Greatorex v Greatorex [2000] EWHC 223 (QB) (05 May 2000)

A fire officer suffered psychiatric illness after attending a road accident where his son was the seriously injured, negligent driver. The court held that the son, as a primary victim, owed no duty of care for psychiatric harm caused to his father.

Facts

The claimant, Christopher Greatorex, was a leading fire officer. He was called to attend a serious road traffic accident. Upon arrival, he discovered that the person severely trapped in the crashed vehicle was his own son, John Greatorex, the first defendant. The son had been driving a car belonging to the second defendant, his friend Mr. Harrison, and had caused the accident through his own negligence. The claimant worked at the scene for a considerable time, providing assistance to his injured son until he was freed from the wreckage. As a result of witnessing his son’s injuries and the aftermath of the crash, the claimant developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and was unable to work. He brought a claim against his son and his son’s insurers for the psychiatric harm he had suffered.

Issues

The primary legal issue was whether a person who negligently injures themselves (a primary victim) owes a duty of care to a third party (a secondary victim) not to cause them pure psychiatric injury as a result of witnessing the event. A secondary issue concerned whether policy considerations, particularly the intra-familial nature of the claim, should preclude the existence of such a duty.

Judgment

The High Court, presided over by Cazalet J, struck out the claim. The judge held that no duty of care was owed by the first defendant to the claimant in these circumstances.

Reasoning of the Court

Cazalet J analysed the existing case law on recovery for psychiatric injury, including the landmark cases of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police and White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police. He classified the claimant as a secondary victim, as he was not directly involved in the accident and did not fear for his own safety. The judge noted a crucial distinction between this case and previous authorities: here, the defendant’s negligence had only resulted in his own injury, whereas in cases like Alcock, the defendant’s negligence caused death or injury to other third parties.

The court found no precedent for imposing a duty on a person to protect others from the psychiatric consequences of witnessing them harm themselves. Cazalet J stated:

In my judgment, there are no English authorities which support a claim for damages for psychiatric harm caused by the self-inflicted injuries of the defendant.

The judgment was heavily influenced by public policy considerations. The judge articulated several reasons why it would not be ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose such a duty of care:

First in my judgment it is not fair, just and reasonable in the particular circumstances of this case to impose a duty of care on the First Defendant, as the primary victim, to the Claimant as the secondary victim. There are no English authorities to support such a claim. This is a case where the primary victim has only injured himself. As primary victim he owed no duty of care to a third party.

Furthermore, the court was concerned about the implications of allowing such a claim, citing the ‘floodgates’ argument and the potential for complex litigation arising from family relationships:

Thirdly, a finding for the Claimant would be to open the door to a flood of claims which I do not consider to be desirable… Fourthly, the imposition of a duty of care in such circumstances would be a step on a road which I consider carries with it the prospect of a potentially difficult and uncertain area of the law with plaintiffs testing the line in particular circumstances of the relationship.

The court also considered it ‘unseemly’ to allow a family member to sue another for the consequences of self-inflicted harm, which would complicate family relationships and potentially inhibit recovery.

Implications

The decision in Greatorex v Greatorex establishes a significant limitation on liability for psychiatric injury in the law of tort. It clarifies that an individual does not owe a duty of care to others to avoid causing them psychiatric harm by negligently injuring themselves. The case reinforces the restrictive approach taken by English courts towards claims for pure psychiatric injury, particularly where policy considerations militate against imposing a duty. It demonstrates that even where the traditional control mechanisms for secondary victims (such as close ties of love and affection and proximity in time and space) are met, a claim can still fail if the defendant is a primary victim who has only harmed themselves.

Verdict: The claimant’s claim was struck out.

Source: Greatorex v Greatorex & Anor [2000] EWHC 223 (QB) (05 May 2000)