Three appellants were convicted of conspiracy to counterfeit half sovereigns. They argued that the Coinage Offences Act 1936 required proof of dishonest intent to defraud. The House of Lords held that the offence under section 1(1)(a) required only basic intent to produce counterfeit coins, not specific intent to defraud.
Facts
The three appellants, David Heron, Peter Edwin Storey, and Christopher Robin Thomas, were charged with conspiracy to falsely make or counterfeit coins resembling current gold coins, namely half sovereigns, contrary to section 1(1)(a) of the Coinage Offences Act 1936. Evidence established that they had engaged in producing coins closely resembling half sovereigns using copper, dies, and other processes. The Crown produced no evidence as to what the appellants intended to do with the coins after manufacture.
Procedural History
At trial, the appellants pleaded not guilty and submitted that the Crown must prove a dishonest intention or intent to defraud. The trial judge ruled against this submission, whereupon the appellants changed their pleas to guilty. They appealed to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), which dismissed the appeal but certified a point of law of general public importance. Leave to appeal was granted by the House of Lords.
Issues
The certified question was whether the offence of counterfeiting under section 1(1)(a) of the Coinage Offences Act 1936 required proof of dishonest intent, or whether it was sufficient to prove only an intention to make false or counterfeit coin resembling current coin (a crime of basic intent versus specific intent).
Judgment
The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeals, holding that section 1(1)(a) enacted a crime of basic intent only, requiring no proof of dishonest intent or intent to defraud.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale
Lord Simon distinguished between crimes of basic intent and specific intent, citing Canadian authority:
“In considering the question of mens rea, a distinction is to be made between (i) intention as applied to acts considered in relation to their purposes and (ii) intention as applied to acts apart from their purposes. A general intent attending the commission of an act is, in some cases, the only intent required to constitute the crime while, in others, there must be, in addition to that general intent, a specific intent attending the purpose for the commission of the act.”
His Lordship examined the statutory context, noting that other provisions of the 1936 Act expressly used words such as “with intent to” where specific intent was required, and that section 5(6) expressly used “with intent to defraud” for the offence of uttering. The absence of such words in section 1(1)(a) was significant. He concluded that “falsely” and “counterfeits” in the section bore the connotation of “spurious” rather than necessarily importing fraud.
Lord Russell of Killowen
Lord Russell emphasised that the language of section 1(1) expressed merely the activity of producing a false or counterfeit coin:
“A false or counterfeit coin is one which resembles a genuine current coin but is not, and so is false or counterfeit. It is the making of such, and no more than the making of such, at which section 1(1) is aimed.”
Lord Scarman
Lord Scarman noted that the certified question was no longer of general public importance as the 1936 Act had been repealed and replaced by the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981. However, he agreed with the Court of Appeal’s interpretation and addressed the proper approach to construing consolidating statutes, observing that recourse to legislative history is appropriate where there is real difficulty or ambiguity.
Implications
This case clarified that counterfeiting offences under the Coinage Offences Act 1936 did not require proof of intent to defraud or deceive; the deliberate act of making false coin sufficed. The decision confirmed the distinction between crimes of basic intent and specific intent in criminal law. Although the 1936 Act has since been replaced, the case remains instructive on statutory interpretation of consolidating Acts and the identification of mens rea requirements from statutory language and context.
Verdict: Appeals dismissed. The Court of Appeal’s decision was affirmed, holding that the offence under section 1(1)(a) of the Coinage Offences Act 1936 required only basic intent to produce counterfeit coins, not specific dishonest intent.
Source: R v Heron [1982] UKHL 9
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To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'R v Heron [1982] UKHL 9' (LawCases.net, January 2026) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/r-v-heron-1982-ukhl-9/> accessed 3 April 2026

