Brutus v Cozens [1972] UKHL 6

The appellant disrupted a Wimbledon tennis match to protest South African apartheid. Magistrates found his behaviour was not 'insulting' under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936. The House of Lords upheld this, ruling that 'insulting' carries its ordinary meaning and whether behaviour is insulting is a question of fact, not law.

Facts

On 28th June 1971, during the annual tournament at the All England Lawn Tennis Club, Wimbledon, the appellant went onto No. 2 Court while a match was in progress, blew a whistle, and threw leaflets around. Nine or ten others then invaded the court with banners and placards. The appellant sat down and had to be forcibly removed by police. The incident lasted two or three minutes. The demonstration was intended to protest against the apartheid policy of the Government of South Africa.

The spectators were upset by the disruption, making loud shouts, gesticulating, shaking their fists, and some attempted to strike the appellant as he was being removed.

Issues

The central issue was whether the appellant’s behaviour constituted ‘insulting behaviour’ within the meaning of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, which provides:

“Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned shall be guilty of an offence.”

The specific question certified by the Divisional Court was: “Whether conduct which evidences a disrespect for the rights of others so that it is likely to cause their resentment or give rise to protests from them is insulting behaviour within the meaning of section 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936.”

Judgment

Lord Reid

Lord Reid held that the meaning of an ordinary English word is not a question of law. He stated:

“The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. If the context shows that a word is used in an unusual sense the Court will determine in other words what that unusual sense is. But here there is in my opinion no question of the word ‘insulting’ being used in any unusual sense.”

He emphasised that it is for the tribunal deciding the case to consider, as a matter of fact, whether the statutory words apply to the proven facts. A decision could only be challenged if it was unreasonable in the sense that no tribunal acquainted with ordinary language usage could reasonably reach it.

Lord Reid rejected the Divisional Court’s definition, stating:

“I do not agree that there can be conduct which is not insulting in the ordinary sense of the word but which is ‘insulting for the purpose of this section’. If the view of the Divisional Court was that in this section the word ‘insulting’ has some special or unusually wide meaning, then I do not agree. Parliament has given no indication that the word is to be given any unusual meaning. Insulting means insulting and nothing else.”

Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest

Lord Morris agreed that the Magistrates’ decision was essentially a decision of fact. He noted that the words ‘insulting behaviour’ permit ready comprehension and the Magistrates properly applied rational judgment and common sense. He rejected the need for a judicial definition:

“I find it unnecessary and indeed undesirable to compose a definition of a word which is in general use and which presents no difficulty of application or understanding.”

Viscount Dilhorne

Viscount Dilhorne emphasised that behaviour evidencing disrespect for others’ rights does not establish that it was insulting. He stated:

“Such behaviour may be very annoying to those who see it and cause resentment and protests but it does not suffice to show that the behaviour was annoying and did annoy for a person can be guilty of annoying behaviour without that behaviour being insulting.”

Lord Kilbrandon

Lord Kilbrandon observed that ‘insulting’ is an ordinary uncomplicated English word and that the drawing of inferences from behaviour is a fact-finding process. He noted that dictionary definitions were unhelpful, quoting Dr Johnson’s preface: “The easiest word, whatever it may be, can never be translated into one more easy.”

Implications

This case established important principles regarding statutory interpretation of ordinary English words. Courts should not substitute judicial definitions for plain statutory language. Whether behaviour is ‘insulting’ is a question of fact for the tribunal, not a question of law for appellate courts to determine by definition. The decision protects against over-broad interpretation of criminal offences and preserves the distinction between behaviour that is merely annoying or causes resentment and behaviour that is genuinely insulting.

Verdict: Appeal allowed. The House of Lords set aside the Divisional Court’s order and restored the Magistrates’ decision to dismiss the information. The appellant’s behaviour was not proven to be ‘insulting’ as a matter of law.

Source: Brutus v Cozens [1972] UKHL 6