Four British Christians claimed workplace discrimination for manifesting their faith. Eweida was barred from wearing a visible cross at British Airways; Chaplin from wearing one as a nurse; Ladele refused to register civil partnerships; McFarlane refused to counsel same-sex couples. The Court found violation only for Eweida, holding her employer gave insufficient weight to her religious freedom.
Facts
Four applicants brought claims against the United Kingdom alleging that domestic law failed adequately to protect their right to manifest their religion under Article 9 of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.
Ms Eweida
A Coptic Christian employed by British Airways as check-in staff, Ms Eweida wished to visibly wear a cross at work. British Airways’ uniform code prohibited visible religious jewellery unless pre-authorised. She was sent home without pay from September 2006 until February 2007 when the company revised its policy to permit visible religious symbols.
Ms Chaplin
A Christian nurse employed by an NHS hospital, Ms Chaplin wore a cross on a chain around her neck. The hospital required her to remove or conceal it on health and safety grounds, fearing injury risk when handling patients. She was moved to a non-nursing role which subsequently ceased to exist.
Ms Ladele
A registrar of births, deaths and marriages employed by London Borough of Islington, Ms Ladele held orthodox Christian views that same-sex unions were contrary to God’s law. When the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force and she was designated a civil partnership registrar, she refused to officiate at such ceremonies. Disciplinary proceedings ultimately led to her losing her job.
Mr McFarlane
A Christian counsellor employed by Relate, a private relationship counselling organisation, Mr McFarlane believed homosexual activity was sinful. He refused to commit to providing psycho-sexual therapy to same-sex couples. He was dismissed for gross misconduct after being unable to assure compliance with Relate’s Equal Opportunities Policy.
Issues
The principal legal issues were:
- Whether the visible wearing of a cross or refusing to provide services to same-sex couples constituted a manifestation of religious belief protected by Article 9;
- Whether the possibility of resigning or changing employment negated any interference with Article 9 rights;
- Whether the State fulfilled its positive obligation to secure Article 9 rights against private employers;
- Whether the restrictions imposed were proportionate to legitimate aims;
- Whether there was discrimination contrary to Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9.
Judgment
General Principles
The Court emphasised that freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society. It held that manifestation of religion is not limited to acts mandated by the religion but includes acts with a sufficiently close nexus to the underlying belief.
“In order to count as a ‘manifestation’ within the meaning of Article 9, the act in question must be intimately linked to the religion or belief. An example would be an act of worship or devotion which forms part of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised form. However, the manifestation of religion or belief is not limited to such acts; the existence of a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case.”
Importantly, the Court departed from earlier jurisprudence suggesting no interference exists where an employee can resign:
“Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any interference with the right, the better approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction was proportionate.”
Ms Eweida
The Court found that wearing a visible cross was a manifestation of religious belief attracting Article 9 protection. Although British Airways was a private company, the State had a positive obligation to secure Article 9 rights. The Court held that a fair balance was not struck:
“On one side of the scales was Ms Eweida’s desire to manifest her religious belief… On the other side of the scales was the employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image. The Court considers that, while this aim was undoubtedly legitimate, the domestic courts accorded it too much weight.”
The Court found a violation of Article 9.
Ms Chaplin
While acknowledging the importance of manifesting religion, the Court found the health and safety justification for the restriction was of greater magnitude. The hospital authorities were better placed to make clinical safety decisions, and a wide margin of appreciation applied. No violation was found.
Ms Ladele
The Court accepted that Ms Ladele’s objection was directly motivated by religious beliefs, engaging Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9. However, the local authority’s aim to provide services without discrimination based on sexual orientation was legitimate. The Court stated:
“The Court generally allows the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to striking a balance between competing Convention rights.”
No violation was found, though two judges strongly dissented on grounds of conscientious objection.
Mr McFarlane
The Court found his refusal constituted a manifestation of belief, but noted he voluntarily enrolled in training knowing Relate’s Equal Opportunities Policy. The employer’s action to secure non-discriminatory service provision attracted a wide margin of appreciation. No violation was found.
Implications
This judgment is significant for several reasons:
- It clarifies that Article 9 protection extends beyond mandatory religious requirements to sincere personal manifestations of faith;
- It rejects the notion that the ability to resign employment automatically negates interference with Article 9 rights;
- It establishes that States have positive obligations to secure religious freedom even against private employers;
- It confirms that protecting others from discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation constitutes a legitimate aim capable of justifying restrictions on religious manifestation;
- It recognises that competing Convention rights must be balanced, with national authorities enjoying a margin of appreciation in striking that balance.
The dissenting opinions notably argued for stronger protection of conscientious objection, distinguishing it from religious practice and suggesting it should receive near-absolute protection.
Verdict: The Court found a violation of Article 9 in respect of Ms Eweida (by five votes to two), awarding her EUR 2,000 in non-pecuniary damages and EUR 30,000 in costs. The Court found no violation in respect of Ms Chaplin (unanimously), Ms Ladele (by five votes to two), or Mr McFarlane (unanimously).
Source: Eweida and others v the United Kingdom (applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10)
Cite this work:
To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Eweida and others v the United Kingdom (applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10)' (LawCases.net, April 2026) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/eweida-and-others-v-the-united-kingdom-applications-nos-48420-10-59842-10-51671-10-and-36516-10/> accessed 18 April 2026
