Partridge v Crittenden 05 Apr 1968 [1968] 1 WLR 1204, DC

An advertiser placed an advertisement for 'Bramblefinch cocks, Bramblefinch hens, 25s. each'. He was charged with unlawfully offering for sale a wild bird. The High Court held the advertisement was an 'invitation to treat', not an 'offer for sale'.

Facts

The appellant, Mr Partridge, placed an advertisement in the periodical ‘Cage and Aviary Birds’ which read: ‘Bramblefinch cocks, Bramblefinch hens, 25s. each’. He was prosecuted by the RSPCA and subsequently convicted by magistrates for the offence of unlawfully offering for sale a wild live bird, contrary to section 6(1) of the Protection of Birds Act 1954. A reader of the periodical had completed and sent a cheque for a hen, which the appellant then dispatched to him. The appellant appealed his conviction to the High Court by way of case stated.

Issues

The sole legal issue before the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division was whether the appellant’s advertisement constituted an ‘offer for sale’ under the Protection of Birds Act 1954. If it was an offer, the conviction was correct. If, however, it was merely an ‘invitation to treat’, then no offence had been committed.

Judgment

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction. The judges reasoned that the general principles of contract law should apply to the interpretation of the phrase ‘offer for sale’ in the statute.

Lord Parker C.J.

Lord Parker C.J. held that there was a ‘business sense’ in treating such advertisements as invitations to treat rather than offers. He drew a distinction between advertisements from manufacturers (which could be offers) and those from individuals. He stated:

I think that when one is dealing with advertisements and circulars, unless they indeed come from manufacturers, there is business sense in their being construed as invitations to treat and not offers for sale.

He referenced the case of Fisher v. Bell, where displaying a flick-knife in a shop window was held to be an invitation to treat, not an offer for sale. He argued that if the advertisement were an offer, the advertiser would be contractually obliged to sell to every person who accepted, which could lead to an impossible situation if stock was limited. The legal offer is made by the person responding to the advertisement, which the advertiser can then accept or reject.

Ashworth J.

Ashworth J. agreed, finding it compelling that the law of contract’s distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat should apply. He saw no reason to interpret ‘offer for sale’ differently in a criminal statute than in a civil context. He noted:

…the insertion of an advertisement in the form adopted here under the title ‘Classified Advertisements’ is simply an invitation to treat.

Blain J.

Blain J. also concurred, emphasising that Parliament should be presumed to have used legal terms in their established legal sense. He distinguished between the ordinary, lay understanding of ‘offer’ and its precise legal meaning:

…it seems to me that it is not a proper legally-phrased offer for sale, which is what is contemplated by the section, in that it is not an offer which is capable of acceptance so as to make a contract: it is an invitation to the public to make offers to the advertiser to buy the articles comprised in the advertisement.

Implications

The decision in Partridge v Crittenden is a leading authority that reinforces the legal principle that advertisements are generally considered invitations to treat, not offers. The case confirmed that this contract law principle applies to the interpretation of criminal statutes unless Parliament has clearly indicated a different intention. This protects advertisers from being legally bound to an unmanageable number of contracts and clarifies that the customer’s response to an advertisement is typically the contractual offer.

Verdict: Appeal allowed and the conviction was quashed.

Source: Partridge v Crittenden 05 Apr 1968 [1968] 1 WLR 1204, DC