Chapelton v Barry Urban District Council 30 Jan 1940 [1940] 1 KB 532, CA

A man hired a deckchair and received a ticket containing an exclusion clause after payment. The chair collapsed, causing injury. The court held the ticket was a mere receipt, not a contractual document, so the clause was not part of the contract.

Facts

The plaintiff, Mr Chapelton, hired two deckchairs from the defendants, Barry Urban District Council, at a beach. A notice beside the chairs stated the price and advised hirers to obtain a ticket. Mr Chapelton paid for two chairs and received two tickets from an attendant. He did not read the tickets. On the back of the ticket was printed: “The council will not be liable for any accident or damage arising from the hire of the chair.” One of the chairs subsequently collapsed when Mr Chapelton sat on it, causing him injury. He brought an action for negligence and breach of warranty. The council sought to rely on the exclusion clause printed on the ticket. The county court judge found in favour of the defendants, holding that the plaintiff had been given sufficient notice of the term.

Issues

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the exclusion clause printed on the ticket was incorporated into the contract for the hire of the deckchair. This involved determining two key questions: firstly, when the contract was formed, and secondly, whether the ticket constituted a contractual document or was merely a receipt.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the plaintiff’s appeal, ruling that the exclusion clause was not part of the contract and the council was liable for the injury.

Reasoning of the Court

The Court held that the contract was concluded before the ticket was issued. Slesser L.J. reasoned that the notice displayed by the pile of chairs constituted the offer. The plaintiff accepted this offer by taking a chair and paying the fee. The contract was therefore complete at that point. The ticket, handed to him after this, could not introduce a new term into the already concluded agreement.

A critical part of the judgment was the court’s characterisation of the ticket itself. Slesser L.J. determined that a reasonable person would not expect a ticket of this nature to contain contractual terms. It was viewed as a simple receipt for payment and proof of the right to use the chair for the allotted time. He stated:

In my opinion, this ticket is no more than a receipt, and is quite different from a railway ticket which contains upon it the terms upon which a railway company agrees to carry the passenger.

Mackinnon L.J. and Goddard L.J. concurred. Goddard L.J. added clarity on the sequence of events, reinforcing that the contract was already formed before the ticket was seen:

In this case the appellant paid his money and took his chair before he was given the ticket at all. The contract was then complete, and the condition on the ticket was a subsequent attempt to modify that contract, and therefore had no effect.

The court distinguished this scenario from earlier ‘ticket cases’ (such as those involving railway or cloakroom tickets) where the document was reasonably understood to be the contract itself. Here, the ticket was considered a post-contractual document and a mere voucher.

Implications

This case is a foundational authority on the incorporation of contractual terms, particularly exemption clauses, via unsigned documents. It establishes a crucial principle: for a term to be incorporated, reasonable notice must be given before or at the moment the contract is formed. Any attempt to introduce terms after conclusion of the contract is ineffective. Furthermore, the case highlights that the nature of the document is key; if a document, such as a ticket or receipt, is not one that a reasonable person would expect to contain contractual conditions, any terms printed on it will not be considered part of the contract. This decision serves to protect consumers from unknowingly being bound by onerous terms presented on non-contractual documents received after a contract has been made.

Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The judgment of the county court was set aside and judgment was entered for the plaintiff for the agreed damages of 50l. 10s.

Source: Chapelton v Barry Urban District Council 30 Jan 1940 [1940] 1 KB 532, CA