Letang v Cooper [1964] EWCA Civ 5

Mrs Letang was sunbathing in a car park when Mr Cooper accidentally drove his car over her legs, causing injury. She sued more than three years later, claiming trespass to the person to avoid the three-year limitation period for negligence. The Court of Appeal held that unintentional injury claims are properly classified as negligence, not trespass, and the three-year limitation applied.

Facts

On 10th July 1957, Mrs Letang was sunbathing on grass in a hotel car park in Cornwall. Mr Cooper drove his Jaguar motor car into the car park without seeing her, and the car ran over her legs, causing injury. On 2nd February 1961, more than three years after the accident, Mrs Letang brought an action claiming damages for (1) negligence in driving and (2) trespass to the person.

Issues

The sole question was whether the action was statute-barred. The plaintiff admitted the negligence action was barred after three years under the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954, but argued that trespass to the person was not barred until six years had elapsed under the Limitation Act 1939. The key issue was whether an unintentional personal injury claim fell within the three-year limitation period.

Judgment

Lord Denning MR

Lord Denning held that the distinction between trespass and case is obsolete. He stated that causes of action for personal injuries should now be divided according to whether the defendant acted intentionally or unintentionally, not by direct or consequential damage.

“When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice, clanking their mediaeval chains, the proper course for the Judge is to pass through them undeterred”

Lord Denning explained that where injury is unintentional, the only cause of action is negligence, not trespass. He further held that even if trespass applied, the phrase “breach of duty” in the 1954 Act was wide enough to encompass trespass to the person.

Lord Justice Danckwerts

Danckwerts LJ agreed that the statutory words were plain in meaning and covered trespass to the person. He stated it would be “monstrous if the ghosts of the forms of action (abolished over 90 years ago) compelled us to come to a different conclusion.”

Lord Justice Diplock

Diplock LJ provided detailed analysis of causes of action. He explained that a cause of action is simply a factual situation entitling one person to obtain a remedy from the court against another. The abolition of forms of action in 1873 did not create separate causes of action; rather, “negligence” and “trespass to the person” are merely alternative descriptions of the same factual situation where unintentional injury occurs.

“It does not cease to be the tort of ‘negligence’ because it can also be called by another name. An action founded upon it is none the less an ‘action for negligence’ because it can also be called an ‘action for trespass to the person’.”

Implications

This case is significant for clarifying that unintentional personal injury claims should be characterised as negligence actions, subject to the three-year limitation period. The judgment firmly rejected attempts to revive the old forms of action to circumvent limitation periods. It established that the phrase “breach of duty” in limitation legislation covers all tortious duties, including trespass to the person. The decision prevents plaintiffs from manipulating limitation periods by choosing different labels for the same factual circumstances.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. Judgment entered for the Defendant. The plaintiff’s action was statute-barred as the three-year limitation period for negligence applied, not the six-year period for trespass to the person.

Source: Letang v Cooper [1964] EWCA Civ 5