Hunt v Severs [1994] UKHL 4 (28 April 1994)

A woman injured by her partner's negligence, whom she later married, could not claim damages for the voluntary care he provided. The House of Lords held that to allow such a claim would let the tortfeasor indirectly benefit from his own wrongdoing.

Facts

The plaintiff, Jacqueline Hunt, was a pillion passenger on a motorcycle driven by the defendant, Brian Severs, who was her fiancé at the time. Due to the defendant’s negligent driving, an accident occurred in which the plaintiff sustained severe and permanent injuries. After the accident, the defendant provided extensive, gratuitous care for the plaintiff. They subsequently married. The plaintiff brought a claim for damages against the defendant, which included a substantial sum for the past and future nursing care provided and to be provided by the defendant himself. The trial judge awarded damages under this head, and the Court of Appeal upheld the award.

Issues

The central legal issue before the House of Lords was whether a plaintiff who has been injured by a defendant’s tortious act can recover damages for the value of nursing and other services provided gratuitously to the plaintiff by the defendant himself. This questioned the underlying principle of awarding damages for gratuitous care established in earlier cases.

Judgment

The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal, finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages for the services provided by the defendant tortfeasor. Lord Bridge of Harwich delivered the leading judgment. He affirmed the principle from Donnelly v. Joyce [1974] Q.B. 454, that an injured plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value of necessary services provided by a third party, even if provided gratuitously. He explained the theoretical basis for this rule: the plaintiff suffers a loss (the need for care) and the award of damages is intended to be held on trust for the voluntary carer.

In an ordinary case the plaintiff who has been provided with services gratuitously by a relative or friend is entitled to claim the reasonable value of the services from the defendant… because the plaintiff’s need for those services is a loss for which he is entitled to be compensated. In the ordinary case the question for whom the plaintiff is claiming ‘for’… is aptly answered by saying, as Megaw L.J. did, that ‘the plaintiff is claiming ‘for’ the voluntary carer.’ A more accurate way of putting the matter is to say that the plaintiff holds the damages awarded under this head for the benefit of the carer.

However, Lord Bridge distinguished the present case where the provider of the care is also the defendant tortfeasor. He reasoned that the underlying justification for the award—to compensate the carer—disappears in this situation. The defendant cannot be required to pay damages that would ultimately be held for his own benefit.

Reasoning of the Court

The court’s reasoning was based on preventing an absurd and unjust outcome. If the plaintiff were awarded damages for the defendant’s care, the money would be paid by the defendant’s insurers but would belong, in a moral sense, to the defendant himself. This would mean the defendant would effectively profit from his own wrong, which is contrary to public policy.

But where the tortfeasor is himself the provider of the services… the plaintiff’s need has been met without cost to the plaintiff and the provider of the services has suffered no loss in providing them. It is not necessary to create any notional ‘trust’ in his favour… To award the plaintiff damages in a case such as this for the value of the services which have been and will be provided for her by the defendant would be to confer on the plaintiff a benefit which would be derived from the defendant’s tort and would be recoverable from the defendant’s insurers…and ultimately the defendant himself would benefit…This seems to me an extraordinary and unreasonable result.

Lord Bridge concluded that the plaintiff’s need for care had been met, and since the provider was the person responsible for the injury, no compensable loss had arisen in respect of that care. The award under this head was therefore a form of double recovery against the defendant.

Implications

The decision in Hunt v. Severs established a clear and important exception to the general rule allowing recovery for the value of gratuitous care. It clarifies that a victim cannot claim damages for care provided by the tortfeasor. The judgment reinforces the compensatory principle of tort law—that damages are awarded to compensate for loss, not to create a windfall. It prevents a situation where a tortfeasor, through their insurance, indirectly benefits from their own negligence. This has significant implications for personal injury claims arising from domestic or other close relationships where the defendant is also a carer for the injured plaintiff.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The award of £86,325 for the value of past and future services provided by the defendant was set aside.

Source: Hunt v Severs [1994] UKHL 4 (28 April 1994)