Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2015] UKSC 34

A pregnant woman surrendered her hostel tenancy due to smells, then gave birth months later. Waltham Forest found her intentionally homeless. The Supreme Court held that her baby's birth, which would have caused homelessness regardless, broke the causal chain.

Facts

The appellant, Ms Haile, surrendered her tenancy of a bedsitting room in a hostel in Leyton on 25 October 2011, being unhappy about smells in the hostel. The hostel permitted only single occupants. She moved into temporary accommodation in King’s Cross, which ended in November 2011 when she was asked to leave due to overcrowding. On 24 November 2011 she applied to the London Borough of Waltham Forest for accommodation as a homeless person under the Housing Act 1996. She was provided with interim accommodation. On 15 February 2012 she gave birth to a daughter; had she still been in the hostel, she would have been required to leave at that point as it only accommodated single persons.

The authority decided on 1 August 2012, confirmed on review on 31 January 2013, that she was homeless, eligible for assistance, and had a priority need, but that she had become homeless intentionally because she had surrendered the hostel accommodation when it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy it until she gave birth. The reviewing officer treated her impending need to leave on giving birth as irrelevant.

Issues

The central issue was whether the review officer was entitled to be satisfied that the appellant became homeless intentionally within section 191(1) and section 193(1) of the Housing Act 1996, given that, by the date of the review, the birth of her daughter meant she would have been homeless in any event. A subsidiary issue was whether, to allow the appeal, the Court must depart from the House of Lords’ decision in Din v Wandsworth London Borough Council [1983] 1 AC 657.

Arguments

Appellant

Counsel submitted that the birth of the child broke the chain of causation between the surrender of the hostel tenancy and the appellant’s state of homelessness at the date of the inquiry. The purpose of the intentional homelessness provisions is to prevent ‘queue jumping’, and that purpose was not served where the applicant would have been homeless regardless of her earlier conduct. It was contended that the Court should, if necessary, depart from Din.

Respondent

The authority argued that the appellant had become homeless when she vacated the hostel in October 2011, that this was an intentional act, and that she should continue to be treated as intentionally homeless until she obtained settled accommodation. This was said to be consistent with the majority in Din.

Judgment

The Supreme Court (Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Clarke and Lord Reed; Lord Carnwath dissenting) allowed the appeal.

Lord Reed’s reasoning

Lord Reed traced the evolution of the homelessness legislation, noting key developments since Din: the post-Puhlhofer amendments introducing the requirement that accommodation must be reasonable to continue to occupy; the affordability requirements under section 177(3); the decision in Birmingham City Council v Ali [2009] UKHL 36 that ‘continue to occupy’ looks to the future; and the review procedure under section 202 conducted on circumstances existing at the date of review.

He identified two distinct causal questions, drawing on Dyson v Kerrier District Council [1980] 1 WLR 1205: first, under section 191(1), whether the applicant’s ceasing to occupy accommodation was caused by deliberate conduct; second, under section 193(1), whether the applicant’s current homelessness was caused by that intentional conduct. The second question is implicit and necessary to avoid absurd results (e.g. an elderly man denied assistance because of conduct decades earlier).

Lord Reed held that the decision in Din on the relevant date for assessing the elements of intentional homelessness remained good law. However, all members of the House in Din had accepted the need for a continuing causal connection between the deliberate conduct and the current homelessness. Later authorities — R v Brent LBC, Ex p Awua [1996] AC 55, R v Basingstoke and Deane BC, Ex p Bassett, R v Harrow LBC, Ex p Fahia, R v Camden LBC, Ex p Aranda, and Stewart v Lambeth LBC — demonstrated that the causal chain could be broken by events other than the acquisition of settled accommodation, including involuntary events unconnected to the applicant’s earlier conduct.

Applying these principles, Lord Reed concluded that the review decision was deficient because no consideration was given to whether the appellant’s current homelessness was caused by her surrender of the hostel tenancy. Applying the ‘but for’ test from Dyson, the birth of the baby meant that it could not reasonably be said that, but for her deliberate act of leaving the hostel, she would not have become homeless. She had not jumped the queue.

Lord Neuberger

Lord Neuberger initially considered the appeal should be dismissed but was persuaded by Lord Reed’s analysis. He emphasised that the Supreme Court should be slow to depart from prior decisions of the House of Lords, citing Fitzleet Estates Ltd v Cherry [1977] 1 WLR 1345. He agreed that the present case could be distinguished from Din on a ‘fairly fine basis’: here there was an undeniable later event (the birth) that would have caused homelessness anyway, whereas in Din there was only a possibility of a hypothetical future cause.

Lord Carnwath (dissenting)

Lord Carnwath would have dismissed the appeal. He considered the majority’s approach in Din had been settled law for over thirty years, reaffirmed in Awua, and that it expressly rejected the relevance of hypothetical causes. He saw the reviewing officer’s decision as an orthodox application of Din. He distinguished cases such as Bassett and Fahia on the basis that, in those cases, a new event was the actual operative cause of the eventual homelessness, whereas here the birth was not the actual cause of loss of either the original or interim accommodation.

Implications

The decision clarifies the operation of sections 191(1) and 193(1) of the Housing Act 1996 by emphasising two distinct causal inquiries. First, whether the applicant’s deliberate act caused her to cease to occupy accommodation it was reasonable to continue to occupy. Second, whether her current homelessness, at the date of the review, was caused by that intentional conduct.

The judgment confirms that the causal connection between deliberate conduct and current homelessness can be broken not only by the acquisition of settled accommodation but also by an intervening event, including one which means that, but for the earlier deliberate conduct, the applicant would still have become homeless. The purposive rationale — preventing ‘queue jumping’ — does not require penalising applicants whose homelessness would have arisen regardless of their earlier act.

The decision is significant for homelessness practitioners, local housing authorities, and applicants. Reviewing officers must consider not only whether the elements of section 191(1) are satisfied at the historical point of loss of accommodation, but also whether the applicant’s present homelessness is causally connected to that earlier conduct. Where a supervening event would independently have caused homelessness, intentionality may no longer be made out.

The case does not overrule Din but distinguishes it narrowly, on the basis that Din involved only a hypothetical future cause of homelessness, whereas here an actual event (the birth) had occurred. The majority preserves Din‘s holding on the timing of the section 191(1) inquiry, while ensuring that the section 193(1) causal question is properly addressed. As Lord Carnwath’s dissent notes, the precise limits of the principle and its relationship with earlier authority remain a matter on which views differ.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court held, by a majority (Lord Carnwath dissenting), that the review officer had failed to consider whether the appellant’s current homelessness was caused by her earlier surrender of the hostel tenancy. The birth of her child broke the causal connection because, by the date of the review, she would have been homeless in any event.

Source: Haile v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2015] UKSC 34