped. The tyres were not, in themselves, exceptionally dangerous or likely to escape; they only became dangerous when ignited by the fire, which started accidentally.

Ward LJ stated the correct legal position for fire cases as follows:

The rule in Rylands v Fletcher is engaged only where the defendant has brought something onto his land and the thing he has brought on to his land has escaped. It is not engaged where the defendant has brought a thing onto his land which is not dangerous but which has been rendered dangerous by the happening of some event and the dangerous thing has then escaped.

Furthermore, the court addressed the question of ‘non-natural use’. It held that storing tyres on the premises of a tyre-fitting business was an ordinary and normal activity for that location. Following the restrictive interpretation of ‘non-natural use’ in Transco, this activity did not qualify. As Ward LJ noted:

…the keeping of tyres on the premises of a tyre-fitting business was a perfectly normal and reasonable activity to be carried on at a light industrial estate. It was not a ‘non-natural’ use of the land.

Therefore, two essential requirements for a claim under Rylands v Fletcher were not met.

Implications

This decision significantly narrows the application of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, particularly in the context of fire damage. It clarifies that strict liability will not be imposed simply because a fire starts on a defendant’s land and escapes, even if materials that exacerbate the fire are present. Instead, liability for the spread of fire will almost always be determined according to the principles of negligence. The case confirms that for the strict liability rule to apply, the object brought onto the land must itself be exceptionally dangerous and it must be that object which escapes. It also reinforces the very high and difficult threshold for establishing ‘non-natural use’ of land post-Transco.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The judgment in favour of the claimant at first instance was set aside.

Source: Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248