Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] EWCA Civ 4 (24 July 1959)

A doctor died attempting to rescue two workers overcome by poisonous fumes in a well due to their employer's negligence. The court held the employer liable, establishing that a duty of care is owed to a rescuer who foreseeably intervenes.

Facts

The defendant company, T.E. Hopkins & Son Ltd, was engaged to clean a well. The managing director, Mr Hopkins, used a petrol-driven pump inside the 50-foot deep, narrow well. He left the pump running for several hours. The following morning, two of his employees, Ward and Wileman, were instructed to descend and continue the work. One after the other, they were overcome by carbon monoxide fumes from the pump’s exhaust and collapsed inside the well. Dr John Baker was summoned to the scene. Despite being warned of the dangerous fumes, he felt compelled to attempt a rescue. He tied a rope around himself and descended into the well, but was himself overcome by the fumes and died. The widows of both the workers and Dr Baker brought actions for negligence against the company. This appeal concerned only the claim by Dr Baker’s executors.

Issues

The Court of Appeal considered three primary legal issues:

1. Whether the defendants owed a duty of care to Dr Baker, a rescuer, who was not present at the time of the initial negligent act.
2. Whether Dr Baker’s deliberate act of entering the well, in full knowledge of the danger, constituted a novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act) which broke the chain of causation stemming from the defendant’s negligence.
3. Whether the defence of volenti non fit injuria (to a willing person, injury is not done) applied, on the basis that Dr Baker had voluntarily assumed the risk of injury.

Judgment

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the defendant’s appeal, affirming the trial judge’s finding of liability. The court held that the defendants were negligent and that their negligence had caused Dr Baker’s death.

Lord Justice Morris

Morris L.J. held that a rescue attempt was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence in creating a situation of extreme peril. He famously stated that a rescuer’s intervention is not to be judged as an independent, disconnected act:

The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law would be otherwise if it did not recognise and praise strange valour. The rescuer’s act is not performed for the benefit of the rescuer. He takes the risk for the benefit of others.

He rejected the argument of novus actus interveniens, stating that the intervention was a probable and natural consequence of the defendant’s wrongdoing. Citing Haynes v. Harwood, he affirmed that danger invites rescue. Regarding the defence of volenti non fit injuria, he held that a rescuer does not freely and willingly consent to the risk created by another’s negligence. Dr Baker was acting under an ‘exigency’ and a ‘compelling moral and social duty’. His action was not ‘truly voluntary’ in the sense required for the defence to succeed.

Lord Justice Ormerod

Ormerod L.J. concurred, finding that Dr Baker’s attempt to save the lives of the trapped men was a direct and foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. He emphasised that in an emergency, one should not be too critical of a rescuer’s conduct. He found no evidence to suggest that Dr Baker’s actions were so unreasonable as to constitute contributory negligence or to break the chain of causation. He agreed that the defence of volenti non fit injuria could not apply, as the rescuer is not consenting to the original breach of duty but is responding to the danger it created.

Lord Justice Willmer

Willmer L.J. also agreed, providing a detailed analysis of the volenti defence in rescue cases. He argued that the doctrine has very limited application in such circumstances:

For my part, I find it difficult to see how the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria can ever be applicable to a ‘rescue’ case… The man who is rescued, in such a case, is a man who is unconscious and in no need of rescue at his own request. The rescuer is a man who has not been invited by the person in peril… The rescuer’s real complaint is not against the man who is in peril, but against him whose negligence has put the man in peril.

He concluded that Dr Baker was a foreseeable rescuer to whom a duty of care was owed. His intervention, being the very thing a reasonable person would expect in such a crisis, could not be a novus actus interveniens. The maxim volenti non fit injuria was inapplicable because Dr Baker, while accepting the risks of the rescue itself, did not consent to the defendant’s prior negligence that necessitated it.

Implications

Baker v T.E. Hopkins & Son Ltd is a landmark decision in the law of tort concerning ‘rescue cases’. It solidifies the principle that ‘danger invites rescue’ and that a defendant who negligently creates a dangerous situation owes a duty of care not only to those directly endangered but also to their foreseeable rescuers. The judgment significantly clarifies and limits the defences of novus actus interveniens and volenti non fit injuria in rescue scenarios, reflecting a public policy that encourages and protects those who attempt to save others from peril caused by negligence.

Verdict: Appeal dismissed. The defendant was found liable for negligence.

Source: Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] EWCA Civ 4 (24 July 1959)