R v Chandler [1964] EWCA Crim 1

Chandler was convicted of inciting public nuisance and causing public nuisance by obstructing highways during demonstrations against the Greek Royal Visit. He appealed on grounds concerning jury challenges, arguing he had a legal right to 'stand by' jurors after exhausting peremptory challenges. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal, ruling no such right exists for the accused.

Facts

The appellant, Terence Norman Chandler, was convicted at the Central Criminal Court in December 1963 of one count of inciting others to cause a public nuisance by obstructing the highway and two counts of causing a public nuisance himself. The offences arose from demonstrations organised by the Committee of 100 during the Greek Royal Visit in July 1963. On 9th July, demonstrators assembled in Trafalgar Square and forced through police cordons along Whitehall. On 11th July, the appellant was observed directing groups of people towards Claridge’s Hotel, telling them to form a queue and follow him despite police opposition. Evidence showed he directed demonstrators with statements such as ‘Follow me. We will beat them yet’ and ‘We must get into Piccadilly. That’s my route for getting to Claridge’s.’

Issues

Primary Issue

Whether an accused person has a legal right, after exhausting peremptory challenges, to ‘stand by’ jurors (provisional challenge) until the entire panel is exhausted before being required to show cause for challenge.

Secondary Issues

Whether the judge erred in ruling that the appellant could not cross-examine a juror challenged for cause; whether the judge wrongly ruled that a prosecution witness need not answer questions about officers assigned to watch the appellant; and whether the obstruction constituted a public nuisance.

Judgment

The Lord Chief Justice (Lord Parker) delivered the judgment of the Court. On the fundamental question of jury challenges, the Court traced the historical development of challenge rights. Prior to 1305, the Crown had unlimited peremptory challenges, but the statute of 33 Edward I abolished this, allowing the Crown only challenges for cause with the privilege of ‘standing by’ jurors until the panel was exhausted.

Regarding the accused’s position, the Court found that while there had been cases where standing by was permitted as a matter of convenience or courtesy, particularly in misdemeanours where no peremptory challenges existed, this was never established as a legal right:

“So far as felonies are concerned, as I have said there is no case where it has been established that there ever was such a right in the prisoner.”

The Court noted that the rationale for granting the privilege had been when there was no peremptory challenge available:

“Accordingly, as this Court sees it, the position today is that there never has been a right in the subject to adopt what is the right of the Crown, and that the real ground for granting the privilege of standing by jurors was when there was no peremptory challenge, as in the case of misdemeanour.”

On the cross-examination of jurors, the Court held that before any right to cross-examine arose, the appellant would need to establish a foundation of fact in support of his challenge. On the question about police officers, the Court held the judge was entitled to prevent the witness answering a general question of that nature.

Implications

This case clarified an important procedural point regarding jury selection. The Court established that while the Crown has a legal right to stand by jurors before showing cause for challenge, the accused has no corresponding legal right. A judge retains discretion to permit an accused to stand by jurors in exceptional cases, but this is not an entitlement. The case also confirmed that following the Criminal Justice Act 1948, which granted seven peremptory challenges in both felonies and misdemeanours, there was no longer any practical need to extend the standing by privilege to defendants as a matter of courtesy.

The Court certified a point of law of general public importance for potential appeal to the House of Lords: whether there is a legal right today in an accused to follow what is the right of the Crown in regard to standing jurors by and not challenging for cause until the panel is exhausted.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed on points of law; application for leave to appeal on other grounds refused. The Court certified a point of law of general public importance but refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

Source: R v Chandler [1964] EWCA Crim 1