Employees sued for hearing loss from noise exposure below the 85 dB(A) level in a 1972 government Code of Practice. The Supreme Court ruled the employer was not negligent, holding that compliance with such a recognized public standard generally satisfies the common law duty of care.
Facts
The claimants were former employees in the knitting industry who developed noise-induced hearing loss (NIHL) due to exposure to noise from machinery in the defendants’ factories between the 1970s and 1990s. The claimants argued that their employers were negligent and in breach of their common law duty of care. A key factual element was that much of the exposure occurred at noise levels below the action level of 90 dB(A) recommended in the 1972 ‘Code of Practice for reducing the exposure of employed persons to Noise’. The Court of Appeal had held the employers liable for failing to provide hearing protection even where exposure was below this threshold, on the basis that a risk of injury was foreseeable.
Issues
The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was to define the content of the employer’s common law duty of care in relation to noise-induced hearing loss during the relevant period. Specifically, the court had to determine whether a reasonable and prudent employer would have been expected to take measures (such as providing ear protection) for noise exposure levels below the recognised national standard set out in the 1972 Code of Practice. The case turned on whether any foreseeable risk required preventative action, or whether an employer could reasonably rely on the publicly endorsed threshold.
Judgment
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, overturning the decision of the Court of Appeal. Lord Mance, giving the leading judgment, held that the employers were not in breach of their common law duty of care for exposures below the level stipulated in the 1972 Code.
Reasoning of the Court
The Court’s reasoning was grounded in the standard of the ‘reasonable and prudent employer’ judged by the knowledge and standards prevailing at the time. Lord Mance emphasised that the common law does not impose a duty to eliminate every foreseeable risk. Instead, it requires a balancing exercise. He stated:
The question is not whether the risk of some injury was foreseeable. It is whether the employer was negligent in failing to take the steps for which the claimants contend. A balancing exercise is called for, which is sensitive to the risks and costs of and justification for any particular measure, and this is to be undertaken on the basis of the knowledge available and the standards prevailing at the relevant time.
The 1972 Code was seen as a crucial benchmark. It was a tripartite document, agreed by government, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), and the Trades Union Congress (TUC), representing a considered view on what was acceptable practice. The Code established a threshold for action, and it was not reasonable to expect an ordinary employer to go beyond this quasi-public standard without special circumstances. Lord Mance concluded:
The 1972 Code represented an evaluation of the risk and a conclusion on the measures that should be taken to meet it. Only in special circumstances could a reasonable employer be expected to go further. No such special circumstances exist here… The common law should not, in the absence of special circumstances, be held to impose a stricter obligation than the Code. To do so would be to introduce an uncertain and more stringent duty than was identified by the expert and representative body which the government had set up specifically to address and advise on the hazard.
The judgment affirmed that reliance on such a formal, public, and expert-led standard was a valid defence against a claim of negligence for conduct falling within the standard’s recommendations.
Implications
The decision has significant implications for the relationship between common law negligence and statutory or quasi-statutory codes of practice. It provides a degree of certainty for employers by confirming that adherence to a recognised and authoritative industry or public standard will generally discharge their common law duty of care. The ruling counters the notion that any foreseeable risk, however minor, must be addressed to avoid liability. It reinforces the principle that the standard of care is measured by what is reasonable in all the circumstances, including the prevailing public and expert consensus on managing a particular risk. This case serves as a key authority in personal injury and health and safety litigation, particularly where conduct is measured against established codes of practice.
Verdict: The appeal was allowed. The employer was found not to have been in breach of its common law duty of care.
Source: Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd (Ver 2) [2011] UKSC 17 (13 April 2011)
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To cite this resource, please use the following reference:
National Case Law Archive, 'Baker v Quantum Clothing Group Ltd (Ver 2) [2011] UKSC 17 (13 April 2011)' (LawCases.net, September 2025) <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/baker-v-quantum-clothing-group-ltd-ver-2-2011-uksc-17-13-april-2011-2/> accessed 17 November 2025

