Allcard v Skinner 09 Jul 1887 36 Ch D 145, CA

Facts

In 1868, the claimant, Miss Allcard, a woman of approximately 35 years, was introduced to the defendant, Miss Skinner, who was the lady superior of a Protestant institution known as the ‘Sisterhood of St. Mary at the Cross’. The sisterhood was a voluntary association of women dedicated to charitable work among the poor. In 1871, Miss Allcard became a full member of the sisterhood, taking vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. The vow of poverty required members to relinquish all their property, though not necessarily to the sisterhood itself. The rules of the order stipulated that members could not seek external advice without the superior’s permission. Over the course of her membership, Miss Allcard made significant gifts of stock and money to the sisterhood, totalling several thousand pounds, which were transferred to Miss Skinner as the superior. In 1879, Miss Allcard left the sisterhood. She formally revoked her will (which had left her remaining property to the sisterhood) in 1880, but did not immediately seek the return of her gifts. It was not until 1885, nearly six years after leaving, that she commenced an action to recover the property, alleging that the gifts were made under undue influence.

Issues

The case presented two principal legal issues for the Court of Appeal:
1. Were the gifts made by Miss Allcard to the sisterhood voidable on the grounds of undue influence?
2. If undue influence was established, was Miss Allcard’s claim for restitution barred by her delay in bringing the action (laches) and her conduct after leaving the sisterhood (acquiescence)?

Judgment

The Court of Appeal unanimously held that while the gifts were indeed voidable due to a presumption of undue influence, the claimant’s right to recovery was barred by laches and acquiescence. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

Undue Influence

The court, particularly Lindley L.J., famously categorised cases of undue influence into two classes. The first involves actual coercion or fraud. The second, which was relevant here, involves relationships where influence is presumed to exist.

But the second class of cases is a much larger one, and is the one which we have to deal with on the present occasion. In this class of cases it has been considered necessary to shew that the donor had independent advice, and was removed from the influence of the donee when the gift to him was made. The Court has not been content to see that the donor knew what he was doing, but has required to be satisfied that his act was a spontaneous act on his part, and not the result of influence from which he was not protected.

The judges found that the relationship between a novice/member of the sisterhood and the lady superior fell squarely into this second category. The vows of poverty and obedience, combined with the rule against seeking outside advice, created a powerful spiritual and emotional influence over Miss Allcard. This relationship gave rise to a presumption of undue influence, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, Miss Skinner, to demonstrate that the gifts were the result of Miss Allcard’s free and independent will. The court concluded that this burden had not been discharged, as Miss Allcard had not received any competent and independent advice.

Laches and Acquiescence

Despite establishing a prima facie right to have the gifts set aside, the claimant’s action failed due to her significant delay. The court reasoned that after leaving the sisterhood in 1879, Miss Allcard was free from the alleged influence. She consulted her solicitor in 1880 and was advised of her rights, yet she waited until 1885 to bring her claim. This delay was deemed unreasonable.

As Bowen L.J. articulated, the delay had practical consequences:

In the present instance the delay has been very great. The Defendant has been left for years in the belief that the transaction was to stand. The property has been in the meantime in her possession, and has been dealt with by her as her own, or rather as the property of the sisterhood. What is the justification for the delay?… In my opinion, this delay of itself, unless explained, is fatal to the Plaintiff’s case.

The court concluded that by knowingly refraining from asserting her rights for nearly six years, Miss Allcard had implicitly confirmed the gifts. Her inaction amounted to acquiescence, and it would be inequitable to allow her to reclaim the property after such a long period. Therefore, the equitable defence of laches barred her claim.

Implications

The decision in Allcard v Skinner is a landmark authority on the equitable doctrine of undue influence and the related defence of laches. It established a clear framework for identifying ‘presumed undue influence’ arising from relationships of trust and confidence (fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationships), as distinct from cases requiring proof of actual coercion. The judgment clarifies that in such relationships, the law presumes that a substantial gift was not made voluntarily, placing a heavy onus on the recipient to rebut this presumption, typically by showing the donor had independent legal advice. Furthermore, the case serves as a critical illustration of the equitable principle that ‘equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights’ (vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit). It demonstrates that even where a transaction is voidable, the right to rescind can be lost through unreasonable delay and acquiescence, thereby providing certainty and protecting defendants from stale claims.

Verdict: The appeal was dismissed; the claimant’s action to recover the property failed due to laches and acquiescence.