Publishers Cassell & Co Ltd published a book containing serious libels against Captain Broome, a retired naval officer, despite warnings that the material was defamatory. The jury awarded £15,000 compensatory damages and £25,000 exemplary damages. The House of Lords upheld Rookes v Barnard on exemplary damages and dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's award.
Facts
The appellant, Cassell & Co Ltd, published a book entitled ‘The Destruction of Convoy PQ17’ written by David Irving. The book contained passages which were highly defamatory of Captain Broome, a retired Royal Navy officer who had commanded escort forces during the ill-fated convoy operation. Captain Broome alleged the book accused him of being disobedient, careless, incompetent, indifferent to the fate of merchant ships, and essentially of cowardice.
Before publication, the appellants had been warned repeatedly that the book contained libellous material. Another publisher, William Kimber Ltd, had refused to publish it on grounds that it was ‘a continuous witch hunt of Captain Broome’ and that ‘the book reeks of defamation’. Captain Broome himself had warned Cassell that publication would result in legal action. Despite these warnings, the appellants proceeded with publication.
Issues
Principal Legal Questions
1. Whether the decision in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 correctly stated the law regarding exemplary damages.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to leave the question of exemplary damages to the jury under the second category identified in Rookes v Barnard.
3. Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the assessment of exemplary damages.
4. Whether the total award of £40,000 (including £25,000 exemplary damages) was excessive.
Judgment
The Authority of Rookes v Barnard
The House of Lords firmly rejected the Court of Appeal’s suggestion that Rookes v Barnard was decided per incuriam and could be disregarded. The Lord Chancellor stated:
The fact is, and I hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that, in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers.
Evidence for Exemplary Damages
The House held unanimously that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that the case fell within the second category of Rookes v Barnard. Lord Reid explained the scope of this category:
It is not necessary that the defendant calculates that the plaintiff’s damages if he sues to judgment will be smaller than the defendant’s profit. This is simply one example of the principle. The defendant may calculate that the plaintiff will not sue at all because he has not the money… or because he may be physically or otherwise intimidated.
The Direction to the Jury
The majority held that the trial judge’s direction, though barely sufficient, adequately conveyed the requirement that exemplary damages should only be awarded if compensatory damages were inadequate as punishment. The Lord Chancellor noted the judge’s emphasis on the word ‘additional’ in the question to the jury.
Quantum of Damages
On the question of whether the award was excessive, the House declined to interfere. The Lord Chancellor stated:
I cannot disguise from myself that I found this an extremely difficult point in the case, and have only decided that the verdict should not be disturbed, with great hesitation, because I am very conscious of the fact that I would certainly have awarded far less myself.
Key Legal Principles
The House confirmed that exemplary damages may only be awarded in three categories: (1) oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of government; (2) where the defendant’s conduct was calculated to make a profit exceeding likely compensation; (3) where expressly authorised by statute.
The distinction between ‘aggravated damages’ (compensating for injured feelings) and ‘exemplary damages’ (punishing the defendant) was reaffirmed as fundamental.
Implications
This case is of constitutional significance in affirming the binding nature of House of Lords decisions on lower courts. It clarified the application of Rookes v Barnard to defamation cases and established that the second category encompasses deliberate publication of known or suspected falsehoods for profit, without requiring mathematical calculation of expected profits versus damages.
The decision also highlighted concerns about the costs of defamation litigation, with the Lord Chancellor noting that aggregate costs in the case exceeded £60,000, prompting calls for reform of the system.
Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The jury’s award of £40,000 damages (£15,000 compensatory and £25,000 exemplary) was upheld. The decision in Rookes v Barnard was confirmed as binding authority.
Source: Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome (No.1) [1972] UKHL 3
Cite this work:
To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome (No.1) [1972] UKHL 3' (LawCases.net, December 2025) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/cassell-co-ltd-v-broome-no-1-1972-ukhl-3/> accessed 8 February 2026

