Clunis v Camden and Islington HA [1997] EWCA Civ 2918

A mentally disordered patient sued the health authority for negligence in failing to provide adequate aftercare following his discharge from hospital, claiming this led to him committing manslaughter. The Court of Appeal held his claim was barred by public policy (ex turpi causa) as it was based on his own criminal act, and that the statutory duty under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 did not give rise to a private law duty of care.

Facts

Christopher Clunis, a patient suffering from mental disorder, was detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 at Guy’s Hospital. He was discharged on 24th September 1992, and the defendant health authority became responsible for arranging aftercare services under section 117 of the Act. Dr Sergeant was designated as the responsible medical officer. Despite several attempts to arrange psychiatric assessments, Mr Clunis repeatedly failed to attend appointments. On 17th December 1992, after concerns were raised about his behaviour (including reports of him waving screwdrivers and knives), Mr Clunis killed Jonathan Zito at Finsbury Park tube station in an unprovoked attack. He was convicted of manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility and detained at Rampton Hospital under a hospital order with restrictions.

Issues

1. Ex Turpi Causa

Whether the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, as it was founded upon his own criminal act of manslaughter.

2. Statutory Duty

Whether the statutory obligations under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 gave rise to a common law duty of care enforceable by damages in private law.

Judgment

Ex Turpi Causa

The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff’s claim was essentially based on his illegal act of manslaughter. Although his responsibility was diminished by reason of mental disorder, he must be taken to have known what he was doing and that it was wrong. The acceptance of a plea of diminished responsibility does not remove liability for the criminal act; it merely reduces culpability. The court held that public policy precluded entertainment of the claim unless the plaintiff did not know the nature and quality of his act or that what he was doing was wrong. Since the plaintiff was not found not guilty by reason of insanity, he must be presumed to have known he was doing an unlawful act.

Statutory Duty

The court held that section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 does not create a private law cause of action for damages. The duties imposed require the provision of aftercare services in cooperation with various agencies, and the primary method of enforcement is by complaint to the Secretary of State under section 124, or by judicial review. The court found that Parliament did not intend to create such extensive liability across the wide spectrum of health and social services involved in aftercare. Furthermore, the court held it would not be fair or reasonable to superimpose a common law duty of care on the authority in relation to the performance of its statutory duties to provide aftercare, as these duties are administrative in nature and different from those owed by a doctor to a patient undergoing treatment.

Implications

This case establishes important principles regarding the application of the ex turpi causa doctrine to claimants with diminished responsibility. A conviction for manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility does not exempt a claimant from the application of public policy bars, as the defendant must still be taken to have known his actions were wrong. The case also clarifies that the aftercare duties under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 do not give rise to a private law action for damages, confirming that enforcement is through administrative mechanisms rather than civil litigation. This has significant implications for the scope of liability of health authorities in community mental health care.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The defendant’s application to strike out the claim was successful on both grounds: (1) the claim was barred by public policy under the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio, and (2) the statutory duty under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 did not give rise to a private law cause of action for damages.

Source: Clunis v Camden and Islington HA [1997] EWCA Civ 2918