Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] UKHL 14

Residents claimed against Canary Wharf Ltd in nuisance for dust from construction and interference with television signals caused by a new tower. The House of Lords held that TV interference was not an actionable nuisance and, crucially, only claimants with a proprietary interest in the affected land could sue.

Facts

This case consolidated two sets of actions brought by hundreds of local residents. The first group of claimants, living in the shadow of the Canary Wharf Tower in London Docklands, complained that the construction of the tower, which was completed in 1990, interfered with their television reception. The tower, a tall building of 250 metres, blocked the signal from the BBC’s Crystal Palace transmitter. The second action involved claims for excessive dust and noise created during the construction of the Limehouse Link road. A significant feature of the claims was that they were brought not only by property owners and tenants but also by their family members, lodgers, and others who simply lived in the properties. The Court of Appeal had held that interference with television reception was capable of constituting a nuisance and that occupation of a property as a ‘home’ was sufficient to grant a person standing to sue in private nuisance, without needing a proprietary interest.

Issues

The House of Lords was required to determine two principal legal issues:
1. Can interference with television reception caused by the mere presence of a building be classified as an actionable private nuisance?
2. Who has standing (the right) to sue in private nuisance? Is it restricted to those with a proprietary or possessory interest in the land, or does it extend to anyone who lives on the land, such as a spouse, child, or lodger?

Judgment

The House of Lords allowed the appeal, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal on both key issues.

Issue 1: Interference with Television Reception

The majority held that the interference with television signals by a fixed structure was not an actionable nuisance. Lord Hoffmann, drawing an analogy to the right to a view, reasoned that the law does not protect rights to things that are enjoyed over a wide area and depend on a delicate balance of circumstances. He distinguished this from cases involving noise, dirt, or smells which are ’emissions’ from a defendant’s land.

The general principle is that at common law anyone may build whatever he likes upon his land. If the effect is to interfere with the light, air or view of his neighbour, that is his misfortune. The owner’s right to build can be restrained only by covenant or the acquisition (by grant or prescription) of an easement of light or air for the benefit of windows or apertures on adjoining land.

Lord Goff also concluded that to allow such an action would be an improper extension of the law of nuisance, stating that ‘the private nuisance is concerned with interference with the enjoyment of land and, in the case of television reception, it is the enjoyment of the land that is interfered with… But it does not follow that the interference should be regarded as an actionable nuisance.’

Issue 2: Standing to Sue in Private Nuisance

This was the most significant part of the judgment. The House of Lords reaffirmed the traditional rule that standing to sue in private nuisance is restricted to claimants with a right to the land, i.e., those with a proprietary or possessory interest. This includes freeholders, tenants in possession, and licensees with exclusive possession. The decision explicitly overruled the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Khorasandjian v. Bush [1993] QB 727, which had suggested that merely living in a property as a home was sufficient.

Lord Goff provided the leading speech on this point, arguing that to extend the right to sue to a wider class of people would transform the tort of nuisance from a tort against land into a tort against the person. He stated:

It is for the very reason that the tort is a tort against land that the right to sue in private nuisance has been traditionally, and in my opinion correctly, confined to persons who have a right in the land… to allow a claim in private nuisance to be brought by a person who has no right in the land would mean that the tort of private nuisance is no longer securely anchored to the land.

He argued that extending the category of claimants would lead to uncertainty, open the floodgates for litigation, and complicate the assessment of damages.

Dissenting Judgment

Lord Cooke of Thorndon delivered a powerful dissenting judgment, particularly on the issue of standing. He argued that the traditional rule was outdated and unjust, particularly for spouses (often wives) who live in a home but have no proprietary interest. He favoured a more modern approach where anyone with a ‘substantial link’ to the property, living there as their home, should be able to sue.

I am not convinced that there is any sound reason of policy why the common law should limit the right to sue to those with proprietary or possessory rights… To the ordinary person with a home of his or her own it would seem strange that the law of nuisance gives a remedy for quiet enjoyment to the family of the rich man in his castle but not to the family of the poor man in his apartment.

Implications

The decision in Hunter v Canary Wharf was a landmark in the modern law of nuisance. It firmly re-established the traditional, property-based foundation of the tort, halting a trend towards a more person-focused approach. By requiring a proprietary interest, the judgment provided certainty but was criticised for failing to protect family members and other residents without a formal interest in their home. The ruling clarified that erecting a building that blocks television waves, light, or a view is not, by itself, an actionable nuisance. The case remains a cornerstone authority on the limits of private nuisance and the necessary standing to bring a claim.

Verdict: The appeal by Canary Wharf Ltd and the London Docklands Development Corporation was allowed. Claims based on interference with television signals were struck out, and the right to sue for nuisance caused by dust was restricted to those claimants who could prove a proprietary or possessory interest in the land affected.

Source: Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] UKHL 14