Lumley v Gye [1853] EWHC QB J73 (1 January 1853)

Theatre proprietor Lumley sued Gye for maliciously inducing opera singer Johanna Wagner to break her exclusive performance contract with his theatre. The Queen's Bench held (3-1) that an action lies for maliciously procuring breach of a contract for exclusive personal services, establishing the tort of inducing breach of contract.

Facts

The plaintiff, Lumley, was the lessee and manager of the Queen’s Theatre. He had entered into a contract with Johanna Wagner, an opera singer, whereby she agreed to perform exclusively at his theatre for a period from 15th April to 15th July 1852, with a condition that she would not sing elsewhere without his written consent. The defendant, Gye, knowing of this contract, maliciously enticed and procured Wagner to refuse to perform at Lumley’s theatre and to abandon her contract entirely, causing Lumley to suffer financial loss.

Issues

Principal Legal Questions

1. Whether an action lies against a third party for maliciously procuring another person to break a contract for exclusive personal services.

2. Whether such action is limited to cases where the strict relation of master and servant exists, as understood under the Statute of Labourers.

3. Whether the action applies both where the contract is executory (not yet commenced) and where it is in course of execution.

Judgment

Majority Opinion (Wightman, Erle and Crompton JJ)

The Court held, by a majority of three to one, that the declaration was good and that an action lies for maliciously procuring a breach of contract to give exclusive personal services for a time certain. This applies equally whether the employment has commenced or is only in fieri (pending), provided the procurement occurs during the subsistence of the contract and produces damage.

Crompton J reasoned that the right of action for wrongfully interrupting the relation between employer and employed exists wherever there is a binding contract of hiring and service. He stated that the distinction between whether actual service had commenced was unjust and repugnant to common sense, observing that the wrong and injury are the same whether a servant is enticed away before or after commencing work.

Erle J stated that the principle is that procurement of the violation of a right is a cause of action, and when applied to violation of a right arising upon a contract of hiring, the nature of the service contracted for is immaterial. He held that one who maliciously procures damage to another by violation of his right ought to be made to indemnify.

Wightman J held that the action was maintainable both upon general principles of actions on the case and upon authority, finding that the right to maintain such action extends to persons who have contracted for personal service for a time and who have been wrongfully procured to abandon such service.

Dissenting Opinion (Coleridge J)

Coleridge J dissented, holding that the action for procuring a third person to depart from his engagement is founded on the Statute of Labourers and is strictly confined to cases where the employer and employed stand in such relation of master and servant as was within that statute. He argued that a dramatic performer is not a servant within the meaning of the statute, and that in all other cases the remedy for breach of contract is only on the contract itself against those privy to it.

Implications

This case established the tort of inducing breach of contract in English law. The decision confirmed that a cause of action exists against a third party who maliciously and intentionally procures another to break their contract, where damage results. The majority suggested, obiter, that the principle might extend to malicious procurement of breach of any contract, not merely contracts for personal services. This case became foundational authority for economic torts and has been extensively cited and applied in subsequent cases concerning interference with contractual relations, trade union activities, and competition law.

Verdict: Judgment for the plaintiff. The majority held that all three counts of the declaration were good, and that an action lies for maliciously procuring breach of a contract for exclusive personal services.

Source: Lumley v Gye [1853] EWHC QB J73 (1 January 1853)