McFarlane v E. E. Caledonia Ltd [1993] EWCA Civ 13

The plaintiff, on board the support vessel Tharos during the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster, claimed psychiatric injury from witnessing the catastrophe. The Court of Appeal held he was not owed a duty of care as he was neither in actual danger, a rescuer, nor had sufficient proximity as a bystander.

Facts

On 6th July 1988, a catastrophic fire engulfed the Piper Alpha oil rig in the North Sea, killing 164 men. The plaintiff, James McFarlane, was a painter employed on the rig who was off-duty and accommodated on the support vessel ‘Tharos’, stationed approximately 550 metres from the platform. When the disaster occurred, the Tharos moved towards the burning rig to assist in firefighting and rescue operations, at times coming within 50-100 metres of the inferno. The plaintiff witnessed the horrific events for approximately one and three-quarter hours before being evacuated by helicopter. He suffered no physical injury but claimed psychiatric injury as a result of his experiences.

The Plaintiff’s Position

The plaintiff observed explosions, men on fire, people jumping from great heights, and the structural collapse of the platform. The trial judge found he was probably more susceptible to psychiatric injury than an average person, having previously suffered two episodes of depressive illness.

Issues

The preliminary issue was whether the defendants, as owners and operators of Piper Alpha, owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing him psychiatric injury. Three bases were advanced:

1. That the plaintiff was reasonably in fear for his life and safety (a participant)
2. That he was a rescuer
3. That as a bystander, the events were so horrendous that psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable

Judgment

Participant Status

Stuart-Smith LJ identified three situations where a plaintiff may be a participant: (1) being in the actual area of danger but escaping by chance; (2) not being in actual danger but reasonably believing so due to sudden unexpected events; (3) coming into danger as a rescuer. The Court held the plaintiff fell into none of these categories.

The Tharos was never in actual danger. Captain Letty, the vessel’s master, gave evidence that:

“We came very close to being in danger, but we did not cross the line.”

The vessel sustained no damage save minimal paint blistering, no debris fell on it, and no one suffered physical injury. Stuart-Smith LJ stated:

“In my judgment it cannot be said that the Defendants ought reasonably to have foreseen that the Plaintiff or other non-essential personnel on board her would suffer such injury.”

Rescuer Status

The Court rejected this argument. The plaintiff’s involvement was limited to helping move blankets and briefly assisting two walking wounded. Stuart-Smith LJ held:

“I do not think that a Defendant could reasonably foresee that this very limited degree of involvement could possibly give rise to psychiatric injury.”

Bystander Claim

While acknowledging dicta in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire suggesting possible recovery for bystanders witnessing particularly horrific events, Stuart-Smith LJ declined to extend the duty, stating:

“In my judgment both as a matter of principle and policy the Court should not extend the duty to those who are mere bystanders or witnesses of horrific events unless there is a sufficient degree of proximity, which requires both nearness in time and place and a close relationship of love and affection between plaintiff and victim.”

Credibility Findings

The Court was critical of the plaintiff’s evidence regarding his alleged fears, noting that fear for his own safety was not pleaded until after the Alcock decision and appeared to be an afterthought. The factual bases for his professed fears were not accepted by the trial judge.

Implications

This case significantly restricts recovery for psychiatric injury by establishing that:

• A plaintiff must be in actual or reasonably perceived danger to recover as a participant
• Being on a vessel approaching a disaster scene does not automatically create the necessary proximity
• Minimal involvement in rescue operations is insufficient to establish rescuer status
• The court is reluctant to extend duty of care to mere bystanders regardless of how horrific the witnessed events
• The test for foreseeability is objective – what the reasonable defendant ought to have foreseen

The decision reinforces the control mechanisms limiting recovery for psychiatric injury established in Alcock and demonstrates judicial reluctance to expand liability in this area.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The defendants did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care to avoid causing him psychiatric injury. The plaintiff was neither a participant in danger, a rescuer, nor entitled to recover as a bystander witnessing horrific events.

Source: McFarlane v E. E. Caledonia Ltd [1993] EWCA Civ 13